

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


REPORTING OFFICE CLEVELAND	OFFICE OF ORIGIN LOS ANGELES	DATE 7/29/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 7/29/71
TITLE OF CASE DANIEL ELLSBERG		REPORT MADE BY SA [REDACTED]	TYPE mk
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE -- X	

REFERENCES

Boston airtel to the Bureau, 7/26/71.
Cleveland teletype to the Bureau, Boston, and Los Angeles,
7/29/71. (u)

- P -

ADMINISTRATIVE



ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					<input type="checkbox"/> NONE	ACQUIT- TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		
							PENDING OVER ONE YEAR <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/>

APPROVED <i>[Signature]</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
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COPIES MADE: 2 - Bureau (65-74060) [REDACTED] 1 - Cleveland (65-3521) [REDACTED]	65-74060-816 EX-10A 8 AUG 2 1971 REC REC
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Dissemination Record of Attached Report				Rotations
Agency				[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.				
By				

7/180

COVER PAGE

14

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of:

SA [REDACTED]

Office:

Cleveland

Date:

7/29/71

Field Office File #:

65-3521

Bureau File #:

65-74060

Title:

DANIEL ELLSBERG

Character:

ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis:

Records of [REDACTED] show [REDACTED] currently listed to [REDACTED] well known Cleveland industrialist and Soviet apologist, as well as to Chesapeake & Ohio and Baltimore & Ohio Railroads, both of which have [REDACTED] 0110

- P -

DETAILS

Records of [REDACTED] indicate that number [REDACTED] is currently listed to [REDACTED] well known Cleveland [REDACTED] and to the Chesapeake & Ohio and Baltimore & Ohio Railroads; [REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE CLEVELAND	OFFICE OF ORIGIN LOS ANGELES	DATE 7/29/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 7/29/71
TITLE OF CASE DANIEL ELLSBERG		REPORT MADE BY SA [REDACTED]	TYPE mk
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - X	

REFERENCES

Boston airtel to the Bureau, 7/26/71.
 Cleveland teletype to the Bureau, Boston, and Los Angeles,
 7/29/71. (u)

- P -

ADMINISTRATIVE

[REDACTED]




ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					<input type="checkbox"/> NONE	ACQUIT- TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		
							PENDING OVER ONE YEAR <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/>

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE COPIES MADE: 6 - Bureau (65-74060) 1 - Cleveland (65-3521)	DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW <div style="height: 100px; border: 1px solid black;"></div>
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Dissemination Record of Attached Report				Notations
Agency	Request Recd.	Date Fwd.	How Fwd.	By

COVER PAGE

CV 65-3521



B*
COVER PAGE

1 - Mr. W. R. Hannall
1 - Mr. J. R. Wagoner

8/3/71

th
Airtel

To: SAC, Cleveland (65-3521)

From: Director, FBI (65-74060) *EX 104 REC-59 816*

MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

ReCVrep of SA [redacted] dated 7/29/71, and
Buairtel 7/30/71.

Resubmit a report setting forth basis for investigation as outlined in referenced Bureau airtel and include information set forth in referenced Cleveland report. In submitting this report, designate two copies for Los Angeles as origin and two copies for Boston in view of Grand Jury proceedings being held in the Boston area.

JRW:mlb *mlb*
(5)

NOTE:

Am
Cleveland submitted a report identifying a telephone number called by Gold of "The New York Times" during a period "The New York Times" employees were preparing material for the release of classified information furnished by Ellsberg.

MAILED 20

AUG - 3 1971

FBI

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

53 AUG 9 1971

TELETYPE UNIT

LEDJ. mlb

JUL 29 1971

TELETYPE

STATE 135, 144, 146

URGENT 7-29-71

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LEGAT TOKYO NR. 154

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Gale
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

[REDACTED]

END PAGE ONE

TELETYPE TO: JUL 1971

FTB

53 AUG 9 1971

NO. 101111 FOR THE DIRECTOR

NOT RECORDED

183 AUG 6 1971

DISN


[REDACTED]

65-74041-101111
[Handwritten signatures and notes]

PAGE TWO

R

END APGE TWO



RECEIVED: 7:44AM TMT

CC-MR. BRENNAN
3RD CC: MR. DAY,

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 30 1971

TELETYPE

NR 002 CV CODE

9:10 PM NITEL 7/30/71 RJB

TO DIRECTOR (65-74060) (ATTN: DID)

FROM CLEVELAND (65-3521) 2P

Mr. Sullivan____
Mr. Mohr____
Mr. Bishop____
Mr. Brennan____
Mr. Callahan____
Mr. Casper____
Mr. Conrad____
Mr. Dalbey____
Mr. Gale____
Mr. Ponder____
Mr. Rosen____
Mr. Tavel____
Mr. Walters____
Mr. Soyars____
Tele. Room____
Miss Holmes____
Miss Gandy____

RE MC LEK (NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE), OO: LA

RE CV TELETYPE TO BUREAU, JULY TWENTY NINE, LAST,
AND PHILADELPHIA TELETYPE TO CV, JULY THIRTY, INSTANT.
REFERENCED PHILADELPHIA TEL REFLECTS CONTACT WITH

FATHER-IN-LAW OF

NOT MADE AS SUPER ON

EXTENDED VACATION AND WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

FOR INFO OF NEWARK, [REDACTED] WAS GUEST HOTEL CONTIN-
ENTAL, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, MARCH TWENTY ONE, LAST AND
EFFORTS TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW RE REASON FOR BEING AT HOTEL
NEGATIVE AS [REDACTED] CURRENTLY ON VACATION AND ALLEGEDLY ENROUTE
TO [REDACTED] AS OF JULY THIRTY, SEVENTY ONE. RECONTACTS WITH
COLLEGE [REDACTED] REFLECTS [REDACTED] ON LEAVE FOR ONE YEAR AND
END PAGEONE

AUG 4 1971

~~Copy to [REDACTED]~~
~~Adm. [REDACTED]~~

PAGE TWO

CV 65-3521

WILL BE AT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AFTER SEPTEMBER ONE, NEXT. SOURCE AT [REDACTED]
WOOSTER STATED [REDACTED] IS COOPERATIVE AND NOT KNOWN TO PARTI-
CIPATE IN ANTIWAR MOVEMENT OR SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS. [REDACTED]
OFFICIALS HAVE NO OTHER ADDRESS FOR [REDACTED] OTHER THAN IN
CARE OF [REDACTED]

DETERMINED INFORMATION RE PURPOSES OF INQUIRY RE

[REDACTED] WILL FOLLOW FOR NEWARK IN SEPARATE COMMUNICATION.

UACB, [REDACTED] WILL BE CONTACTED UPON ARRIVAL AT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AFTER SEPT. FIRST, SEVENTYONE.

BOSTON, LA, NEWARK, AND PHILADELPHIA ADVISED BY MAIL.

P

END -

MGS FBI WASHDC

TU AND CUL

cc - C. D. Brennan

8/4/71

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. R. Wagoner

Airtel

To: SACs, Newark
Los Angeles

From: Director, FBI (65-74060) — 817

MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

ReCYtel 7/30/71, setting forth lead for Newark to interview [redacted] upon his arrival at [redacted] subsequent to 9/1/71.

In view of information developed at [redacted] indicating [redacted] not known to have participated in anti-war movement or similar organizations, no attempt should be made by Newark to contact [redacted] for the purpose of ascertaining the reason for his residence at the Continental Hotel, Cambridge, Massachusetts. No further inquiries regarding [redacted] need be made.

1-Boston
1-Cleveland
1-Philadelphia


JRW:mlb *MLB*
(10)

NOTE:

Prior investigation revealed that [redacted] was a guest at the Hotel Continental, Cambridge on 3/21/71, which was during the period that Susan Sheehan stayed at this hotel and engaged in the duplication of classified documents in the Boston area. Boston previously identified individuals who stayed at the Continental Hotel at the same time for the purpose of determining if any of these individuals had a connection with Sheehan.

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Breunann, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

61 AUG 10 1971
F-406



NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Airtel to SAC, Newark

Re: Mc Lek

65-74060

NOTE CONTINUED

[REDACTED] has been identified as connected with the [REDACTED] and has since 7/19/71, been on an extended vacation. He is reported, however, to be scheduled to arrive at [REDACTED] some time after 9/1/71. Newark has been requested to interview [REDACTED] upon his arrival at Cape May.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 7/21/71

FROM : Legat, London (65-1421) (RUC)

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

ReBucab 7/16/71 and Loncab 7/20/71.

On 7/20/71 [redacted] was interviewed at Oxford, England, by [redacted]. Attached are five copies of LHM reporting results of the interview.

- ③ - Bureau (Encs. 5)
 - 1 - Foreign Liaison Desk
 - 1 - London
- ACM:cm
(5)

EX-105

REC-47 65-1421-818
8-4
16 JUL 29 1971

1 AAS/ISTD
1 BS
1 LP
JED rnp 7/30/71
JW/1/71

Deleted Copy Sent [redacted]
by [redacted]
Per CIA [redacted]

57 AUG 11 1971

NAT. INT. SEC.

EX-105
65-1421-818

FBI

Date: 7/23/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

AIR MAIL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)

Attn: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (105-27952) (P)

SUBJECT: MC LEK
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE
OO: Los Angeles

Re Bureau airtel to Los Angeles, dated 7/21/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of "The Day Loc Tien Was Pacified", author DANIEL ELLSBERG, February 1968, Rand Number P-3793; one copy of "Some Lessons from Failure in Vietnam", author DANIEL ELLSBERG, July 1969, Rand Number P-4036; one bibliography of publications by DANIEL ELLSBERG.

On 7/23/71,

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, made available the above three described enclosures which are unclassified material. [redacted] advised that the two papers, P-3793 and P-4036, were research papers written in their entirety by DANIEL ELLSBERG on his own time and are related to Government contracts. [redacted] advised that it is Rand's policy to assist their researchers in getting papers published and in this manner handle the printing of the papers and their assembly into documents. The "P" designation refers to the fact that it is a private paper of the researcher. Inasmuch as both of these papers were related to Government contracts, being worked on by the Rand Corporation, both papers were submitted to Rand for their clearance before being made public. Rand distributes these papers to a number of university libraries throughout the United States and Europe.

Bureau (Encl. 3)
2 - Los Angeles

ENCLOSURE

RFK/lsp

ENCLO. BEHIND FILE

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

NAT.

er

59 AUG 11 1971

LA 105-27952

Concerning the enclosed bibliography of publications by DANIEL ELLSBERG, the designation "D", followed by numbers and the titles of the documents indicates that these are documents or papers that were prepared for the Rand Corporation by DANIEL ELLSBERG in connection with his work and were not disseminated outside of the Rand Corporation. They are primarily classified documents.

The three enclosures to this airtel were all that were made available to the Los Angeles Office, and therefore, Los Angeles will retain no copies of the above three enclosures.

Ellsberg
publications

PUBLICATIONS BY DANIEL ELLSBERG

Prior to 1963

- P-2173 ^{AT-6P} Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
- P-2183 " " The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choices
- ✓ D-6628 Comments on Hitchcocks IICBM Four Requirements
- ✓ D(L)-6920 } Type II Deterrence Kahn and Con
- D(L)-7233 } The Emergency Actions File (TS-2030)
- D(L)-7234 } The PACOM Response to the JCS (Execute Message) (TS-2031)
- D-7247 } The Possibility of Unauthorized (Execute) Messages
- ✓ D-7772-1 Minutes of the Monterey Seminar on Active and Passive Defense I
Alternative Military Postures for National Security
- ✓ D-7773-1 Minutes of the Monterey Seminar on Active and Passive Defense II
Protecting Cities Without Active Defense
- ✓ D-7774-1 Minutes of the Monterey Seminar on Active and Passive Defense III
The Spectrum of Central War Moves
- ✓ D-7775-1 Minutes of the Monterey Seminar on Active and Passive Defense IV
Policy on Civil Defense and Recuperation
- ✓ D-7776-1 Minutes of the Monterey Seminar on Active and Passive Defense V
Budgets for National Security
- ✓ D-7777-1 Minutes of the Monterey Seminar on Active and Passive Defense VI
Running the Nation in a Crisis
- ✓ D-7778-1 Minutes of the Monterey Seminar on Active and Passive Defense VII
Stability and Provocativeness of Central War Actions
- ✓ D-7779-1 Minutes of the Monterey Seminar on Active and Passive Defense VIII
Concluding General Session
- ✓ D-7838 Strategic Objectives and Command Control Problems
- ✓ D-7947 Possible Strategic Objectives and Alternative Military Policies
- D-8140 } Trends in Strategic Planning for General War - no listing
- D(L)-8458 } Latest Trend in Strategic Planning (TS-2160) no listing
- ✓ D-8469 Some Comments on Kaufmann's 2-205
- ✓ D-8486 Should Fixed, Primary Command Sites Be Hardened. Comments on
WSEG-50. Enclosure C.
- ✓ D-9857 Paramilitary Operations

1963

P-2705 CA Vagueness Decision: A Rejoinder.

✓D-11685-ISA Notes on ISA NATO Seminar

1964

✓D-12995-PR Risk, Ambiguity, and Decision

CS 111-98 PR Survey of Current Literature

Problem and Research in ()

PUBLICATIONS BY DANIEL ELLSBERG

1968

Titles

- ✓P-3793 The Day Loc Tien was Pacified Feb.
- P-3683 < The Theory and Practice of Blackmail
- P-3965 < Kehn on Winning in Vietnam: A Review
- ✓D-16722-ARPA/AGILE Some Prospects and Problems in Vietnam
- ✓D-16823-ISA Impact of the VC Winter-Spring Offensive
- ✓D-16914-ISA Effects of the Tet Offensive in III and IV Corps
- ✓D-17283-ARPA/AGILE 'The National Security Bureaucracy and Military Intervention,' by R. Barnet
- ✓D-17284-ARPA/AGILE 'The Strategy of Intervention,' by R. Thompson, J. McDermott
- ✓D-17285-ARPA/AGILE 'The Effects of Our Involvement in Vietnam on Future U.S. Patterns of Intervention,' by J. C. Thomson, Jr., E. Reischauer
- ✓D-17286-ARPA/AGILE 'Some Thought on Progressive Involvement,' by A. Yarmolinsky, T. Draper
- ✓D-17287-ARPA/AGILE 'Military Intervention, Political Involvement, and the Unlessons of Vietnam,' by S. P. Huntington
- ✓D-17288-ARPA/AGILE 'Vietnam and American Foreign Policy,' by S. Hoffman (u)
- ✓D-17843-ARPA/AGILE Some Lessons from Failure in Vietnam (u)
- ✓D-17892-ARPA/AGILE Betting on the Third Wave (u)

1969

- ✓P-4029 OK Public Goods and Public Bads: Comments on Mancur Olson's 'The Optimal Institutional Mix'
- P-4036 OK Some Lessons from Failure in Vietnam July
- ✓D-18408-PR Time-Preference and Savage Type Axioms
- ✓D-18933-AGILE Views of Tran Ngoc Chau on GBN/NLF Talks
- ✓D-18958-ARPA/AGILE Critical Postures on U.S. Decision-making in Vietnam: Multiple Choice. Working Notes on Vietnam No. 2.
- ✓D-18963-ARPA/AGILE U.S. Aims and Leverage in Vietnam, 1950-65. Working Notes on Vietnam No. 3.
- ✓D-19127-ARPA/AGILE Vu Van Thai on U.S. Aims and Intervention in Vietnam, Working Notes on Vietnam, No. 4.

1969 (cont'd)

- ✓D-19128-ARPA/AGILE U.S. Support of Diem: Comments by Vu Van Thai, Working Notes on Vietnam No. 8.
- ✓D-19129-ARPA/AGILE U.S. Policy and the Politics of Others. Working Notes on Vietnam No. 3.
- ✓D-19134-ARPA AGILE Communists and Vietnamese: Comments by Hoang Van Chi, Working Notes on Vietnam No. 7.
- ✓D-19135-ARPA/AGILE Confucians and Communists: Hoang Van Chi on the Relations of Marxist to Confucian Concepts, and Cultural Susceptibility to Communism: Working Notes on Vietnam, No. 5.
- ✓D-19136-ARPA/AGILE On Pacification: Comments by Thai and Ellsberg, Working Notes on Vietnam No. 6.
- ✓D-19205-ARPA/AGILE Infeasible Aims and the Politics of Stalomato, Working Notes on Vietnam No. 9.

1970

- ✓D-19807-ARPA/AGILE Revolutionary Judo: Working Notes on Vietnam No. 10.

PREFACE

From December 1966 until I left Vietnam (with hepatitis) in June 1967, I was Special Assistant to Deputy Ambassador William Porter in Saigon, in his capacity as head of all U.S. civil field operations in Vietnam (OCO: Office of Civil Operations). My job was primarily to make field evaluations of progress and programs for Porter personally, looking in particular at the interaction between military and civil operations.

One morning in December I was talking to Wade Latham, Director of Operations of OCO, who was leaving that afternoon for briefings in Washington, encouraging him to be very frank and realistic in his description before Congress and elsewhere of the prospects (in my opinion, very limited) for pacification in the coming year. I emphasized the need for a minimal, prior level of security from the VC if pacification work were to be effective: and the fact that most areas where pacification work was being attempted did not now have even this minimally adequate security from VC attack, harassment or penetration.

The ultimate aim of RD work was to evoke public participation with the government in efforts of self-protection, to raise the level of security further and make it lasting, without the continual dense presence of U.S. or ARVN regulars. Even in areas of relative security -- usually based on local saturation with friendly regular forces -- there had been little success in inducing people to make this commitment to the GVN or to resisting the VC: because the GVN did not attract their support (and RD Cadre performance rarely inspired a change in their attitudes) and because security from VC retaliation was only relative and looked temporary to most people. But in the "contested" areas where Cadre tended to be assigned, the VC presence was often so obtrusive that it was quite hopeless to persuade people to risk their necks, rather than to cooperate with both sides (depending on which side was represented at the moment by "the man with the gun:" generally, away from outposts and main roads, the VC).

When I finished the story, Lathram urged me to write down just what I had told him, fast, so he could take it to Washington and show it around to illustrate concretely why progress in pacification was slow (or often, non-existent). In the next couple of hours, using notes I had made at the time, I wrote as fast as I could, and managed to hand the memo that follows (as it appears) to Lathram at the airport. Which is by way of explanation how a memo as anecdotal and personal as this came to be written in the Deputy Ambassador's office. (There were those in Washington who needed an explanation, in face of their "Why are you doing this?" or "Whose side are you on?" reactions to its substance and tone. But I should also mention that I never got any criticism from my superiors in Saigon or Washington for writing or circulating -- as I did to old friends -- a memo that was not exactly supportive of official optimism.)

Readers not familiar with the Revolutionary Development concept may need some terms explained, though they are becoming fairly familiar in the newspapers. "Revolutionary Development" (RD) is an American name for what the French call "pacification" and the Vietnamese call "Rural Construction:" coined by White House aides at Honolulu, because it sounded less French and more forward-looking. An RD Cadre team is a 59-man group specially trained to carry out various organizational activities in a hamlet to fulfill the six criteria (described in the memo) of a "pacified" or "secured" hamlet: an achievement symbolized on the RD maps in distinct and province offices by marking the hamlet (or road, or area) blue, as distinct from red -- "VC-controlled" -- or white, yellow or green -- various colors for "contested." (I have described the concept and strategy of RD in detail, with a critique, elsewhere.) PF are Popular Force soldiers, local, lightly trained and equipped militia operating in squads and platoons at village level; RF are Regional Force, better trained and equipped commanded at province level and operating in a district, generally in companies; ARVN are the regular units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, organized in divisions.

A postscript: On a visit a few weeks later, I checked the quotes in this piece with the deputy district advisor who had accompanied me; his memory confirmed my notes. He told me that the new hamlet chief was not sleeping in the hamlet (a sure sign -- though a common occurrence -- of security inadequate for the achievement of any of the purposes of RD).

The district advisor said that Minister of RD Thang had put heavy pressure on the district chief to come up with his quota of completed hamlets by the end of the year. The district chief wanted to declare three more hamlets pacified ("blue") within two weeks, by running RD Cadre through them fast (mainly taking a census). Of these, one wasn't in bad shape, one was contested, and one -- a hamlet in the (VC) village of Ph^oúc Lam mentioned in the story -- was simply VC-controlled. "I told him I had had it," the advisor said. "He could tell Thang whatever he wanted, but I wasn't going to go along with it, with those last two hamlets." He refused to certify them; in the end, I believe, ceremonies were held for the first two but not the last. I don't know what has become of them since then: or of Lộc Tiên.

THE DAY LỘC TIÊN WAS PACIFIED

Daniel Ellsberg*

The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

On Friday morning, 9 December 1966, three neighboring hamlets in Cần Giuộc District of Long An Province were being formally declared "pacified," joining the fifteen other "secure" hamlets of the 183 hamlets in the district. Revolutionary Development Cadre teams had been working in the three hamlets for about ten weeks, and although the U.S. district advisors were dubious that anything very fundamental had been accomplished or that the area could reasonably be called "secure," the District Chief was satisfied that the six-point pacification criteria had been met and the cadre could move on.

"They're anxious to finish up their 1966 program so they can get started on the 1967 hamlets," the major who was the MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) district advisor said. There was to be a formal ceremony at the main hamlet, Lộc Tiên II, to celebrate the acceptance of the hamlets into the "secure" category, with all the district and village officials and the MACV and USAID district advisors taking part. I went along with an interpreter and the assistant MACV advisor, a captain, to talk to some of the villagers and cadre.

At 0820 it was still raining as we got into jeeps in the district headquarters compound. An old woman was keening loudly in a corner of the courtyard, where some newly painted coffins rested on sawhorses in a shed. She was a relative of one of the Regional Force

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. Papers are reproduced by The RAND Corporation as a courtesy to members of its staff.

(RF) soldiers killed in an ambush the morning before. Other women had chanted and cried, standing around the coffins in the light of candles, through most of the night. In the candlelight -- and now, on a dark morning -- the colors of the wooden boxes were very gay; orange with painted flowers. There were six of them.

The ambush had taken place on the main road from Saigon, a few kilometers south of the district headquarters. A Regional Force platoon, on a mission to clear some dirt roadblocks the VC had put up the night before, walked past a Popular Force outpost without checking in at it -- they assumed the PF had already cleared the road ahead -- and 200 meters further on at 0900 on a bright morning they were hit by a VC company. "I missed that one by ten minutes," the district advisor said. "I was on my way by jeep -- about ten minutes away -- to visit the schoolhouse below the PF outpost. That's where the roadblocks were, at the schoolhouse, and that's where the ambush was. I heard the firing and stopped at the outpost.

The old woman was rocking on her heels on the muddy ground, and she gestured rhythmically with one hand as if, in her wailing, she were lecturing to the little girl facing her. But the little girl was looking past her expressionlessly, once in a while turning her eyes to the woman, whose voice rose and fell and sobbed without stopping. The assistant advisor said: "I've been trying to get the district chief to move the mortuary out of this courtyard. I think it's depressing to the troops that sleep here. And this has been happening too much."

After a while of sitting in the jeep I asked what we were waiting for. "After we came out, the district chief got word that the force he sent out to clear the area between here and the hamlets wasn't through yet" I was told.

"You mean you need a special clearing operation to get to these pacified hamlets?"

"Oh, I doubt if we'll have any trouble today," the district advisor said. "With all the troops they'll have in that village

during the ceremony, with all the officials there, I'm only taking a pistol." His assistant, in the other jeep, shrugged and tapped his M-16. I got out of the jeep and came back with a weapon. About this time the sun came out and a radioman announced that the clearing operation was finished. The district chief and his party emerged from his office, we all shook hands, and the convoy set out.

The three hamlets were a few kilometers northwest of the district town, along red dirt roads. By the time we got there it was very hot. The entrance to the main hamlet was marked by a high wooden arch over the road with the name of the hamlet -- Ấp Lộc Tiên II -- neatly painted across the top: this was one of the accomplishments of the RD cadre. [It fell in the category of "self-help and development projects" -- though the people were supposed to do them themselves (along with any fortifications) to give them a sense of commitment -- which was fourth of the six criteria for a pacified hamlet.] "Their other big contribution was to build the hamlet 'fortifications,'" the major said. "See that berm over there?" He pointed to an earth embankment about three feet high, stretching out from the road and curling around a clump of bamboo in the distance.

"What good is that?"

"Useless. They worked hard on it, I'll say that. The villagers couldn't care less. They know it's ridiculous. It's over a thousand meters long: a real Chinese Wall. It would take a battalion to man it, for it to mean anything, and what they've got is twelve PF. But it helps meet one of the six-point criteria." (The first one: area cleared of VC, and local defenses set up.)

"As a matter of fact, it's been more of a help to the VC," the assistant advisor added. "The Claymore mine they set off last week, one that killed five RD Cadre, they set up on top of that berm -- it's just the right height -- next to the road pointing down toward the hamlet, with the wires trailing outside. The Cadre were just leaving the hamlet, coming up to that sign."

"Are you saying that five Cadre were killed here last week?" I asked.

"They weren't the only ones. They've had six Claymores here in the last couple of months, four detonations. But the worst thing was last week the VC came into the other two hamlets, just down the road from this one, and kidnapped the two hamlet chiefs that had just been elected; and their families." (Election of hamlet officials is the sixth "pacification criterion.")

How could they be holding the ceremony this week, then?

"Oh, the Cadre held another election quick, and the assistant hamlet chiefs were elected chief."

"Aren't they afraid?"

"Don't worry, they won't be sleeping here at night; they'll be in the district town."

The convoy had stopped at a cluster of building, decorated for the day with banners and slogans. There were a lot of soldiers of different types about; the district advisor pointed out there were even some troops from the 46th Regiment on duty. On one side of the road, classrooms filled with children surrounded a nest courtyard. The ceremony was being held across the road in a garden so filled with flowers and vines that the faces of the officials were hidden when they sat down on the porch. In a corner next to the porch stood the village notables, flanked by a double row of little girls, sitting up straight in white so-dais. They were all pretty, all with long black hair combed smooth down their backs. The district chief and the MACV and USAID advisors took their places under the banners and the vines, and a Cadre leader in black pajamas stepped up to a microphone. The assistant advisor and I watched from across the street, and the little girls stole side glances at us as the Cadre leader began the morning's speeches; the district policeman saw this and smiled. It was a cheerful occasion.

The interpreter translated for us for a few sentences -- "When we came to this hamlet ten weeks ago, there were six VC agents in the hamlet infrastructure....," the speaker was saying (ridding the hamlet of VC "infrastructure" -- agents, informers, political organization --

is third among the pacification criteria). Then we turned back down the road to talk to some of the villagers. First, we visited the new outpost, My Loc, just in back to one side, of the house where the ceremony was being held.

"Don't judge other outposts around here by this one," the MACV captain said. "This is one of the best in Vietnam." It was built as the base for an RF company. We had to work our way through an elaborate maze of barbed wire to reach the moat surrounding the thick mud walls. Inside, the bunkers were covered not only with the usual sandbags but with concrete. Narrow slits in the bunker walls looked out over cleared fields of fire; I looked through one to see the house where the pacification ceremony was going on, the black hair against white silk showing through gaps in the vine leaves. In the center of the little fort was a heavy cement communications bunker; next to it, the familiar wooden arrow, studded with cans of kerosene-soaked sand, pivoted horizontally to point out the enemy to planes during a night attack. The sergeant who had left his hammock to show us around was proud of the post, which was just finished and which Premier Ky had visited ten days earlier. He said it would take more than one battalion of VC, maybe two, to overrun it.

"They're safe enough in here," the captain said. "I think they could hold out in here against 500 men. Of course, whether they make the people around here feel much safer depends on how much the RFs move around outside the barbed wire. Too many posts like this, the VC could walk into the other end of the hamlet whenever they felt like it." Apparently, the presence of the RFs had not deterred the VC from the dual kidnapping of the week before, a few hundred meters down the road.

The ruins of the old post that this had been built to replace lay just across the road, again in close sight of the ceremony. It had been manned by PFs. One night last spring the VC had overrun it, and the reaction force the next morning -- our interpreter had been part of it -- had found the PFs inside beheaded, lying in a row, with their dependents, wives and children, lying by the opposite wall where

they had been machine-gunned. That had happened in this hamlet just nine months before. It would be much harder to destroy this new fort, which had begun construction soon after; but I wondered, looking at the grass-covered ruins of the old PF post (the interpreter warned me not to step inside; it had been mined) how long it really took before the local people unlearned lessons like that.

The houses of the hamlet were widely spaced; the first one we came to was about fifty yards down the road. We passed through a garden, and said good day to a middle-aged woman on the porch, surrounded by children; she was joined by her husband, about 45, wearing shorts. As we asked questions, an old woman peered out at us, through a door, from the darkness of what seemed a very large room.

I asked, through the interpreter, what the RD Cadre had done for them. "They came one afternoon, drank tea, and took a census, the interpreter translated. Had the Cadre ever talked politics, or asked about grievances? "No." Was that all the Cadre had done? "They formed everyone into groupings, organizations." Which organization did the husband belong to? "The men's organization." ("Organizing the people" by interest-groupings, and by age and sex, for purposes of self-defense, was the fifth task the Cadre must fulfill to meet the six-point criteria for a "pacified" hamlet.) What was the purpose of that organization. "When the Cadre came to drink tea, they just told him, 'You are in the men's organization.' He doesn't know what the purpose of it is."

Did the Cadre stay at night in the village? "No. They came in the morning. About five o'clock he would see them wandering back, along the road; he doesn't know where they went." Had VC visited the village in the past year? "Often." Did he think they still would, with the RF post so near? "Perhaps not. But they had come into the neighboring hamlets last week and taken off the hamlet chiefs."

Did he think the new hamlet chief would sleep in the hamlet at night? "Not now; now he sleeps in the district town. But that is because he is not yet confirmed by the Province Chief. When he is

confirmed by the Province Chief he will sleep in the hamlet." Why so? "After he is confirmed by the Province Chief, if he is killed or kidnapped by the VC his family will get death benefits. But not now."

Reflecting on that, we moved on to two houses next to each other, another fifty yards down the road. In the first, we asked an older man and a very old woman many of the same questions, and got the same answers. No, the Cadre had never slept in their house at night; the Cadre went away at night, they didn't know where. The Cadre had been polite, the one afternoon they had called. They were taking census, and they had left a metal doorsign, "22/7" in red letters on a yellow background, which was up on the porch. ("Taking census is what Cadre like to do best," I had been told by advisors in different parts of Vietnam; "in fact," the comment usually ran, "that's about all they do do. That and some fortifications." Interrogation -- supposed to identify grievances and aspirations, along with census data -- is the second of the six pacification criteria.)

Had ARVN soldiers ever taken food, chickens or ducks, without paying for it? "They used to do that, when there was only a PF squad in the hamlet. But now that the RF outpost was there, they don't think the ARVN soldiers will do that any more."

Finally, the captain suggested we visit some houses several hundred meters off the road. As we started along the embankment between two flooded rice paddies, the convoy passed by down the road, leaving the hamlet. People waved at us from the jeeps. The ceremony was over; now Ấp Lộc Tiên II and the other two hamlets would be colored blue on district and province pacification charts: little patches of blue about the size of a grease-pencil stub, because red areas ("VC-controlled") pressed close on either side of the road. "We won't go too close to that line of trees," the captain said, pointing to a bamboo thicket about five hundred yards off. "That's all deep red, beyond that."

As we walked in file, the river chest-high on either side, a distant shot rang out now and then. I had heard the first ones back in the outpost: some far, some fairly close. "Soldiers shooting birds," the captain said. "Or checking their weapons. Or having fun. You can't stop them. Sometimes you hear one answering another: dut, dut...dut. We call it a conmo check." Now artillery was firing sporadically, far off. The sound joined birdcalls, wind in the rice, bamboo clicking, low thrumming of a helicopter moving slowly a mile off: Delta sounds on a quiet, hot day.

The captain told me more about the ambush the day before. For three nights, the VC had put up dirt roadblocks on roads in that area: no mines, none were covered by snipers, no harassing of the clearing parties. That was all it took to lull the RFs; that was why they hadn't checked with the PF outpost about the road ahead, or put out a point, the morning of the 8th. That fourth morning, the VC waiting in the grass had caught them relaxed and unalert. Now, for a while, they would be more cautious.

Two hundred meters off the road, a thick grove of bamboo, palms, fruit trees and bushes rose among the rice fields. It looked wild and wholly dense, but through a gap in the vines one could see water, a moatlike fish pond surrounding a bare, clean yard and a shaded hut. "People think there's no cover in the Delta," the captain remarked. "There's plenty of cover. We couldn't be seen from the air right now; there could be a company in here. And look around." Even before the forest began, the paddies were broken by treelines along canals and other thickets as dense as this one. Standing in the shaded path we talked to an old man wearing shorts and shower sandals. He was dignified, his face deeply lined and handsome; his good-looking twelve-year-old son stood by smiling at us, very interested in my camera.

The Cadre had visited his house once, to fill out his family book and take the census. They did not stay in the area at night, because it was not safe for them. VC came every now and then; sometimes they spent the night. Government troops also came once in a while. Some of them paid for food, some took without paying. The

ones who paid did not pay much; but that was all right, he didn't mind. It was the war.

No one from the Government had ever asked him his opinions, he said, but he did not have any opinions about politics; he was an old man, just tending his rice fields, and neither side bothered him very much. The VC collected taxes at harvest time (he also paid rent to a landlord), but they didn't talk politics. The RD Cadre, like the VC, were polite. In one way they were better than the strategic hamlet cadre, because then, three years ago, the cadre had made the people build the fortifications, but the RD Cadre built the wall around the hamlet themselves. (They were not supposed to do this. The point of the Revolutionary Development process -- the aim of RD Cadre activities -- was to encourage the people to involve themselves in their own self-protection, on the Government side. The real point of fence-building -- supposedly, by the people -- was to commit them, by their voluntary actions, to the Government. But it was late in the war really to achieve this very often. The people had been through it too many times.)

The captain started to ask the old man some detailed questions about the VC village two kilometers to the north, and I walked around the thicket to see if anyone else were at home. The fish pond moat surrounded the clearing inside without a bridge that I could see; at one point I looked through the thick, wall-like vine leaves enclosing the moat to see a young woman squatting across from me, scrubbing clothes in the pond. She looked up and smiled. The yard behind her was swept spotless, if dried mud can be called that: dirt with no dust on it.

The captain caught up with me, with the interpreter, and we set off along another embankment. "I wouldn't put too much stock in what that man had to say," the captain said.

"Why not?"

"I asked him what he did when the VC squads came near his house. Who did he tell? He said he didn't do anything; he didn't tell anyone.

I asked him how he thought the war would ever be over, how would there ever be security so that his son could grow up in peace, if everyone acted like that: if he wouldn't even tell the district officials when the VC came through. He said he was an old man. The Government soldiers couldn't protect him -- the post was far away -- and the VC would make trouble for him if he talked to the Government. It wouldn't do any good for anyone, and he didn't want to get into trouble. He said the war had gone on for a long time, and I told him it would go on for a lot longer when people like him refused to take any part in it." The captain was very irritated. I could see the old man's point of view -- we were pretty far away from the road now -- but I didn't argue with the captain.

I wanted to see one more household, so we headed for another clump of bamboo a hundred yards further from the road: "about as far as we ought to go," according to the captain. Again, the house inside was hidden from us till we penetrated the screen of bamboo, brush, and palm trees; then we were in a large dirt courtyard, surrounded by flowers in neat rows and lined on two sides by large ceramic flowerpots. I reflected again on how clean it was possible for a dirt yard to look: in contrast to the rural slums of Cần Giuộc, the district town a few kilometers away, where refuse littered the mud in the yards and ragged holes held stale water and sewage.

A man and his wife, each looking about 55 but perhaps much older, greeted us warmly. After a few questions, they invited us all inside their house, where they had been having tea. The wife brought out new cups; her husband disappeared in back, then came out with a plate of store cookies. We each took one with our tea, and they did, too, then refilled the plate. They seemed pleased to have company. A little later the host -- who had a round, witty face, and who darted, like his eyes, when he moved -- brought out a package wrapped in pink tissue paper and began to unwrap it. I protested, but he spoke to the interpreter and went on unwrapping what seemed to be halvah, which he added to the plate. The interpreter explained, "He says he wants to have some, too," which seemed to be true, so we relaxed.

The house looked prosperous. Dirt floor, neat as the yard outside; heavy, carved furniture, brass lamps, screens, religious scrolls and pictures: very Victorian. The old man listened carefully to our questions and gave long answers, gesturing with his eyes and hands; usually his wife, sitting over on the smooth wooden bed, joined in to add to the answers, sometimes intensely.

We started with some of the same questions, but as the captain had predicted, moving off the road three hundred yards gave a twist to some of the answers. Yes, the Cadre had come by, once. They had taken a census, and left a doorsign. The man suddenly left the table, got a ladder and climbed up to a loft over the bed; he poked around under some tiles for a while, then came down brandishing a yellow sign with red numbers on it. When we nodded, he replaced it in the loft, climbed back and sat down at his tea, waiting for our next question.

After a pause, I asked: "Why isn't it on his door?"

The interpreter listened to his answer and said: "Last week many VC came to the house next to this and took down the doorsigns and tore up the family books. They didn't come to this house, but he thought he had better hide what the Cadre gave him, to keep it safe."

We sat and looked at each other for a while, drinking our tea.

The interpreter was very good. He put his questions in a gentle voice and listened carefully; the people seemed to trust him. He had lived in this area a long time. The MACV advisors respected him very much; they thought he could be a good district chief.

The captain asked the husband what he knew of Ph^oúc Lâm, the VC village two kilometers to the south. "The people in Ph^oúc Lâm are much less happy than the people in L^oc Tiên." Why was that? "Because they get much artillery; they cannot live a peaceful life." The same was true, he said, of the VC village two kilometers to the north.

The captain spread out his map and showed me the two villages, one on either side of L^oc Tiên II. "You see how crazy it all is,"

he said; "they talk about this village being secured, while right up there, two kilometers away, there's a VC base area that ARVN won't go near. When ARVN gets close to it they start hitting mines and heavy harassing; they just don't go into it. But the VC come out. And they live there; and the same down below here." The villages were frequently hit by artillery -- "though nobody will go in to find out what's happened" -- but the district chief was reluctant to use air strikes within the heavily-populated district.

Were they bothered by artillery near this house? "Not now," the man said cheerfully. "Last year, when there were only PF's in the outpost, the VC came often and there would be much artillery; but now that there was an RF outpost, he did not expect there to be shelling, even if the VC did probe, unless they attacked the post." I recalled the earlier comment, that the presence of the RF's meant that ARVN was less likely to steal poultry from the hamlet, and began to see an ironic meaning to the (welcome) "security" that a permanent Government presence in the hamlet brought to the villagers.

While he spoke of artillery, the shelling we had heard earlier had grown much louder, closer. Light was reflected off the glass of a picture frame behind the man's head, holding a red sheet of paper with Chinese characters on it; a sudden roll of artillery shimmered the light on the glass like the surface of a pond. "That may be Phouc Lam they're shelling right now," the captain said; "though it sounds closer."

"I am a Cao Dai," the man said. He gestured toward the religious ornaments around the room. "I pray every day for peace."

When did he think the war would end?

"I am an old man," he told the interpreter. "I have only a few years left. The war will not end while I am alive."

Who did he think would win?

He pointed up to the sky and answered briefly. "He says Heaven will decide," the interpreter said. "He does not know who will win."

Which, then, would he like to see win? There were only two answers he could give us, I was thinking: he was indifferent; or he wanted the GVN to win. "He does not care which side wins; he would like the war to be over."

Would it make a difference to him if the VC won, I asked. How does he think his life would be different if the VC should win?

"He does not know. The VC who come to collect his taxes do not talk politics; so he really does not know what they would do or what they would be like if they were the Government."

How does he think the long war started? Who began it?

"People in cities have magazines and newspapers, and listen to speeches; they know about things like that. But people who live in the hamlets do not have a chance to learn about such things. He does not know how it started."

On the subject of taxes, he said that his paddies yielded 50 gia (one gia = 20 kilos, a hectare - 2.5 acres) per hectare; of this, the landlord took 20 gia and the VC took 5.

Did either the GVN or the VC troops do any bad things in this area? "Both Government troops and VC troops always behaved correctly." The Government troops did not always pay when they needed food, but that was to be expected.

The glass in the picture frame shimmered violently; but this time it was from a burst of automatic weapon fire that came from only 200 yards off. The captain started up, took his weapon and went outside with the interpreter. The old man and woman paid no attention; they didn't blink as they drank their tea, to the small arms any more than the shelling. I thought: they have heard this summer thunder, in bright daylight, for a long time. The captain and interpreter came back and sat down again; but the captain said he thought we should be going soon.

We asked a few more questions, then got up to go, thanking them for their tea. The man spoke, smiling, to the interpreter, who turned

to me and said: "Now, before you go, he would like to ask you one question."

As he said this, the automatic weapon opened up again, a long burst, this time from no more than 100 yards away. The captain went outside. "What is his question?" I asked. The man spoke to the interpreter.

"He says: You are Americans. He would like to ask you, in your opinion, when will the war end?"

I glanced out the door; the captain was looking watchful, but relaxed. I turned back to the old man, who watched my face intently, with a polite smile, while I chose my words for the interpreter. "Tell him," I said carefully, "that I am glad that he has prayed to Heaven for peace. Say that I think that he is a virtuous man; therefore, I believe the war will end while he is alive."

As the interpreter translated this, the captain stepped inside the doorway and said, calmly, that he thought we should be moving along. I picked up my weapon, but the old man held out his hand on my arm and stopped me for a moment, continuing his question.

"He says that he is a Cao Dai, and though he has prayed for years for peace, peace has not come. However, he knows some Catholics; and they believe that peace will come in the 2000th year. In the Catholic calendar, this is the year 1966. So he thinks that perhaps peace will come in the year 2000. What do you think?"

"Tell him I hope it will come much sooner than that," I said, backing out the door as a third burst sounded, about as far away as the last. The interpreter finished my answer, then came out, as our hosts waved goodbye, and walked quickly past me to the captain; they spoke briefly, and the interpreter moved out around a corner of the thicket.

"With that automatic weapon, it could be a squad," the captain said softly. "Three or four, anyway. I don't know what they're firing at, probably harassing the hamlet because of the ceremony.

We can't very well go back the way we came, now; too open. I think we'd better try to get them before they get us. OK?" He asked me to cover him; he pulled back the bolt on his submachine gun and cocked it; I did the same. As we moved through the bushes around the yard, I glanced back. Our hosts were standing in the doorway, watching; when they saw me looking, they waved again.

On the other side of the thicket, the captain moved in a crouch along a paddy embankment toward a second grove, in the direction of the shorts. It was now very quiet, except for the artillery. When he reached the grove he squatted next to a palm and gestured to me; I moved over to him, bending below the level of the tall rice, trying to remember what I had learned a long time ago about moving quietly. As I came up, he slid into a stream of water, moved across it, climbed up on the bank and disappeared into thick brush. After a moment I followed, feeling the cool water move up my boots, my pants, to my crotch as my boots hit mud at the bottom. Trying not to splash, but unable to avoid the sucking sound as my boots pulled out of the mud at each step, I crossed the stream and crawled up. The captain had moved next to a hut, apparently deserted. As he peered around the far corner, there was a short burst; very loud, though it did not have the sharp crack of bullets aimed directly at us. The captain, however, had pulled back quickly from the edge of the hut, and we moved around the other side and tried to make out movement in the undergrowth. He saw nothing.

In the next twenty minutes, we crossed another stream and a pond, continuing to move around the outer edge of the thicket. The cold water was no longer a shock. The captain was concerned about finding the interpreter. Finally, he said, "If there is a squad, with that weapon, we're not well off here, with just two of us. We'd better try to find Wa. Anyway, I don't think they're shooting at us." There had not been any firing since we left the last hut. On the other side of one more canal we found Wa, who had been circling in the other direction. He said he couldn't tell what the firing was. We walked back along an embankment, keeping a watch to our rear. When

we reached the road, we walked back to the jeep. Our clothes were drying fast in the sun, except for our socks.

I wanted to talk to the hamlet chief before we left, but a villager standing next to our jeep said that he had gone back to the district town with the convoy after the ceremony.

It was now almost noon. As we drove out of the hamlet, past the berm the Cadre had built, we saw several Cadre in a hut next to the entrance arch. I had the driver stop, and they came over to us; one turned out to be the leader of the RD Cadre Group. He had bushy hair and looked about fourteen, but was probably about 18 or 20.

I asked if the Cadre had slept in the hamlets while they were working there. "Yes," the interpreter translated, but smiled slightly at me. Where had they been when the two hamlet chiefs were kidnapped? The answer was: the Cadre groups were "mobile" and they had warned the hamlet chiefs to move with them, but the chiefs were foolish and stayed in their homes.

Did the leader think that the new hamlet chiefs would be safe enough to stay in their hamlets at night? The Cadre leader looked back at the RF outpost as he answered.

"He says that if the troops in the outpost are active and operate at nighttime, the hamlets will be safe enough and the chiefs will sleep in the hamlet.

An "if" answer to a direct question -- like replies beginning, "The plan is," or "It has been ordered, or agreed, that ..." -- was familiar to me after 18 months in Vietnam. The antidote, sometimes, was another question. Did the Cadre leader believe that the troops in the outpost would be active enough, and operate at night? The interpreter looked doubtful about putting the question; "These men are RD Cadre, they are not military..." Ask him anyway, I said, I only wanted his opinion. Did he believe...? The interpreter asked him.

"No."

Then, in his opinion, would it be safe enough, and would the hamlet chiefs stay at night?

"No."

But at this point, the Cadre leader bent over the jeep and began talking quietly and seriously to the interpreter. He talked for a long time; he suddenly seemed much older. At last the interpreter translated, while the Cadre leader looked down the road with a somber expression.

"He says there is no security here. This hamlet is too insecure to be pacified. Twelve PF's are not enough to protect the people. If ARVN troops would come, and stay here, and operate at night, there would be a chance; but when ARVN comes at all, the units leave at four, five o'clock, and at night the VC come. The RF outpost will not make much difference to the people, because the RF's will stay inside their post at night. The Cadre were not here long enough to accomplish anything; but even if they had been here much longer, they could not have changed the people's attitudes, because the people are afraid. The six-point criteria have been met, but only on paper."

How about eliminating the VC infrastructure, I asked. How had that criterion been met? "One member of the infrastructure was shot," one of the Cadre by the jeep answered. "There were six. The other five moved out of the hamlet while the Cadre were there; they will come back now that the Cadre are leaving."

"Anyway," the leader added, "there are other people still in the hamlet who would inform to the VC when they come through. There are many people in the hamlet who really sympathize with the Government: but they are afraid to identify themselves to the Cadre. They are afraid to say anything good about the Government. And that is still true, after ten weeks' work."

After a pause, I asked the interpreter to thank the leader for being so frank with us. We saw that he was sincere, and that he had done what he could.

"Ten weeks is not enough to do anything, in an area like this," the leader repeated. "But it doesn't make any difference; ten months would not have been enough, either. We worked hard, and we did the best we could; but the people do not really want to talk to us because the VC are all around and they are afraid. Maybe somewhere else we can do more. Or here, when things are better."

We offered the group a lift into town, and they all piled into the jeep. As we moved out toward Cấn Giốc, and dry socks, I asked the interpreter to ask the Cadre if they knew what the firing had been about. Could they hear it?

One answered, and the interpreter said: "He heard some firing. He thinks perhaps it was some other Cadre." I looked at the captain, who said: "Could be. I doubt it, that far off the road. But who knows?"

"Ask them what the Cadre would have been firing about," I said to the interpreter. Another Cadre, hanging on behind me, gave an answer.

"He says they may have been shooting to celebrate, because they had finished their work here, and the hamlets were pacified."

PREFACE

In June, 1968, I attended a conference at the Adlai Stevenson Institute, Chicago, on the subject, "Vietnam: Lessons and Mislessons."

Harper and Rowe have now published an edited (mainly, reorganized) transcript of the proceedings, "No More Vietnams?", edited by Richard Pfeffer. The Atlantic Monthly published some excerpts in its November and December, 1968 issues (including several of my comments below).

My own contribution at the Conference was in the form of extemporaneous oral comments on the formal papers and discussion, generally bearing on "lessons of Vietnam." I reproduced transcriptions of these for RAND internal use earlier, and issue them now as a Paper in response to several requests. They have been edited lightly -- the transcriptions were very unreliable -- but they preserve oral syntax. (The edited version here differs very slightly from the published version.)

I did not attempt to expand or modify my conference remarks, which were each subject to a strict four-minute limitation, and which were generally responsive to some specific preceding comments by others, or more often, to a written paper. Thus, in no case should my comments be interpreted as anything like a comprehensive, or adequate, or indeed, more than suggestive discussion of the particular subject. (The comments on failure to learn, for example, and on "anti-learning mechanisms" -- referring to such phenomena as the one-year turnover in U.S. personnel, and deceptively optimistic reporting -- demand concrete examples and amplification, which I propose to provide elsewhere.) Nor do they reflect my own sense of priorities on the most important lessons of Vietnam.

I have preceded each comment with a pertinent passage (in some cases, one out of several) to which I was responding. And in the interests of historical honesty, or perhaps masochism, I have left in a prediction of mine -- on the probable fate of Saigon in 1968 -- that was not, I am happy to say, fulfilled.

SOME LESSONS FROM FAILURE IN VIETNAM

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I. THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

Theodore Draper: " 'Massive retaliation,' that monstrous doctrine of the 1950's, saved us from large-scale intervention in Vietnam in 1954. But its successor, variously known as 'limited war,' 'graduated response' or 'flexible response,' did not save us from increasingly large-scale intervention in Vietnam since 1961 and especially since 1965. In fact, I think the doctrine of 'limited war' as it was worked out in the latter half of the 1950's outside the government and taken over by the government in the 1960's must be held partially responsible for pulling us in."

Ellsberg: I do not really agree that it was the theory of limited war that encouraged Americans to favor our Vietnam decision in 1965. I think it was something else, some attitudes and expectations associated with the American way of war.

Specifically, there has been in the U.S. since the Second World War a widespread belief in the efficacy and acceptability of aerial bombing, and in particular of bombing of a strategic nature, aimed at the will of the opponents via his industrial and population resources. This belief played a critical, if not decisive, role in getting us into Vietnam, in reassuring us, in giving us confidence to stay in, and then in stimulating escalation while keeping us reassured as to ultimate success.

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In 1961, the group of men most in favor of an enlarged intervention, including the sending of ground troops, was headed by Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow. These two pointed, as early as 1961, to the essential problem of stopping infiltration. They took the point of view, rightly or wrongly, that the problem in the South would be insoluble until we were able to stop infiltration from the North, not as it was then but as it could become.

It was clearly stated by them that we must go in with the recognition, especially if we were successful in the early stages, that we could anticipate a high level of infiltration, which somehow would have to be stopped. These people, both privately and publicly, indicated there was only one effective way to stop infiltration - that, of course, was through bombing.

Thus, their recommendation for expanded U.S. involvement in Vietnam rested on the implicit assumptions that bombing would be used against the North when - as was likely - it became necessary, and that it would be effective. Kennedy may or may not have accepted this reasoning or conclusion; the record is not clear. However, given attitudes within the defense bureaucracy and the larger American public, it would have been difficult, even for the President, explicitly to reject this "solution" in advance. Really, no other proposal was ever seriously made for dealing with that essential problem.

In 1965 - when we felt ourselves in trouble in Vietnam in a number of ways, especially with regard to the need to demonstrate our commitment - Johnson was not prepared immediately to send troops; but one thing that came easy to an American president was a demonstration by bombing. In other ways as well, bombing was the natural solution to our problems; it was the key ingredient in our policy that was going, one way or another, to make everything turn out all right. And in 1966 and 1967, despite disappointments, these same hopes persisted and sustained our continued and expanded involvement.

Recently, a former Ambassador to the U.S. from Vietnam has expressed a plea that, despite his deep pessimism about the prospects today in Vietnam, we should not precipitously withdraw. He said he

was against our immediate withdrawal even though he believed life under the Communists would be better than the continuation of this war: which since 1965 - not since 1961 or 1964, but since the bombings of 1965 in South Vietnam and since we came in there with our troops - has begun to demolish his society, to turn it into a vast zoo, a vast refugee camp. Despite this belief, the Ambassador could not be for ending the war at the cost of a quick Communist victory because he felt that would encourage the North Vietnamese in their most aggressive aspects. In that case he foresaw that within five years the Vietnamese would be doing things in Thailand which would cause us then totally to destroy Vietnam.

The calling in of Americans and our subsequent bombing in North and South Vietnam has not brought success; hence the bombing and shelling in the South has gone on long enough to disrupt the society of South Vietnam enormously, and probably permanently. In general, if local governments who call for American aid are in other respects acting effectively, then any bombing we may do need not last very long and the resulting damage will not be permanent. But if these governments face a strong enemy who can frustrate them and the U.S. and prolong the war, then the damage done by American bombs and artillery can be irrevocable.

We are talking here about lessons for us to learn about ourselves, and lessons for others - including those who might ask our aid in the future - to learn about us, from our experience in Vietnam and elsewhere.

The lesson which can be drawn here is one the rest of the world, I am sure, has drawn more quickly than Americans have: that, to paraphrase H. Rap Brown, bombing is as American as cherry pie. If you invite us in to do your hard fighting for you, then you get bombing and heavy shelling along with our troops.

Many of us in Vietnam believed that we were there because we should win, and that we could win, though not by the methods we had been using. "Of course, I am against the kind of bombing we are doing;" I can hear myself, with others, saying this hundreds and hundreds of times.

I protected myself, I am afraid, from perceiving what should have been easily foreseeable - especially easy were I not American and terribly reluctant to realize it -- namely, that if you bring in Americans like me, as part of a heavy U.S. combat involvement, you are going to get both strategic and widespread tactical bombing and heavy use of artillery along with us, no matter how critical these particular individuals may be of it.

If you ask what will happen in Thailand if we go in militarily and have to face prolonged opposition, the answer is bombing and shelling.

If you ask what would have happened if the Dominican Republic had chosen to oppose us, the answer is that the Dominican Republic probably would have been heavily bombed.

Indeed, a most ominous lesson is there to be drawn by the people of nations whose leaders might call for U.S. military support: that such a plea - if the national leader knew that the conflict would be long and the U.S. military commitment great - could amount to an act of treachery against his society.

II. THE BASIS OF PUBLIC REVULSION

Samuel Huntington: "While U.S. involvement in Vietnam was one aspect of the broader post war pattern of U.S. expansion I previously referred to, the trauma resulting from the war, was the product of a fundamental shift in attitudes toward the costs and benefits of American expansion. The type of involvement which in the 1950's could be viewed as desirable and necessary became in the 1960's a highly dubious venture. By 1967, of course, the costs to the U.S. -- in money and troop commitments -- of the Vietnamese war exceeded those of the Korean War.

"Opposition to the war, however, focused less on these material costs than on the moral and ideological issues. In comparison to the Korean War the Vietnamese war has been a relatively limited, and undestructive conflict. In one year of fighting almost every major city in North and South Korea was virtually leveled to the ground. Up to mid-1968 the only major Vietnamese city which has received anything like this treatment was Hue. In Korea somewhere between two and

three million civilians were killed directly or indirectly by the war. The civilian suffering in Vietnam, however bad it may be, was little by comparison. Senator Edward M. Kennedy estimates the civilian casualties in South Vietnam at about 100,000 a year, only some of which were fatalities. At that current rate, the Vietnamese war could thus go on for twenty years before the total civilian casualties (killed and wounded) in South Vietnam equalled the minimum estimate of civilians killed in Korea.

"American outrage at the war thus reflected less the war than it did the impact of TV and, more basically, a fundamental change in American attitudes -- official and informed toward American involvement in international affairs. It is, of course, easy to say with hindsight that this change was predictable. It was also in fact, however, predicted. The shift in opinion on foreign policy in the mid-1960's "appears to be simply the latest manifestation of a regular alternation of American attitudes towards foreign affairs between introversion and extroversion. Using a variety of indicators, including naval expenditures, annexations, armed expeditions, diplomatic pressures, and attention devoted to foreign affairs in presidential messages and party platforms, Frank L. Klingberg has charted these alternations in mood since the Revolutionary War. Beginning in 1776 American attitudes toward international affairs have gone through eight alternating phases of introversion and extroversion as follows:

Introversion	Extroversion
1776-1798	1798-1824
1824-1844	1844-1871
1871-1891	1891-1919
1919-1940	1940

"The periods of introversion thus averaged twenty-one years, those of extroversion twenty-seven years. Writing in 1951 Klingberg confidently rejected the possibility of the U.S. then adopting the 'Gibraltar' politics advocated by Hoover and Taft and predicted that the U.S. was 'probably capable of great world leadership for another decade or more.' Extroversion still had sixteen years to run. Klingberg also suggested, however, that further in the future it was logical 'to expect America to retreat, to some extent at least from so much world involvement, and perhaps to do so sometime in the 1960's.' He was, if anything, a little too unsure of his own theory, for sixteen years later, the swing of introversion came along right on schedule...

... The in-swing of the Klingberg Cycle is clearly a fact, and it is precisely this fact that caused the national trauma over the Vietnamese War. At an earlier point in the cycle such a war would not have caused so much commotion. But not even Lyndon Johnson could successfully buck Frank Klingberg."

Ellsberg: Professor Huntington says the Vietnam war has led to an unprecedented revulsion in the minds of the American public, essentially because of a cyclical change in American attitudes. If true, this would imply we are in for some twenty years of similar reaction against any sort of involvement, followed by some twenty years of acceptance of any sort of involvement.

This implication is made more specific by saying that the same sort of war waged earlier, with the same consequences, would not have evoked this reaction. I believe this is wrong. If we had taken the same action in Indochina in 1954 or in 1961 that we did in 1965, we would have become involved that much sooner in the same kind of war, with the same prospects, and, in turn, would have gotten very much the same reaction in the middle of the Klingberg cycle. Therefore, the notion of a cyclical change in American attitudes as the main explanation for the response is wrong. The revulsion is largely a response to this war: including among other things, the manner we got into it, the manner we have explained it, the manner we are conducting it, and perhaps above all, our evident lack of lasting progress or prospects of success.

Speaking personally, and frankly, I must say that Professor Huntington's analysis -- insofar as it reveals his perceptions of the war and of the public's reaction to it -- distresses me very much. However, I don't want to dwell on my reaction to his description of the Vietnam war, which I had the fortune to witness fairly close up, as a relatively "limited and undestructive" war. What I wish to explore here is the empirical question, when our government should anticipate widespread public reactions against such an involvement.

Huntington's dismissal of the point that it could be the war itself that led to revulsion is based on a comparison with Korea, in which he suggests that the relevant differences in the wars themselves should have led to greater acceptance of the Vietnam war than of the Korean war. Therefore, he concludes, the cause of the actual lesser acceptance could not be our acts in Vietnam.

But what is the relevant difference he considers? When we look closely, it is very simple: it is body count. In other words, the analysis here of the moral issue all comes down to the single dimension of body count. I would suggest that this is as inadequate a predictor of the public's feeling of moral revulsion as it is a predictor of progress in the war.

For one thing, the question of the perceived stakes at issue in the war is relevant. Specifically, the Vietnam war simply is not regarded as a war of self-defense, whereas Korea virtually was: especially early in the war, which was when most of the civilian casualties were inflicted. In the summer of 1950, we had a vision of Western Europe being at stake, with satellite armies poised to profit from the example of successful aggression in Korea. This had, I suggest, great bearing on the acceptability of the infliction of damage on people who themselves were not threatening us.

Moreover, the specific operations in Korea that were causing the casualties were regarded as effective and even essential there. These same operations such as bombing that is not in close support, Sir Robert Thompson tells us -- and I feel sure he is correct -- have little impact on VC strength; yet at the same time, by their social and psychological effects within Vietnam, they strongly favor the longer-run political prospects of the VC. Therefore, regrettably, we have the spectacle of non-combatant casualties being inflicted in Vietnam, and massive refugee movements imposed, by processes which qualified experts tell us are unnecessary, ineffective, and even counterproductive.

Above all else, you have the factor of perceived failure and the very low likelihood of real success in the future. Moral, as well as practical, issues will surely arise at the point when this is perceived, for everybody for whom they did not arise earlier. Here, of course, is the enormous difference from Korea.

It is simply not acceptable, in the eyes of many people, to kill as many people as we are doing in Vietnam, or even a much smaller number, when the process of violence offers as little promise of success in any terms as it does here and especially in the case of

U.S. are no larger than they seem there. To put it simply, a great many people in the country believe that you have to have very good reasons for killing innocent people; and the reasons they now perceive for sustaining the kind of operations we are pursuing in Vietnam just do not appear to be good enough. There may be a trend in attitudes here, especially among youth; yet there would have been no lack of such people, making the same judgment, if they had been confronted with the same war ten years ago.

III. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AS A SLOW LEARNER

Richard Barnett: "The roots of the Vietnam failure lie more in the structure and organization of the national security bureaucracy than in the personality of the President or the idiosyncracies of the particular group of foundation executives, military commanders, Rhodes Scholars, and businessmen who have been the President's principal advisers during the escalation of the Vietnam commitment into the Vietnam War."

Ellsberg: There is no question the bureaucracy must bear substantial responsibility for our failure in Vietnam. The bureaucracy, of which I was formerly a part, finds it peculiarly difficult to learn from failure: in large part because, for both bureaucratic and political reasons, failure can be neither recognized nor admitted. But if one is to learn lessons at all from Vietnam, one must be prepared to draw lessons from failure, for that has been our dominant experience there. I am talking about the situation as it looks today and last year and that, of course, defines failure. Our experience to date there involves failures upon failures.

"Bureaucracy," I want it clearly understood -- more clearly than in Barnett's discussion -- includes here the participants at the highest levels of the United States government. I am really tempted to include as well the Establishment, from which many of the top cabinet people were drawn. The performance of this "bureaucracy" in connection with Vietnam policy has been very bad, so bad it is very hard to characterize it simply as an aberration or bad luck.

We could have foreseen that the enemy -- probably the most finely trained guerrilla organization in history -- would perform as well as

it did and that our bureaucracy and military would perform as inadequately as they did. Some people did foresee this. For example, Stanley Hoffmann attacked my defense of our expanded involvement on just these grounds in 1965, when, representing the Administration, I confronted him at a teach-in. Therefore, in this sense, it was foreseeable. But not to our "bureaucracy."

There was ignorance about the problems, about the area, about the people, about ourselves. But there is another related factor just as important: the fact that the ignorance persisted, that it diminished scarcely at all over time. Important U.S. decisions have been made on Vietnam since 1950, and especially since 1961. I participated in a small way in decisions in Washington in 1964-1965, and in Vietnam in 1965-67. I have now had occasion to study both 1961 and 1963 in great detail.

The bureaucracy was raising the same problems then -- starting in the earliest years -- that we raise today, though in a different context. And some of these problems have been understood clearly, then and now. Yet the actual performance of our system for exerting influence and for deciding about and operating in Vietnam reveals not only ignorance at every stage but also the persistence of ignorance, the inability of the system in this particular sphere to learn from a very long record of experience. I don't believe the bureaucracy is any smarter about this problem in 1968 than it was in 1965, or 1961, or 1954.

As a result of being in Vietnam, I became aware, over a long period, of some of the sources of willful ignorance, what one might call "anti-learning mechanisms" in the United States government. I think one can only appreciate this by viewing the performance up close. Newspaper readers can not really get it. You have to be close to the decision-making apparatus to know how inexcusable some of these things are, month after month and year after year. I draw from this not only a lesson about the limited ability of our system to learn and adapt, our inability, at least on some important occasions, to reduce our initial ignorance. I also draw a general policy indication, concerning

the prospects for U.S. intervention in areas and problems of which initially we know little.

The "limitations of power" many people are talking about are really, I think, identifiable in many cases as limitations due to ignorance and the inadequate ability of the system as it now exists to learn from experience and especially to learn from failure.

We have a tendency to deny failures or to disguise failures by a process of self-deceit. Now, this might be viable if we were not also troubled by a tendency to activist intervention in large parts of the world where we do not know much to start with.

I infer that we should be especially cautious about any policy that calls for activist intervention in these areas. There is no use jumping in, no matter how important the problems seem to be, with the objective of on-the-job training, because it just doesn't work. Moreover, however nice it might be in Huntington's framework to have a super-CIA to facilitate more appropriate political intervention in these parts of the world, we do not now have any agency adequate to this role, and we could not have it next year or, in my opinion, in five years, or even longer. Therefore, it seems to me, one lesson we should draw concerns situations we should stay away from.

IV. THE IMPACT OF NOT LEARNING

Leroy Wehrle: "But despite our limited knowledge, and the desirability of understanding ourselves and others more, we still have to get up each morning, say to ourselves we do not understand enough, and then go out and try to deal with the world. To say that because of the tragedy of Vietnam, we no longer should be interventionists or activists or whatever words you want to use, is to miss a larger meaning which the world thrusts at us. I think that the balance U.S. foreign policy has struck during the last twenty years is still the right one, refined perhaps by what we have learned and the lessons in the mislearnings of Vietnam..."

"Finally, I would like to close on a point that has been a theme of this discussion, namely, the mislessons of Vietnam, particularly to disagree with one of Mr. Ellsberg's lessons.

"We have all agreed there have been mistakes, and mistakes compounded, but Mr. Ellsberg generalizes from this to conclude

that we have an anti-learning process built into government and therefore that we should be more reticent in our foreign policy elsewhere because we fail to learn from our failures. Stated in this generalized form, quite apart from whether it is valid to Vietnam, I think this is nonsense. I can think of many counter-examples. For example, painfully, we turned around our policy in Iran. Because of the lessons of China, we have had a sensible policy regarding Taiwan, and the results have been fairly good on the social and economic but not on the political front. Korea is another example.

"The United States government, like all of us, makes mistakes, sometimes learns from them and sometimes doesn't. We should not take as a datum of policy that it cannot learn, because the implications of such a conclusion are severe."

Edwin Reischauer: "If we all came to these problems as children, with completely open minds, we would probably learn quickly. However, we do not examine them that way. We come to Asian problems, for example, with wrong conceptions. It therefore takes a long time to relearn."

"I don't think, in relation to Mr. Ellsberg's terms of willful ignorance, that we have to try to perpetuate ignorance. The human mind tends to operate in this way. It is human nature."

"With regard to Asia and what we have pointed out here, I am rather surprised that we have managed to learn within twenty years that we are on the wrong track. This is pretty good for man."

Ellsberg: Obviously a major lesson of Vietnam is that we must know ourselves better. My experience in Vietnam has led me to believe we do not know enough about at least one aspect of ourselves -- that is, the learning properties of our bureaucracy and government. Let me dismiss as a straw man, one caricature of my earlier remarks. Obviously, the issue is not that we cannot learn, or that we never learn, or that we never learn fast or effectively enough. The issue is that we often need to learn a great deal more and faster; now, even in the most urgent situations, our adaptive processes sometimes lead only to amazingly and disastrously slow and unreliable interpretations and changes.

That this is a simple point does not reduce its significance. Mr. Wohlstetter, in the Fifties, was very important in drawing implications for our strategic plans and posture from what seemed a

very simple perception -- that electronic messages take time to be communicated and can be interrupted by some physical phenomena. Now, it would not seem that this was a great physical discovery. However, at that time our strategic plans were formulated as if this were not the case, as if messages travelled instantaneously and were thoroughly reliable.

Similarly, the perception that organizations, in certain situations more than others, have bureaucratic, and not merely human, properties which involve peculiarly bureaucratic insensitivities, blindnesses or distorted incentives that delay learning, or slow up learning, or make learning uncertain: this perception is not as much in our consciousness for purposes of analysis and planning and policymaking as I think it should be.

It is especially important to try better to estimate the odds and the speeds of learning when one is involved in giving advice. Many of us in this room have been in the position time after time, of giving advice whose appropriateness was premised upon the United States government or that of another country changing itself fast and in important ways. I can easily name specific examples of advice in which the speed with which governmental change would occur was critical to the appropriateness of that advice. Yet in few cases did the advisors concern themselves with that issue and, if they did, they rarely give the right answer. Their advice, consequently, often led to very bad results. To give advice in the hope that all of one's own preferred tactics or instruments can and will in fact be adopted is often terribly unrealistic; and it can be dangerous and even irresponsible if we know that this is not the way it is going to be. It is very important in designing and giving advice, in other words, to ask oneself how that advice is likely to be carried out.

I want to illustrate generalization with a very narrow but important prediction with regard to Vietnam and elsewhere.

I think that at least one great failure probably still lies ahead of us in Vietnam. Saigon, to my mind, is unlikely to survive this year and, indeed, perhaps even unlikely to survive the summer. I make

that prediction here because it illustrates my point.

Many people in the bureaucracy can see that this eventuality would be disastrous for us, whether you think in terms of negotiations or anything else. Saigon, of course, is preeminently the "oil spot," more and more, almost the only one; with a few other cities and towns, it is the home of the supporters of the GVN, people who have been driven to Saigon by what Huntington regards as our "modernizing instruments" in Vietnam, bombs and artillery. It is easy to see that, on any point of view, it is not in our interest to destroy Saigon. But I think it probably will be destroyed -- and by us -- because it is in the interest of the Viet Cong to move us to do so. And the Viet Cong understand us better, perhaps, than we understand ourselves, and they understand how difficult it is for us to change our habits and how unlikely such change is. I think we will not learn fast enough.

I would say that it is important to prevent our destroying Saigon, and that it can, in principle, be avoided. The President can give an order, and it could be effective. But it is essential in arriving at appropriate policies -- in this case, as in others -- to ask: Will he in fact give that order, and to what degree will it be effective?

My own judgment in this instance, right or wrong, is that the President can keep our bombers from bombing populated areas in cases of isolated Viet Cong incursions into Saigon. But in a desperate situation, where bombers appear the only way to save American lives and the American presence, the President probably would not, in the face of the advice he will get from the military, resist the call for measures that would destroy Saigon -- perhaps all at once, perhaps district by district.

First, it is worth enormous resources to prevent the Viet Cong from getting into Saigon at all, in large numbers. This means a re-deployment of our forces, which we have not yet carried out to the necessary extent, and probably won't.

Second, once we realize in a particular case that we are very unlikely to learn fast enough, we must conclude time is strongly against us; and our attitudes in negotiation should reflect this conclusion.

The longer we allow the fighting to go on, the more difficulty we will have, because the VC have gotten our number: they have an effective tactic to use against us, and sooner or later they are likely to use it. In fact, they have found a way to exploit our reflexes -- in Sir Robert's terms, a jujitsu technique. Thus, our bargaining position is likely to get worse over time, not better.

Finally, it is essential, I think, to study the governmental and military learning process itself to learn much more about its limits and how one can speed it up.

V. U.S. INTERVENTION, OCCUPATION, AND REFORM

Samuel Huntington: "A second problem concerns the effects of American efforts to promote social reforms. So long as American efforts remain relatively small and are limited to the carrot and the stick of economic assistance and its denial, the impact of these efforts on social change will be relatively small. Where the U.S. massively intervenes in a society, however, its effects on the promotion of social reform, economic change, and modernization are likely to be overwhelming and revolutionary. American liberals frequently think of U.S. involvement in the politics of another country as inherently biased on the side of the status quo. This is, however, only a half-truth. In fact, there would appear to be a direct correlation between the scope and direction of American involvement. The more extensive the American involvement in the politics of another country, the more progressive or reform-oriented is its impact on that country. In those countries which it has governed militarily or colonially the impact of the U.S. has generally tended to undermine and destroy the traditional order, promote social and economic equality, expand human welfare, and stimulate economic development. In the years since World War II, for instance, rapid and thoroughgoing land reforms have (with one exception) been carried out under two auspices: Communist revolution (China, Vietnam, Yugoslavia) and American military occupation (Japan, Korea, and, at a second remove, Taiwan). The only other country which has carried out a land reform as sweeping as these is Bolivia, and that was done by a revolutionary government financed by the United States.

The revolutionary and modernizing impact which a massive American presence has on a foreign country is in part the result of conscious desire to promote reform and in part simply the byproduct of the exposure of a traditional culture to the ways of an egalitarian, affluent, liberal, modern society. On the other hand, where the American presence

is relatively limited -- and in particular, of course, where the American governmental presence is limited -- the net effect of the American impact tends to be much more conservative, witness most of the states of Central America."

Ellsberg: I am very disturbed by several lessons Professor Huntington has drawn from experience. This, by the way, does not lead me at all to think one should avoid learning lessons; I think that is essential, and it is not at all too early that there be efforts such as the one we are on.

Professor Huntington has generalized that the more extensive the American involvement in the politics of another country, the more progressive is its impact on that country. He several times alludes to a possible relationship between intervention and reform.

Now, the first thing that strikes me about this proposition is that Vietnam itself provides a spectacular counter-example. The period of our intervention in Vietnam -- which includes the period from 1950 on, and especially from 1954 on -- cannot be described in general as a progressive or reform-oriented interval by any means.

One thing, perhaps, that might have misled Professor Huntington -- it has misled a lot of other people -- is the amount of talk there has been about reform, generally from lower-level staff members, and, occasionally, official pronouncements. When he refers to the stress on reform by people in State and CIA, he is mainly talking about the PSO's who accompany visitors to Vietnam. But this does not characterize very much of what their superiors have said, in official, internal policy statements and decisions, and it characterizes even less what we have effectively done.

Stress by the U.S. Government on reform in Vietnam has been virtually entirely verbal, and after the long period we have been in Vietnam it hasn't had much impact. Verbal stress, it turns out, does not create psychological stress in the minds of the people we are advising, or any real impulse for reform. We have obviously not been an effective influence for reform in Vietnam. Talking about land reform, or talking about anything else, has meant essentially

nothing.

In fact, if you look at examples that seem to support Huntington's case, they can be much more precisely defined. The critical factor is not presence but occupation. It is as simple as that. When we Americans occupy a militarily defeated country and are not plagued by a continuing resistance in the country, experience shows a considerably progressive and reform-oriented impact. But experience does not show whether those efforts would have survived a resistance movement. We have not been tested on that.

Incidentally, I know that the historical examples of U.S. occupation misled many people in the Administration in their predictions of the benign effects of a great American build-up in Vietnam. Many of them had had experience in military government in places like Korea, Japan or Germany, and this led them to think of us as inevitably a force for reform. But lacking in Vietnam the responsibility we had in occupied countries for the long-term political and economic development of the country, we were in no sense effectively a force for reform. Therefore, to accept your proposition, Professor Huntington, would surely lead us greatly astray in countries where we do not propose fully to take responsibility.

Samuel Huntington: "I disagree with you on the specifics of Vietnam and the nature of our impact. If you want to go back over the period since 1954, the more we have become involved, the more we have had precisely the sort of impact which the proposition states we will have.

When you talk about occupation, that is precisely the point. This is an extreme case of American intervention. The logic of your argument seems to suggest that if we only did go in and take over Vietnam and run it the way Korea was run or Japan was run, we would have these effects. Here it seems to me you are focusing on an extreme case and building an argument for even more intervention."

Ellsberg: I certainly do not want to be misunderstood in my remarks. I was interpreting your proposition. I believe it is wrong to say that there is anything like a smooth function relating intervention and a progressive impact.

As we have increased our presence militarily, economically, politically and in every other way, we have, of course, demolished the society of Vietnam. From a very long term view, this is what is happening right now. Out of this ruin, perhaps, one might say some benefit may come, at great cost. However, in any case, we are perceived by the Vietnamese, correctly, as having first supported the French regime and secondly, the Diem regime; hardly progressive reform governments, whatever else they were. Finally, we are seen now as having saddled them with a deplorable military regime with essentially nothing to recommend it. This has been our impact, and it is creating intense anti-Americanism.

As for occupation, I am scarcely suggesting that is the solution. Conceivably it would have led to more reform but that isn't the only criterion anyway. I do not believe it would be acceptable either in Vietnam or the United States, nor should it be.

Even with respect to the past, I would again ask whether the occupation of Japan or Germany could have had the reforming effect it did, had it been confronted with an ongoing insurgency.

VI. THE RELEVANCE OF POLITICAL REFORM

The references to Sir Robert Thompson's views below are to his oral remarks at the Conference and to recommendations scattered through his paper, "The Strategy of Intervention." The last part of the comments refer to the following passage:

Sir Robert Thompson: "As part of the process of strengthening the government's assets, the question will arise as to just how far the major power can, in support of the aid program, bring political pressure to bear on the local government to undertake 'the needed reforms' expected of it. Great caution has to be exercised in this sphere to avoid creating either an issue where it did not exist or resentment by the local government being pressured to reform to an unacceptable pace. ...

"When a government is under pressure in time of war or insurgency and its main concern is the defense of the country, there will always be a tendency to hold firmly to the reins of power, to impose restrictions, to rely on the faithful and to ignore the 'nervous Nellies.' There will be few opportunities to press for 'the broadening of the administration.' It was interesting to watch this same process in action in the United States during 1967. One could almost hear the ghost of President Diem saying to President Johnson, 'Mr. President, why don't you broaden the base of your administration?'"

Ellsberg: It was very heartening to hear a very American "can do" attitude sounded by Sir Robert Thompson. His remarks could almost be paraphrased by the old Seabee slogan, "the difficult we do immediately, the impossible takes a little longer." But we must address ourselves to the question of whether time is really a solvent for all our problems.

All the measures Sir Robert has proposed would have been useful at the various times he proposed them, would have been worthwhile, would have strengthened the situation; they were, in fact, necessary. But, was there any likelihood of any of these being done in Vietnam? They were not in fact done, and the high odds that they would not be done should have become clear to us very early in the game in Vietnam. Regarding administrative strengthening, policing, intelligence improvements, and the other things he describes in looking at the strategic hamlet program, it is frequently said that the governing concepts were good but that they were carried out badly. But it was incumbent on us to ask in the beginning whether it was likely for them to be carried out, by a government like Diem's advised by Americans.

I believe there are only two ways that one could imagine these kinds of steps having been taken, and both ways, really, are ruled out by Sir Robert.

One would have been a comprehensive kind of American control. Certainly the success in Malaya reflected not British 'advisors'

but British control. The British were in a position to run things in Malaya. Could the Americans from the beginning have exerted the same kind of control in South Vietnam? In any case, they were not inclined to intervene to that extent, for that purpose.

The other method would have been some kind of popular Vietnamese pressure. Mr. McDermott suggests we should help the people control their government. In principle, this is not an unthinkable sort of assistance. But Sir Robert deprecates this quite strongly.

I would argue that such political change in the relations between governed and governors has many positive implications for the success of the venture and the feasibility even of the administrative changes Sir Robert wants. Take administration as an example. Without detailed and informed pressure by the United States as the intervening power, is it imaginable that the Diem government would have achieved the kind of spontaneous strengthening of administration Sir Robert wants? In fact, even with that pressure there was a weakening of administration from 1954 to 1964 largely due to political factors.

Similarly, talent that could have been drawn back from France and other parts of the world was excluded from government either deliberately or because the persons involved would not associate themselves with a government of the nature of Diem's. The same is true of the governments after Diem. They have denied themselves this kind of administrative talent.

Moreover, even the best administration in the world would not have survived the fall of Diem, which was a direct result of defective political relationships between governed and governors. I think, therefore, that Sir Robert's sarcasm about U.S. talk and efforts to broaden Diem's regime is a little misplaced -- especially right now and especially in view of the analogy Sir Robert draws to the Johnson Administration. One almost has a feeling that his sarcastic comments, about how LBJ would have received a suggestion to broaden his government, were written before March 31, 1968.

The fact is that our own government was toppled at that point.

At least, it came as close to it as our system allows, and by very much the same kind of agitation that toppled Diem, and for many of the same reasons. The Congress having been bypassed in 1965 and inadequately consulted since then, the public having been ignored and misled, resentments were built up which created a situation where the President of this country was not able to get easily and safely to airports and auditoriums to campaign -- just as, as early as 1961, I observed that Diem needed large military escorts to get to the airport.

Failure has always been over-determined in Vietnam but, in the case of Diem, it happened at least in part because he disregarded the advice we had given him to do something to improve popular support for his regime.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : C. D. Brennan

DATE: July 31, 1971

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. Brennan

1 - Mr. Wannall

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

1 - Mr. Wagoner

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

REC-23 Wannall

On the evening of 7/30/71 Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Washington Field Office, forwarded the attached material which had been received by SA [redacted] on 7/29/71 from [redacted] Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The attachment is a compilation of a long list of names of persons who were reportedly connected with the task force that prepared the "McNamara Study." [redacted] explained that various people had been requested to compile lists based on their recollections and that there has been no confirmation of the fact that all persons listed were actually involved in task force matters.

The principal list is dated 7/27/71 and it is supported by seven attachments.

SA [redacted] said that it is his understanding a copy of the attachment was sent to the White House and may have been the basis for the 17 names listed in the attachment to the President's letter to the Director wherein he requested that information on these 17 individuals be sent to Mr. Egil Krogh. [redacted] was instructed to get all possible information on these 17 individuals since the Bureau is considering having interviews conducted with all those not previously interviewed.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

Enclosure
WRW:ams

(4)

EX 101

REC-23

1 AUG 5 1971

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

67 AUG 11 1971

John D. [signature]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : C. D. Brennan

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bishop

DATE: August 2, 1971

1 - Mr. Dalbey
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Wagoner

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Memorandum 7/31/71 advised that we would send through under date of Tuesday, 8/3/71, material to be sent to Mr. Egil Krogh of the White House regarding Daniel Ellsberg, principal suspect in the leak of the "McNamara Study" and 16 other individuals. In this connection, the President by letter to the Director received 7/30/71 requested that this information be furnished to Mr. Krogh, whom he had directed to examine in depth circumstances of the many recent disclosures of Top Secret and other sensitive material. Letter to Mr. Krogh with material we have compiled is attached.

Information which we have included regarding Ellsberg relates not only to his background and apparent connections with the disclosure of the "McNamara Study" but also to public admissions of his connections with this disclosure and his change of attitude toward the Vietnam war from one of support to one of active opposition.

With regard to the 16 other individuals on whom we have compiled data for Mr. Krogh, we have noted that five of them have been interviewed during the Ellsberg investigation and the actual reports of interviews have been included as a part of the memoranda compiled. This is in compliance with the specific request of the President. With respect to the sixth individual, Charles M. Cooke, we have noted that we endeavored to interview him 7/21/71 but he declined in the absence of specific clearance from the Deputy Attorney General. We called this to the attention of the Attorney General in the past, advising we would make no further efforts to talk to Cooke at this time.

In view of White House interest in this matter, in our cover communication to Mr. Krogh we are advising that if he concurs we will proceed with interviews of the 10 remaining individuals whom we have not yet interviewed. This, of course, does not include interview with Ellsberg at this time.

1 AUG 5 1971

Since the President has designated Mr. Krogh to examine this matter in depth, Mr. Krogh may well be in touch with the Attorney General and, accordingly we feel we should send to Attorney General as well as his Deputy and Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, copies of the material we have compiled for Mr. Krogh.

EX-105 REC-47 111-100-821
AUG 11 1971
WRW:ams (8)

ACTION - CONTINUED OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Brennan
Re: MC LEK

ACTION:

(1) Attached for approval is a communication to Mr. Krogh transmitting the requested material.

(2) Attached is a proposed letter to the Attorney General, with copies for Deputy Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, enclosing copies of the memoranda compiled for Mr. Krogh. If approved, this letter will also go forward.

ozw
J

OK.
is WCL

WBS. JS
T
PEP 7
DJD
gam

1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Mohr
 1 - Mr. Bishop
 1 - Mr. Dalbey
 1 - Mr. Brennan
 1 - Mr. Wannall
 1 - Mr. Wagoner

August 2, 1971

BY LIAISON

REC-10

EX-112

74060

722

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of July 29, 1971, which requested certain information for Mr. Egil Krogh relative to our continuing investigation of Daniel Ellsberg, as well as information regarding individuals of interest to Mr. Krogh in his examination of the circumstances of many recent disclosures of Top Secret and other sensitive material to the public.

The information is being compiled and will be furnished expeditiously to Mr. Krogh in accordance with your request.

Sincerely yours,

ERH:emj:ams
 (9)

NOTE:

REC'D BY LIAISON

See cover memorandum W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan, captioned "MC LEK," dated 7/31/71, prepared by WRW:ams.

DELIVERED BY LIAISON
 ONE

Tolson _____
 Felt _____
 Sullivan _____
 Mohr _____
 Bishop _____
 Brennan, C.D. _____
 Callahan _____
 Casper _____
 Conrad _____
 Dalbey _____
 Gale _____
 Ponder _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Walters _____
 Soyars _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

51 AUG 11 1971

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Wannall

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

PRG 7
CB/psm

PRG

Wann

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1971

Dear Edgar:

I have directed Egil Krogh to examine in depth the circumstances of the many recent disclosures of top secret and other sensitive material to the public. It is vital to the security of this country that appropriate and immediate steps be taken to correct the procedures and practices which have led to such disclosures.

To assist Mr. Krogh in this project, I ask that you forward to him as soon as possible:

- (1) All information acquired to date, including individual reports of interviews, with respect to those persons named on the attachment to this letter; and
- (2) A comprehensive background paper on Daniel Ellsberg;

and to provide him with such other further information or investigation as he may, in the future, request.

Please keep Mr. Krogh up-to-date on the results of your continuing investigation into this matter.

Sincerely,



Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

REC-10

EX-112

65-77060-912
12 AUG 5 1971

71
61 AUG 15 1971

FBI

Date: 7/27/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

REGISTERED AIRMAIL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
FROM: SAC, HONOLULU (65-1081) (RUC)
SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
OO: Los Angeles

Re Bureau airtel to Albany dated 7/21/71.

The following investigation was conducted by SA-
[REDACTED] at Honolulu, Hawaii:

Confidential informants who are familiar with some phases of New Left activity in Hawaii were contacted on 7/27/71 and advised they had been furnished no information bearing on ELLSBERG's past or present connections with New Left Peace Groups and similar organizations of a subversive nature:

[REDACTED]

In addition the following agencies were contacted and advised their files contain no information concerning ELLSBERG:

[REDACTED]

Attorney General's Office EX-105
Honolulu, Hawaii

REC-47.65-74060-823

JUL 31 1971

② - Bureau
2 - Los Angeles
1 - Honolulu
TC/ctm
(5)

NAT. SEC.

App

67 AUG 11 1971

Sent

M

Per

Special Agent in Charge

HN 65-1081

[REDACTED]
710th MID
Honolulu, Hawaii

[REDACTED]
NISO Pearl Harbor
Hawaii

[REDACTED]
OSI Hickam Air Force Base

The indices of the Honolulu Office contain no information concerning ELLSBERG.

The Honolulu Office will remain alert for any information concerning any connection of ELLSBERG with a subversive group and the Bureau and the office of origin will be advised if such information is received.

F B I

Date: 7/26/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)

FROM *guy* SAC, OMAHA (65-849) (P)

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

OO: Los Angeles

Re Bureau airtels, 7/21/71.

Check of Postal Inspectors, Des Moines, Iowa, indicates that "New York Review of Books", Post Office Box 79, Des Moines, Iowa, a subscription promotion box number of Cowles Publications Communications, 111 10th Street, Des Moines, Iowa, box discontinued as of 7/15/71.

For information of Bureau and receiving offices, Cowles Publications (Look Magazine), Des Moines, Iowa, has utilized box numbers for magazine subscription promotion both for their own publications and for other publications in Des Moines, Iowa, for sometime, however, recently Cowles has discontinued this subscription promotion practice.

For further information of the Bureau and receiving offices, a review of the records of the Des Moines, Iowa, Public Library indicates publication "New York Review of Books", a bi-weekly publication of a literary nature.

- EX-105 [REC-34] 65-74060-*5118*
② - Bureau (RM)
2 - New York (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (105-27942) (info) (RM)
1 - Boston (65-5236) (info) (RM)
2 - Omaha
DET:dsa
(8)

17 JUL 29 1971

NAT. SEC.

Approved: *51* AUG 11 1971 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

OM 65-849

The publication is published in New York, New York, and the headquarters is located at 250 West 57th Street, New York City, zip code 10019.

A. WHITNEY ELLSWORTH is its publisher and one of its editors is a BARBARA EPSTEIN.

A review of library records indicated that the March 11, 1971, issue of "New York Review of Books" carries an article, "Laos: What is Nixon Up To?" DANIEL ELLSBERG is credited with being the author of this article.

LEADS:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, will obtain back issues of "New York Review of Books" March 11, 1971, issue which contains article entitled "Laos: What is Nixon Up To?", by DANIEL ELLSBERG, and furnish same to Bureau by airtel.

OMAHA

AT OMAHA, NEBRASKA, will contact sources familiar with New Left activity within the Omaha Division and furnish results to Bureau and Los Angeles.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE PHILADELPHIA	OFFICE OF ORIGIN LOS ANGELES	DATE JUL 28 1971	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 7/20-23/71
TITLE OF CASE DAVID L. BISHOP		REPORT MADE BY [REDACTED]	CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE

REFERENCE

Boston airtel to Philadelphia, dated 7/14/71.

-JFC-

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

[REDACTED] was contacted by [REDACTED]

Files of the Philadelphia Office reflect [REDACTED]
 born 11/3/05 at [REDACTED] of American parents.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED				FOUR	ACQUITTALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVICT	ARREST	FUGITIVE	FINES	RECOVERIES	FILED	PENDING OVER ONE YEAR <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
			SAVINGS			PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO

APPROVED: [Signature]
 SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

- COPIES MADE:
- 5 - Bureau (65-27460) (RM)
 - 2 - Boston (65-5234) (RM)
 - 2 - Los Angeles (105-27712) (RM)
 - 1 - Philadelphia (65-6346)

65-74012-825 REC-110
 8-4
 22 JUL 30 1971

Distribution Record of Attached Report	
Agency	PAH/LSO, DCD (Brughardt)
Request Recd	(By [Signature])
Date Fwd	8/2/71
How Fwd	15
By	[Signature]


Notations

NAT. INT. SEC.

57 AUG 11 1971

COVER PAGE

PH 65-6346



DISSEMINATION

The identity of [REDACTED] is being maintained by
the Bureau and Philadelphia.

-B4-
COVER PAGE

PH 65-6346



-BIV-
COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of:

Date:

JUL 28 1971

Office: Philadelphia, Pa.

Field Office File #:

65-6346

Bureau File #:

65-74060

Title:

DANIEL BLOOMING

Character:

ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis

-RUC-

DETAILS:

On July 13, 1971, [REDACTED]
Hotel Continental, Cambridge, Mass., advised that during
the period March 18-25, 1971, fifty-five (55) hotel regis-
trations were executed. Included in the 55 were the following:

PH 65-6346

William Middleton Young

born 11/15/1915 (b. 11/15/1915)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised he did not want to be interviewed by the FBI. [REDACTED] 11/15/1915

[REDACTED] on July 21, 1961.
advised [REDACTED] is issued to [REDACTED] current residence [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He previously resided [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed on several occasions in the latter part of 1962 in connection with another investigative matter. [REDACTED] This was his third marriage. [REDACTED] and noted for his work in the [REDACTED]

PH 65-6346

Mass. In 1941 they moved to [REDACTED] when [REDACTED]
married for the second time. They moved to the [REDACTED]
area upon her marriage to [REDACTED] in 1946, where they
lived in [REDACTED] Pa., and subsequently at
Philadelphia, Pa.

Voters Registration Records, Chester County
Courthouse, West Chester, Pa. checked in December 1969
reflect [REDACTED] was born [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

F B I

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via Airtel _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)

FROM: SAC, CLEVELAND (65-3521) (P)

RE: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
OO: Los Angeles

ReBuairtel to all offices 7/21/71.

A review of Cleveland indices and contact with logical sources familiar with the established Left, the New Left, and peace groups failed to develop any information indicating ELLSBERG's past or present connection with such group in the Cleveland area.

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM)
2 - Cleveland
TAC:jev
(6)

EX-105

REC-34

65-74060-82

JUL 30 1971

NAT. INT. SEC.

51 AUG 11 1971

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M

Per _____

F B I

Date: 7/27/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
 FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (65-1729) (RUC)
 SUBJECT: MC LEK
 (Nationalities Intelligence)
 ((00:Los Angeles))

Re Bureau airtel to All Offices, 7/21/71.

Indices of Atlanta Office and contacts with informants familiar with activities and organizations of a subversive nature in Atlanta were negative regarding DANIEL ELLSBERG except information set forth in Atlanta report of SA [REDACTED] dated 7/22/71, concerning distribution of document entitled "Pentagon Viet Nam Study - Top Secret - As Published in the New York Times" at conference of Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 6/25-27/71.

② - Bureau (RM)
 2 - Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM)
 1 - Atlanta
 TFL/els
 (5)

REC-34

65-74060-827

JUL 30 1971

EX-105

NATIONAL SECURITY

51 AUG 11 1971

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE DENVER	OFFICE OF ORIGIN LOS ANGELES	DATE 7/27/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 7/23/71
TITLE OF CASE DANIEL ELLSBERG		REPORT MADE BY [REDACTED]	TYPED BY CS
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESP - X	

REFERENCE: Denver report of SA **[REDACTED]** 7/21/71;
 Denver teletype to Bureau 7/21/71;
 Bureau teletype to Los Angeles 7/22/71.

- P -

LEADS:DENVER DIVISIONAT DENVER, COLORADO:

Per referenced report, will await decision of Departmental officials in Boston, Massachusetts, regarding service of subpoenas on BURT WALLRICH and ANNE GUILFOILE, 701 South Washington Street.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN: PENDING OVER ONE YEAR <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		
APPROVED <i>[Signature]</i>						SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	
COPIES MADE: (8)-Bureau (65-73454) (RM) 2-Boston (65-5236) (RM) (1-USA, Boston) 3-Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM) (1-USA, Los Angeles) 2-Denver (105-4507)						DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW 65-74060-811 8-4 6 JUL 30 1971 REC-3 EX-105	
Dissemination Record of Attached Report						Notations	
Agency	AFM/ISD, DCD (Bryhardt)					<i>UPH/CH</i> <i>NAT. SEC.</i>	
Request Recd.	By Home						
Date Fwd.	8/2/71						
How Fwd.	RS						

51 AUG 11 1971

- A* -

COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1-USA, Boston, Massachusetts
1-USA, Los Angeles, California

Report of: [REDACTED]

Date: July 27, 1971

Office: Denver

Field Office File #: 105-4507

Bureau File #: 65-73454

Title: DANIEL ELLSBERG

Character: ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis:

[REDACTED] Daniel Ellsberg,
interviewed. [REDACTED] cooperative but could furnish
no pertinent information classified documents being
ELLSBERG's possession.

- P -

DETAILS:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1.

Date of transcription 7/27/71

B. APPECK 1875 Europe

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
DANIEL ELLSBERG, has visited him on occasion in the past, but as best he can recall [REDACTED] ELLSBERG's last visit was over a year ago. He recalled that ELLSBERG's present wife, PATRICIA, was with ELLSBERG on the last two visits, both of which were for the purpose of going skiing. At the time of the first of the two last visits, ELLSBERG was not yet married to PATRICIA.

[REDACTED] could recall no visit in August, 1969, and stated that ELLSBERG visited him less frequently than he did [REDACTED] another relative in Estes Park, Colorado. He could recall no packages in ELLSBERG's possession during any visit which could have contained documents. He stated ELLSBERG never discussed having classified papers of any sort.

He stated that he and his wife [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and he first learned that ELLSBERG was involved with classified documents when he read of it in the Herald-Tribune while overseas.

an office [REDACTED]

handles [REDACTED]

from which he [REDACTED]

Interviewed on 7/23/71 at Denver, Colorado File # DN 105-4507

SAs [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (BDA:CS)

Date dictated 7/27/71

FBI

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

AIRMAIL

(Priority)

copy

for
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
ATTN: DID
FROM: SAC, MILWAUKEE (65-2035) RUC
SUBJECT: MC LEK
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE

your material

Re Milwaukee report of SA [redacted]
7/22/71, Milwaukee teletypes to Director, 7/20/71
and 7/28/71.

No pertinent information developed regarding
DANIEL ELLSBERG or his association with established left,
New Left or peace groups within the Milwaukee Division.
Milwaukee indices negative regarding ELLSBERG.

m

EX-105

REC-34

65-74060-820

15 JUL 31 1971

2 - Bureau RM
1 - Milwaukee
KAM/bkc

(3)

NAO [unclear] SEC.

51 AUG 11 1971

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

FBI

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

AIRMAIL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)

FROM: SAC, JACKSON (65-46) (RUC)

MC LEK

(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

OO: LOS ANGELES

Re Bureau airtel to Albany, 7/21/71.

The Jackson Division had one informant, [REDACTED] attend May-Day activities sponsored by Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) at Washington, D. C., during the month of May, 1971. [REDACTED] currently unavailable for contact.

B. APPROX 1949

[REDACTED] advised only one person from Mississippi known to attend PCPJ activities in Washington, D. C. during May, 1971, this person being [REDACTED] age 22, who attended the demonstration for curiosity reasons. Source, who has been in daily contact with [REDACTED] advised she has never mentioned any information concerning DANIEL ELLSBERG. Source is not personally acquainted with ELLSBERG.

Jackson indices negative.

EX-105

REC-32

65-74060-830

1971

15 JUL 31 1971

2-Bureau (RM)
1-Jackson
CS:pjb
(3)

NAT. INT. SEC.

51 AUG 11 1971

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

F B I

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via Airtel _____

(Priority)

To: Director, FBI (65-74060)

From: SAC, San Juan (65-496) RUC

MC LEK

(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
(OO:LA)

ReBuairtel to AL dated 7/21/71.

Indices of the San Juan Office reflect no information relating to DANIEL ELLSBERG.

The following investigation to determine if ELLSBERG was in contact with pro-communist or pro-independence elements on the island of Puerto Rico was negative:

[REDACTED]

contacted on 7/27/71, [REDACTED]
contacted on 7/27/71, and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] contacted on 7/27/71.

me

Local confidential sources were contacted on 7/27 and 7/28/71 and advised they had no information bearing on ELLSBERG'S past or present connections with organizations of a subversive nature.

- (2) - Bureau (RM)
2 - Los Angeles (RM)
1 - San Juan

JJK:clb
(5)

EX-105

REC-32

65-74060-831

JUL 31 1971

Approved: *CDU/300*

Sent _____

NAT. INT. SEC.
M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

59 AUG 11 1971

F B I

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (65-1729) (RUC)

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
OO: Los Angeles

Re Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 7/21/71.

Indices of Atlanta Office and contacts with informants familiar with activities and organizations of a subversive nature in Atlanta were negative regarding DANIEL ELLSBERG except information set forth in Atlanta report of SA [REDACTED] dated 7/22/71, concerning distribution of document entitled, "PENTAGON VIET NAM STUDY - TOP SECRET - AS PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES" at conference of Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 6/25-27/71.

EX-105

REC-34

65-74060-832

22 JUL 30 1971

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM)
1 - Atlanta
TFL/jwu
(5)

W. J. Hall
NAT. INT. SEC.
W. J. Hall

31 AUG 11 1971

Approved: [Signature]
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

GPO

FBI

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060) ATTENTION: DID
FROM: SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (65-1447) (P)
SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

Re Buairtel 7/21/71.

For information of the Bureau, Minneapolis has submitted the following communications which tend to link DANIEL ELLSBERG with subversive or extremist individuals:

1. Minneapolis airtel and LHM captioned "KENNETH EARL TILSEN, SM - C", dated 6/28/71 (Bureau file 100-361062).
2. Minneapolis airtel to Bureau dated 6/28/71, captioned "MC LEK" and containing copy of ELLSBERG's testimony on behalf of FRANCIS XAVIER KRONCKE and MICHAEL DUANE THERRIAULT, who were convicted on charges emanating from their attempted raid on Minnesota Selective Service boards.
3. Minneapolis airtel dated 7/19/71 captioned "MC LEK - Nationalities Intelligence" and LHM of same date captioned "DANIEL ELLSBERG ESPIONAGE - X."

2 - Bureau
2 - Minneapolis
TJM:ras
(4)

EX-105

22 JUL 30 1971

51 AUG 11 1971
Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

☆ U. S. G. P.

PRINTING OFFICE 1971-413-135

MP 65-1447

4. Minneapolis report of SA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] dated 7/22/71 and captioned
"DANIEL ELLSBERG, ESPIONAGE - X."

F B I

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65- 74060)

FROM: SAC, LOUISVILLE (65-933) (P)

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

OO: LOS ANGELES

Re: Bureau Airtel to Albany, 7/21/71,
Louisville Teletype to Bureau, 7/13/71,
Louisville Report of SA [REDACTED]
captioned "DANIEL ELLSBERG, ESPIONAGE-X",
dated 7/15/71.

In accordance with the provisions of referenced Bureau Airtel to Albany, dated 7/21/71, the Bureau's attention is invited to referenced Louisville Teletype and report containing information re identity of subscriber to Kentucky telephone number appearing as collect call charge (4/18/71) on toll record of telephone subscribed to by CORNELIUS SHEEHAN, 4505 Klinge Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., as well as pertinent data contained in Louisville files re said Kentucky telephone subscriber and individual most closely connected therewith.

Louisville has been unable to develop information re association of DANIEL ELLSBERG with above mentioned Kentucky telephone subscriber (Pike County Citizens Association, Elkhorn City, Kentucky) or any subversive organization and/or individuals affiliated therewith within the Louisville Division.

- ② - Bureau (65-74060) (RM)
- 2 - Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM)
- 3 - Louisville
 { 2 - 65-933
 { 1 - 65-934

EVA/vlr
(7)

JUL 30 1971

AUG 11 1971

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

LS 65-933

Investigation at Louisville continuing per instructions set forth in referenced Bureau Airtel to Albany. Bureau will be advised of all pertinent developments re captioned matter.

F B I

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
(Attn: DOMINTEL) *REC-32*

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (65-5236)

SUBJECT: MC LEK
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies of documents received from the USA's office on this date. These documents are as follows:

- 1.) Defendant's Reply Memorandum filed by Attorneys LEONARD B. BOUDIN and CHARLES R. NESSON on behalf of Doctor DANIEL ELLSBERG
- 2.) Reply Memorandum of the U. S. submitted by HERBERT F. TRAVERS, JR., USA, by LAWRENCE P. COHEN, AUSA, Boston, Mass., to the above memorandum *me*
- 3.) Defendant's Response to the Reply Memorandum of the U. S. which was submitted by Attorneys LEONARD B. BOUDIN and CHARLES R. NESSON

1961-1962
1960 AD
ENCLOSURE

② - Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM)
1 - New York (65-25641) (RM)
1 - WFO (65-11613) (RM)
2 - Boston
REB:mcj
(7)

EX-105

REC-32

65-74060-835

12 JUL 30 1971

NAT'L I.

Approved: *[Signature]*
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES
v.
DANIEL ELLSBERG,
Defendant

Magistrate's Doc. No. 14-1
Case No. 71 -

DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM

I.

In oral argument the Government expressed agreement with the defendant on two critical points.

First, it acknowledged that a removal hearing is not a pro forma proceeding, but rather that it is a judicial function of this Court, involving a deliberative process during which defendant's constitutional and statutory rights must be afforded full protection

1/ In our principal memorandum we stressed the fact that removal will not be ordered where to do so would subject a defendant to prosecution in a district lacking venue. United States v. Winston, 267, F.Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Defendant, in this removal hearing, does not raise any question as to venue in California. The purpose of the discussion in our memorandum of the fact that the venue issue may be raised in a removal hearing despite the introduction of an indictment, was to underscore the point that removal is not automatic upon presentation of an indictment and proof of the defendant's identity. This also was the purpose of our citation of United States v. Malekh, 190 F.Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) holding that removal will not be ordered if it would infringe a defendant's diplomatic immunity. These cases make it undeniably clear that a warrant of removal will not issue, even where an indictment is present if removal will have the effect of denying or facilitating the denial of a defendant's constitutional rights.

In Winston and Malekh, the Government argued, as it does here that the defendant's request for relief is premature, that it can be heard and decided in the demanding district. But in both Winston and Malekh this argument was flatly rejected on grounds fully applicable here. A claim of constitutional or statutory right which goes to the validity of a court's process, as the Winston and Malekh courts said cannot be deferred since it challenges the very power and jurisdiction of the Court to order removal. Moreover, to defer such claims and to mechanically issue a removal warrant would be a negation of the Court's judicial function. Finally, while the demanding district may eventually rule favorably to the defendant on such claims, the defendant will have, in the meantime, suffered a substantial and irreparable denial of his liberty by virtue of his removal.

Second, the Government recognizes the broad scope of 18 U.S.C. §§2515 and 2518(10)(a) and that their proscription against the use of illegally obtained wiretap and eavesdrop evidence in "any trial, hearing or other proceeding in or before any court" does not contain or imply any exemption for removal hearings. The Government, moreover, has not in its memorandum presented, nor has our research disclosed any legislative history which would support such an exemption.

In fact, the legislative history indicates clearly that there is no exemption from the unqualified prohibition in §§2515 and 2518 for any judicial proceeding, where as here, an individual has been made a party and may as a result of the proceeding be subjected to a denial of liberty or other serious injury.

The provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 relating to wiretapping and eavesdropping represent a full scale "attack" on "unjustifiable interception, disclosure, or use of any wire or oral communications" by private individuals of law enforcement organizations. Sen. Rept. No. 1097, 1968 U.S. Cong. and Adm. News, pp. 2112, 2156 (hereinafter cited S. Rept., supra). Congress explicitly recognized the need to enforce its wiretap and eavesdrop prohibitions "with all appropriate sanctions." Sen. Rept. supra at 2156. Thus, recognizing that criminal prosecutions for violations of §2515 were of limited value, Congress decided to codify and to expand judicially created exclusionary rules. See Rept., supra. It was Congress' expressly stated purpose that no one should benefit from illegal wiretapping or eavesdropping. Therefore, the "perpetrator must be denied the fruits of his unlawful actions in civil and criminal proceedings." Sen. Rept., supra at 2156. This exclusionary remedy "is intended to be comprehensive" in order adequately "to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications, [and] to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings." Sen. Rept., supra at 2156.²

^{2/} It is clear from both the structure and history of §2518 that Congress plainly sought to expand the application of exclusionary rule beyond what had been previously permitted under judicial decisions. Thus, in §2518 Congress created a procedure for obtaining wiretap warrants, resort to which is pointedly encouraged by the exclusion from evidence, under §2518(10)(a), of the fruits of warrantless wiretapping.

Moreover, prior to the enactment of §2515, there was great reluctance on the part of the courts to bar illegally obtained evidence and its fruits from use in non-trial criminal proceedings, such as sentencing hearings. By enacting §2518(10)(a), Congress has expressly directed the application of exclusionary rules in all criminal proceedings to which a defendant is a party. Sen. Rept., supra at 21

The Section 2518(10)(a) ban on the use of illegal evidence applies to "any trial, hearing or proceeding", by which Congress "intended to include all adversary type hearings." Sen.Rept., supra at 2156.³

If there is an exception to this explicit Congressional edict it must be found by specific reference to the statutory provisions or their legislative history. In the absence of a specific expression by Congress, no exception may be found to exist since it was Congress' express intention that the remedy provided by §2518(10)(a) "be comprehensive".

Only two such exceptions were declared by Congress; one was for grand jury hearings.⁴ Thus, in the legislative history to §2518(10)(a) Congress expressed a specific but very narrow determination that this provision not be read as giving anyone standing to object, during grand jury hearings, to the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. This exception is, of course, perfectly consistent with the general intention of Congress to bar illegal evidence from use in "all adversary hearings."

A grand jury hearing, in contrast to a removal hearing, is obviously not an "adversary hearing." Neither the defendant nor his counsel is present in a grand jury hearing. The hearing is conducted in secret; the witnesses may not be confronted or cross-examined by the defendant; only the prosecution's case is presented to the grand jury; the defendant has no right to testify or present witnesses or evidence in his own behalf.

Quite clearly the exception for grand jury hearings represents merely a practical accommodation to the nature of such hearings, and nothing more. As stated in the Senate Report, No. 1097: "Because no person is a party as such to a grand jury proceeding, the provision [§2518(10)(a)] does not envision the making of a motion to suppress in the context of such a proceeding itself." S. Rept., supra at 219.

A removal hearing is unquestionably an adversary hearing at which the defendant and his counsel are present. That removal hearing are governed by §§2515 and 2518(10)(a) is therefore perfectly consistent.

3/ "It would include a trial itself, a probation revocation proceeding or a hearing on a motion for reduction of sentence." S.Rept., supra at 2156.

4/ The other exception bars any assumption of jurisdiction by the "Federal courts over Congress itself." Sen. Rept. supra at 2156.

with the express purpose and intention of Congress. Coupling this with the fact that Congress was capable of specifying exceptions, and did in fact so specify two exceptions, the conclusion is inescapable that removal hearings are intended to be within the scope of the Congressional exclusionary rules set forth in §§2515 and 2518(10)(a).

II.

The Government's argument does not respond to and, in fact, ignores completely the unequivocal wording and intention behind §§2515 and 2518(10)(a). Rather the Government contends that the defendant is seeking prematurely to dismiss the indictment, and thereby to prevent not only his removal, but his prosecution as well. This contention has no support in fact.

The defendant has made no request or suggestion in his moving papers or during oral argument, and none is now made, that the indictment be dismissed on the grounds of its invalidity or insufficiency.

The defendant's motion is made under Rule 40(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to prevent the issuance of a removal warrant; the relief defendant seeks is limited strictly to that purpose. Therefore, the sole question defendant has raised before this Court is whether an arrest warrant issued in California can, consistent with the Fourth Amendment and federal statutes, be enforced by issuance of a removal warrant in this district despite the fact that the arrest warrant is the product of illegal conduct by the Government.

We thought this point was made unmistakeably clear in our principal memorandum and during oral argument. The present motion seeks suppression of the arrest warrant, not dismissal of the indictment.

The defendant is, of necessity, limited to this issue. We recognize that the proper place to challenge the validity of the indictment for purposes of barring prosecution is in California, when and if the Government has certified to this Court that it has not sought to secure defendant's removal on the basis of a tainted arrest warrant and other tainted evidence. It is defendant's removal, not his prosecution, that poses the immediate threat of injury to him. And it is the arrest warrant, not the indictment, that is the prerequisite for removal. Removal is not authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, except where a valid and outstanding arrest warrant has been proven to exist or has been presented to the Court.

to whom the request for removal is made. In fact, no other document issued by the Court in the demanding district is required or necessary to effect defendant's removal. To put it another way, the jurisdiction and power of this Court to order the defendant's removal depends solely on the existence of a valid arrest warrant.

To grant the relief defendant requests, will in no way disable the Government from prosecuting the defendant under the present indictment. All it need do is secure a new arrest warrant on the basis of untainted evidence.⁵

III.

If and when a valid arrest warrant is issued, the Government may seek defendant's removal. It may then seek to introduce the indictment in evidence to establish probable cause under Rule 40(b). But, if like the present arrest warrant, the indictment is also the product of illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping, then it must be excluded (not dismissed) as evidence in this removal hearing. In this case, the Government clearly does not seek, as the Government contends, to prevent defendant's trial on the indictment, but rather he seeks to prevent his removal on the indictment.

The conditions to admissibility of evidence imposed by §§2515 and 2518(10)(a) apply to indictments, just as they do to all other forms of evidence. Sections 2515 and 2518(10)(a) provide without exception or qualification that "[w]henver any wire or oral communication has been intercepted [illegally] no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence . . ." (Emphasis supplied). As we pointed out in our principal memorandum, for purposes of a removal hearing an indictment is merely evidence (conclusive or presumptive) of probable cause; nothing more. Morse v. United States, 267 U.S. 80, 83. As such an indictment is subject, like all evidence, to the rules governing the admissibility of evidence, including those established by §§2515 and 2518(10)(a). Morse v. United States, supra.

Blue v. United States, 384 U.S. 251 and the reference to Blue in Sen. Rept. No. 1097, on which the Government places chief reliance have no bearing on this case.

^{5/} The Government's failure to do so thus far provides grounds for stopping the Government from introducing any independent evidence against the defendant. And if it does not, then the Government may be seeking to harass the defendant by securing his removal for a prosecution it may ultimately have to drop because it does not have any evidence to support its charges.

In Blue, the defendant sought dismissal of the indictment because the Government might introduce at trial evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

The District Court holding in the defendant's favor was grounded on what it found, as the Supreme Court characterized it, "to be past compulsory self-incrimination and in its [the District Court's] apparent belief that this mischief could not be undone save by turning back the clock through ending the prosecution." 384 U.S. at 254. The Supreme Court rejected this remedy and ruled that while the defendant might be entitled to suppression of such evidence, he was not entitled, on the grounds presented, to dismissal of the indictment and preclusion of the prosecution altogether.

The differences between this case and Blue are both fundamental and obvious.⁶

First, defendant has not moved for the indictment's dismissal and no attempt is being made to bar his prosecution. Indeed, the indictment is of no relevance to this proceeding until the Government has certified that the present arrest warrant is untainted or that it has obtained a valid, untainted arrest warrant.

Second, defendant seeks to suppress, not dismiss, the indictment in a removal hearing where it is offered as evidence. The underlying premise of the Court in Blue is that the indictment, whatever its evidentiary source, is nothing more than a notice of charges; it is not evidence against the defendant. Therefore, if the indictment serves its purpose of adequately notifying the defendant of the charge against him, its issuance is not prejudicial. Again, by contrast, an indictment in a removal hearing is offered as evidence against the defendant, and if admitted, will certainly prejudice the defendant since it forecloses the principal, substantive defense to removal.

Third, essentially, Blue's complaint was directed against the injury he would suffer were the illegally obtained evidence admitted against him at trial. Thus, in Blue, as in most cases involving illegal evidence presented to a grand jury, the defendant's rights are fully protected by suppression of the evidence for purposes of the trial.

^{6/} It should be noted that Blue did not, in fact, claim that the indictment he sought to quash was the product of tainted evidence. 384 U.S. at 254.

Also, Blue is in part premised on two prior decisions of the Court which held that an indictment is based on hearsay is not a ground for its dismissal. 384 U.S. at 255 n.3. But these prior decisions no longer appear to be the law. See e.g. United States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 42-43 (D.R.I. 1969).

Issuance of an indictment based on illegally obtained evidence does not, by itself, inflict substantial and irreparable injury on the defendant. But, it is a completely different case where a Court issues a removal warrant to enforce an arrest warrant based on illegally obtained evidence. In that case, a defendant immediately suffers both severe and irreparable injury. To safeguard against such wrongful and improvident removals is the essential purpose of Rule 40. This case bears out the wisdom of Rule 40. No hearing or remedy provided by the District Court in California will in any way adequately redress the wrong done to defendant. He will already have been uprooted from his home, family and friends and the Government will have gained the full benefit of its illegal conduct at the expense of defendant's right to privacy and the integrity of the judicial process.⁷

Read in this light the legislative reference to Blue is easily seen to be inapposite to this case. See also Matter of Egan, ___ F.2d ___ (3rd Cir. 1971). Moreover, the legislative history relied on by the Government, makes clear that Congress excepted grand jury hearings from the coverage of §2518(10)(a) for the very practical reason that "no person is a party to a grand jury proceeding". Sen. Rept., supra at 2195. However, defendant is plainly a party to this removal proceeding. Therefore, defendant's claim of right does not conflict with the "general rule" Congress sought to preserve, that "[n]ormally, there is no limitation on the character of evidence that may be presented to a grand jury, which is enforceable by an individual." Sen. Rept., supra. By his motion, defendant does not seek to limit the character of evidence presented to the grand jury; but rather the character of evidence presented in this adversary hearing for removal.⁸

^{7/} The situation here is analogous to that presented where an illegal arrest warrant is sought to be enforced. A conviction based on evidence seized incident to the illegal arrest may be suppressed by the trial court or the conviction reversed because the evidence was introduced. But that remedy does not preclude a defendant's right to be immediately freed from custody imposed under the illegal warrant. Here, as in the hypothetical case, the presence of a future remedy can be taken as authority for illegal deprivation of a defendant's liberty in the interim. Cf. In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276, 279-280 (7th Cir. 1971).
^{8/} It is significant that Congress did not intend to codify completely the rule Blue established for grand jury hearings. This plainly appears from the sentence in the Senate Report No. 1097, which begins where the portion quoted in the Government's memorandum ends. The Report states:

when a motion to suppress is granted in another context, its scope may include use in a future grand jury proceeding."
Thus, a defendant can bar the use of illegally obtained evidence in any future grand jury proceeding instituted against him. Presumably,

Moreover, the legislative history to 504(a), which was enacted in 1970, reflects the fact that Congress sought to comply fully with the Supreme Court's ruling in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165. Alderman dispelled any doubt as to the right of a defendant, in this or any other proceeding, to bar enforcement of a search warrant secured on the basis of illegal wiretap and eavesdrop evidence. 394 U.S. at 177-179. See also In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971) where the Court ordered invalidation of a grand jury subpoena issued in violation of the Fourth Amendment, despite Government contentions that the action was premature and that the proper remedy was to move for the exclusion of the evidence at trial. The Court rejected the Government's argument because it was founded on the incorrect "premise that the grand jury may for its own purposes compel production of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment." 442 F.2d 280. For similar reasons the District Court in United States v. Bailey, ___ F.Supp. ___ (N.D.Ill. 1971) 40 U.S.L.W.2014 denied a government motion which would indiscriminately compel defendants to furnish handwriting exemplars on the grounds that it would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. In view of Alderman, Dionisio and Bailey, as well as the evident Congressional intention to provide a "comprehensive" and meaningful remedy for persons subjected to illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping, it is patently unreasonable for the Government to

8/(Con'd.) also, if the defendant learns of the Government's intention to utilize such evidence in an attempt to obtain a superseding indictment or any other indictment, he may enjoin the Government and the grand jury from taking such action. If a subsequent indictment has been rendered, it clearly would be subject to a dismissal motion under §2518(10)(a) notwithstanding Blue.

maintain that the defendant does not have the right in this hearing for his removal to bar the enforcement of a tainted arrest warrant and the introduction against him of other tainted evidence, where in this proceeding it is not merely his property, but his liberty which is in jeopardy.

IV

Contrary to the Government's assertion, the defendant does not seek full disclosure of its case. A very limited, albeit important, hearing is contemplated by the defendant's motion. The Magistrate in this proceeding is fully empowered, as the Attorney General has recognized, 1970 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 4058 to determine the legality of the Government's evidence and to adopt such procedures as he may deem necessary to safeguard the interests of both parties and prevent any abuse of the process. See 18 U.S.C. §2518(8) (d).

Conclusion

Defendant's motion is not only grounded on §§2515, 2518(10) (a) and 3504(a), but is also grounded independently on Rule 40 and the Fourth Amendment. Significantly the Government's memorandum ignores this latter ground for defendant's motion. The singular thrust of the Government's memorandum is directed at §§2515, 2518(10), (a) and 3504(a). For that reason, the substance of our reply has been limited to a discussion of the applicability of those provisions. And it is clear that we are entitled to relief under those provisions. But it is equally clear, and we do not intend that our silence in this reply be taken as abandonment of the point, that we are independently entitled to the relief requested in the instant motion under Rule 40

and the Fourth Amendment.

Therefore, upon all the grounds stated above and previously stated in our principal memorandum, we respectfully submit that the relief requested in the instant motion be granted in each and every respect.

Dated: July 23, 1971

Respectfully submitted,

Leonard B. Boudin

Leonard B. Boudin
Langdell Hall
Cambridge, Massachusetts
and

Charles R. Nesson
Langdell Hall
Cambridge, Massachusetts,

Attorneys for Defendant

Of counsel,
David Rosenberg.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

v. :

MAGISTRATE'S NO. 14-1 71-315

DANIEL ELLSBERG,

Defendant :

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO THE REPLY MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES

1. The Government argues that removal can be effected, under Rule 40, without presentation of a valid arrest warrant. In this, the Government is clearly in error.

As it concedes, Rule 40 (b) (1) provides that the removal process is initiated by an arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant issued in the demanding district. The express reference to an arrest warrant in (b) (1) is not superfluous or the result of carelessness by Congress, as the Government has intimated. Rather Congress has explicitly made the existence and presentation of a valid arrest warrant the predicate for removal under Rule 40. Indeed, where a person has been arrested without a warrant, Rule 40 (b) (4), which the Government has apparently overlooked, provides that the removal hearing "be continued for a reasonable time, upon a showing of probable cause..." but that removal shall not be permitted "unless a warrant issued in the district in which the offense was committed is presented."*

*The Government does not cite and our research has not disclosed a single case in which a Court ordered a defendant's removal solely on the basis of the existence of an indictment. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, cited by the Government is inapposite. Frisbie involved neither arrests, arrest warrants, federal prosecution nor federal removal proceedings. Nor is United States v. Stauffer, 22 F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1927), also relied on by the Government, relevant to this case. Stauffer's reference to "bond or arrest", quoted by the Government, does not relate, as the Government implies, to the issue of what constitutes a predicate for removal. Rather, that reference pertains only to the fact that a person may not object to removal on the grounds that he is presently in custody, whether in prison or on bail, in the removal district.

2. The Government's reply, does not argue that 18 U.S.C. §§2515, 2518(10)(a) and 3504(a) are inapplicable to removal hearings, but rather merely that "practical considerations" bar their application. We fail to understand the relevance of the Government's argument.

Under §3504(a) the Government is required to do no more than confirm or deny the existence in this proceeding of wire-tap or eavesdrop evidence or evidence derived therefrom. If the Government confirms that the indictment bears such a taint then it may not be offered in evidence in this proceeding to establish probable cause. While the Government has thus far not complied with this requirement, it is clear that to do so will not subject Government files or grand jury transcripts to a search by anyone.

Moreover, the Government may avoid all inquiry and proceed with defendant's prosecution by establishing probable cause through independent evidence without offering the indictment in evidence.

If the Government confirms that it has engaged in illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping, and persists in introducing the indictment in evidence in this proceeding then a hearing must be held in accordance with the requirements of §§2515, 2518 and 3504 to determine whether the indictment is tainted by the Government's illegal conduct. The dangers the Government claims will result from such a hearing are unreal. The Magistrate is empowered to establish procedures to prevent unnecessary disclosure of grand jury testimony. Certainly, in a pretrial suppression hearing held pursuant to §2518, which the Government concedes defendant is entitled to (in California), the sources of the Government's evidence

*(continuation of footnote from preceding page)

issued in that district. Stauffer does note, however, that the removal proceeding in question was initiated by the defendants having been "rearrested." Id. at 553.

grand jury testimony will be subject to such review. That this pretrial review may entail discovery of the Government's case not otherwise authorized by Rules 6 and 16, would not, as the Government again concedes, bar defendant from asserting his rights under 18 U.S.C. §§2515, 2518 and 3504.*

3. Thus, the Government's argument boils down to one of prematurity. But, we have shown that a suppression hearing in California to exclude wiretap and eavesdrop evidence from trial does not provide a remedy for the immediate denial of defendant's liberty that will result from his illegal removal. Only this Court, at this time can afford a meaningful remedy for the deprivation of defendant's rights.

Respectfully submitted,

Leonard B. Boudin

Leonard B. Boudin
Langdell Hall
Cambridge, Mass.

Charles R. Nesson
Langdell Hall
Cambridge, Mass.

Of Counsel

David R. Rosenberg

*We fail to understand the relevance of the Government's rather ambiguous reference to United States v. Friedland, No. 71-1071 (1st Cir. June 29, 1971) since defendant does not seek to invalidate the indictment or bar his prosecution

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

v. :

MAGISTRATE'S NO. 14-1 71-315

DANIEL ELLSBERG,

Defendant :

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2. The Government's reply, does not argue that 18 U.S.C. §§2515, 2518(10)(a) and 3504(a) are inapplicable to removal hearings, but rather merely that "practical considerations" bar their application. We fail to understand the relevance of the Government's argument.

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*(continuation of footnote from preceding page)

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grand jury testimony will be subject to such review. That this pretrial review may entail discovery of the Government's case not otherwise authorized by Rules 6 and 16, would not, as the Government again concedes, bar defendant from asserting his rights under 18 U.S.C. §§2515, 2518 and 3504.*

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Respectfully submitted,

Leonard B. Boudin

Leonard B. Boudin
Langdell Hall
Cambridge, Mass.

Charles R. Nesson
Langdell Hall
Cambridge, Mass.

Of Counsel

David R. Rosenberg

*We fail to understand the relevance of the Government's rather ambiguous reference to United States v. Friedland, No. 71-1071 (1st Cir. June 29, 1971) since defendant does not seek to invalidate the indictment or bar his prosecution.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR MASSACHUSETTS

* * * * *

UNITED STATES

v.

DANIEL ELLSEERG,

Defendant

* * * * *

Magistrate's Doc. No. 14-1
Case No. 71 -

DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM

I.

In oral argument the Government expressed agreement with the defendant on two critical points.

First, it acknowledged that a removal hearing is not a pro forma proceeding, but rather that it is a judicial function of this Court, involving a deliberative process during which defendant's constitutional and statutory rights must be afforded full protection

1/ In our principal memorandum we stressed the fact that removal will not be ordered where to do so would subject a defendant to prosecution in a district lacking venue. United States v. Winston, 267, F.Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Defendant, in this removal hearing, does not raise any question as to venue in California. The purpose of the discussion in our memorandum of the fact that the venue issue may be raised in a removal hearing despite the introduction of an indictment, was to underscore the point that removal is not automatic upon presentation of an indictment and proof of the defendant's identity. This also was the purpose of our citation of United States v. Malekh, 190 F.Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) holding that removal will not be ordered if it would infringe a defendant's diplomatic immunity. These cases make it undeniably clear that a warrant of removal will not issue, even where an indictment is presented if removal will have the effect of denying or facilitating the denial of a defendant's constitutional rights.

In Winston and Malekh, the Government argued, as it does here that the defendant's request for relief is premature, that it can be heard and decided in the demanding district. But in both Winston and Malekh this argument was flatly rejected on grounds fully applicable here. A claim of constitutional or statutory right which goes to the validity of a court's process, as the Winston and Malekh Courts held, cannot be deferred since it challenges the very power and jurisdiction of the Court to order removal. Moreover, to defer such claims and to mechanically issue a removal warrant would be a negation of the Court's judicial function. Finally, while the demanding district may eventually rule favorably to the defendant on such claims, the defendant will have, in the meantime, suffered a substantial and irreparable denial of his liberty by virtue of his removal.

Second, the Government recognizes the broad scope of 18 U.S.C. §§2515 and 2518(10)(a) and that their proscription against the use of illegally obtained wiretap and eavesdrop evidence in "any trial, hearing or other proceeding in or before any court" do not contain or imply any exemption for removal hearings. The Government, moreover, has not in its memorandum presented, nor has our research disclosed any legislative history which would support such an exemption.

In fact, the legislative history indicates clearly that there is no exemption from the unqualified prohibition in §§2515 and 2518 for any judicial proceeding, where as here, an individual has been made a party and may as a result of the proceeding be subjected to a denial of liberty or other serious injury.

The provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 relating to wiretapping and eavesdropping represent a full scale "attack" on "unjustifiable interception, disclosure, or use of any wire or oral communications" by private individuals or law enforcement organizations. Sen. Rept. No. 1097, 1968 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, pp. 2112, 2155 (hereinafter cited S. Rept., supra). Congress explicitly recognized the need to enforce its wiretap and eavesdrop prohibitions "with all appropriate sanctions."

Sen. Rept. supra at 2156. Thus, recognizing that criminal prosecutions for violations of §2515 were of limited value, Congress decided to codify and to expand judicially created exclusionary rules. See Rept., supra. It was Congress' expressly stated purpose that no one should benefit from illegal wiretapping or eavesdropping. Therefore the "perpetrator must be denied the fruits of his unlawful actions in civil and criminal proceedings." Sen. Rept., supra at 2156. The exclusionary remedy "is intended to be comprehensive" in order adequately "to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications, [and] to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings." Sen. Rept., supra at 2156.²

^{2/} It is clear from both the structure and history of §2518 that Congress plainly sought to expand the application of exclusionary rules beyond what had been previously permitted under judicial decisions. Thus, in §2518 Congress created a procedure for obtaining wiretap warrants, resort to which is pointedly encouraged by the exclusion of the fruits of warrantless wiretapping, under §2518(10)(a), of the fruits of warrantless wiretapping.

Moreover, prior to the enactment of §2515, there was great reluctance on the part of the courts to bar illegally obtained evidence and its fruits from use in non-trial criminal proceedings, such as sentencing hearings. By enacting §2518(10)(a), Congress has expressly directed the application of exclusionary rules in all criminal proceedings to which a defendant is a party. Sen. Rept., supra at

The Section 2518(10)(a) ban on the use of illegal evidence applies to "any trial, hearing or proceeding", by which Congress "intended to include all adversary type hearings." Sen.Rept., supra at 2156.³

If there is an exception to this explicit Congressional edict it must be found by specific reference to the statutory provisions or their legislative history. In the absence of a specific expression by Congress, no exception may be found to exist since it was Congress' express intention that the remedy provided by §2518(10)(a) "be comprehensive".

Only two such exceptions were declared by Congress; one was for grand jury hearings.⁴ Thus, in the legislative history to §2518(10)(a) Congress expressed a specific but very narrow determination that this provision not be read as giving anyone standing to object, during grand jury hearings, to the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. This exception is, of course, perfectly consistent with the general intention of Congress to bar illegal evidence from use in "all adversary hearings."

A grand jury hearing, in contrast to a removal hearing, is obviously not an "adversary hearing." Neither the defendant nor his counsel is present in a grand jury hearing. The hearing is conducted in secret; the witnesses may not be confronted or cross-examined by the defendant; only the prosecution's case is presented to the grand jury; the defendant has no right to testify or present witnesses or evidence in his own behalf.

Quite clearly the exception for grand jury hearings represents merely a practical accommodation to the nature of such hearings, and nothing more. As stated in the Senate Report, No. 1097: "Because no person is a party as such to a grand jury proceeding, the provision [§2518(10)(a)] does not envision the making of a motion to suppress in the context of such a proceeding itself." S. Rept., supra at 2195.

A removal hearing is unquestionably an adversary hearing at which the defendant and his counsel are present. That removal hearing are governed by §§2515 and 2518(10)(a) is therefore perfectly consistent.

3/ "It would include a trial itself, a probation revocation proceeding or a hearing on a motion for reduction of sentence." S.Rept., supra at 2156.

4/ The other exception bars any assumption of jurisdiction by the "Federal courts in any case involving the removal of a defendant from a grand jury hearing." S. Rept., supra at 2195.

with the express purpose and intention of Congress. Coupling this with the fact that Congress was capable of specifying exceptions, and did in fact so specify two exceptions, the conclusion is inescapable that removal hearings are intended to be within the scope of the Congressional exclusionary rules set forth in §§2515 and 2518(10) (a).

II.

The Government's argument does not respond to and, in fact ignores completely the unequivocal wording and intention behind §§2515 and 2518(10) (a). Rather the Government contends that the defendant is seeking prematurely to dismiss the indictment, and thereby to prevent not only his removal, but his prosecution as well. This contention has no support in fact.

The defendant has made no request or suggestion in his moving papers or during oral argument, and none is now made, that the indictment be dismissed on the grounds of its invalidity or insufficiency.

The defendant's motion is made under Rule 40(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to prevent the issuance of a removal warrant; the relief defendant seeks is limited strictly to that purpose. Therefore, the sole question defendant has raised before this Court is whether an arrest warrant issued in California can, consistent with the Fourth Amendment and federal statutes, be enforced by issuance of a removal warrant in this district despite the fact that the arrest warrant is the product of illegal conduct by the Government.

We thought this point was made unmistakably clear in our principal memorandum and during oral argument. The present motion seeks suppression of the arrest warrant, not dismissal of the indictment.

The defendant is, of necessity, limited to this issue. We recognize that the proper place to challenge the validity of the indictment for purposes of barring prosecution is in California, when and if the Government has certified to this Court that it has not sought to secure defendant's removal on the basis of a tainted arrest warrant and other tainted evidence. It is defendant's removal, not his prosecution, that poses the immediate threat of injury to him. And it is the arrest warrant, not the indictment, that is the predicate for removal. Removal is not authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, except where a valid and outstanding arrest warrant has been proven to exist or has been presented to the Court.

to whom the request for removal is made. In fact, no other document issued by the Court in the demanding district is required or necessary to effect defendant's removal. To put it another way, the jurisdiction and power of this Court to order the defendant's removal depends solely on the existence of a valid arrest warrant.

To grant the relief defendant requests, will in no way, disable the Government from prosecuting the defendant under the present indictment. All it need do is secure a new arrest warrant on the basis of untainted evidence.⁵

III.

If and when a valid arrest warrant is issued, the Government may seek defendant's removal. It may then seek to introduce the indictment in evidence to establish probable cause under Rule 40(b). But, if like the present arrest warrant, the indictment is also the product of illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping, then it must be excluded (not dismissed) as evidence in this removal hearing. In this defendant clearly does not seek, as the Government contends, to prevent his trial on the indictment, but rather he seeks to prevent his removal on the indictment.

The conditions to admissibility of evidence imposed by §§2515 and 2518(10) (a) apply to indictments, just as they do to all other forms of evidence. Sections 2515 and 2518(10) (a) provide without exception or qualification that "[w]henver any wire or oral communication has been intercepted [illegally] no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence . . ." (Emphasis supplied). As we pointed out in our principal memorandum, for purposes of a removal hearing an indictment is merely evidence (conclusive or presumptive) of probable cause, nothing more. Morse v. United States, 267 U.S. 80, 83. As such an indictment is subject, like all evidence, to the rules governing the admissibility of evidence, including those established by §§2515 and 2518(10) (a). Morse v. United States, supra.

Blue v. United States, 384 U.S. 251 and the reference to Blue in Sen. Rept. No. 1097, on which the Government places chief reliance have no bearing on this case.

^{5/} The Government's failure to provide grounds for speculation as to whether it has any independent evidence against the defendant. And if it does not, then the Government may be seeking to harass the defendant by securing his removal for a prosecution it may ultimately have to drop because it does not have any evidence to support its charges.

In Blue, the defendant sought dismissal of the indictment because the Government might introduce at trial evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

The District Court holding in the defendant's favor was grounded on what it found, as the Supreme Court characterized it, "to be past compulsory self-incrimination and in its [the District Court's] apparent belief that this mischief could not be undone save by turning back the clock through ending the prosecution." 384 U.S. at 254. The Supreme Court rejected this remedy and ruled that while the defendant might be entitled to suppression of such evidence, he was not entitled, on the grounds presented, to dismissal of the indictment and preclusion of the prosecution altogether.

The differences between this case and Blue are both fundamental and obvious.⁶

First, defendant has not moved for the indictment's dismissal and no attempt is being made to bar his prosecution. Indeed, the indictment is of no relevance to this proceeding until the Government has certified that the present arrest warrant is untainted or that it has obtained a valid, untainted arrest warrant.

Second, defendant seeks to suppress, not dismiss, the indictment in a removal hearing where it is offered as evidence. The underlying premise of the Court in Blue is that the indictment, whatever its evidentiary source, is nothing more than a notice of charges; it is not evidence against the defendant. Therefore, if the indictment serves its purpose of adequately notifying the defendant of the charge against him, its issuance is not prejudicial. Again, by contrast, an indictment in a removal hearing is offered as evidence against the defendant, and if admitted, will certainly prejudice the defendant since it forecloses the principal, substantive defense to removal.

Third, essentially, Blue's complaint was directed against the injury he would suffer were the illegally obtained evidence admitted against him at trial. Thus, in Blue, as in most cases involving illegal evidence presented to a grand jury, the defendant's rights are fully protected by suppression of the evidence for purposes of the trial.

^{6/} It should be noted that Blue did not, in fact, claim that the indictment he sought to quash was the product of tainted evidence. 384 U.S. at 254.

Also, Blue is in part premised on two prior decisions of the Court which held that the fact an indictment is based on hearsay is not a ground for its dismissal. 384 U.S. at 255 n.3. But these prior decisions no longer appear to be the law. See e.g. United States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 42-43 (D.R.I. 1969).

Issuance of an indictment based on illegally obtained evidence does not, by itself, inflict substantial and irreparable injury on the defendant. But, it is a completely different case where a Court issues a removal warrant to enforce an arrest warrant based on illegally obtained evidence. In that case, a defendant immediately suffers both severe and irreparable injury. To safeguard against such wrongful and improvident removals is the essential purpose of Rule 40. This case bears out the wisdom of Rule 40. No hearing or remedy provided by the District Court in California will in any way adequately redress the wrong done to defendant. He will already have been uprooted from his home, family and friends and the Government will have gained the full benefit of its illegal conduct at the expense of defendant's right to privacy and the integrity of the judicial process.⁷

Read in this light the legislative reference to Blue is easily seen to be inapposite to this case. See also Matter of Egan, ___ F.2d ___ (3rd Cir. 1971). Moreover, the legislative history relied on by the Government, makes clear that Congress excepted grand jury hearings from the coverage of §2518(10)(2) for the very practical reason that "no person is a party to a grand jury proceeding". Sen. Rept., supra at 2195. However, defendant is plainly a party to this removal proceeding. Therefore, defendant's claim of right does not conflict with the "general rule" Congress sought to preserve, that "[n]ormally, there is no limitation on the character of evidence that may be presented to a grand jury, which is enforceable by an individual." Sen. Rept., supra. By his motion, defendant does not seek to limit the character of evidence presented to the grand jury; but rather the character of evidence presented in this adversary hearing for removal.⁸

^{7/} The situation here is analogous to that presented where an illegal arrest warrant is sought to be enforced. A conviction based on evidence seized incident to the illegal arrest may be suppressed by the trial court or the conviction reversed because the evidence was introduced. But that remedy does not preclude a defendant's right to be immediately freed from custody imposed under the illegal warrant. Here, as in the hypothetical case, the presence of a future remedy can be taken as authority for illegal deprivation of a defendant's liberty in the interim. Cf. In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276, 279-280 (7th Cir. 1971).
^{8/} It is significant that Congress did not intend to codify completely the rule Blue established for grand jury hearings. This plainly appears from the sentence in the Senate Report No. 109 where the portion quoted in the Government's memorandum ends. The Report states:

It is the intent of the provision only that when a motion to suppress is granted in another context, its scope may include use in a future grand jury proceeding."
Thus, a defendant can bar the use of illegally obtained evidence in any future grand jury proceeding instituted against him. Presumably,

Moreover, the legislative history of §3504(a), which was enacted in 1970, reflects the fact that Congress sought to comply fully with the Supreme Court's ruling in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165. Alderman dispelled any doubt as to the right of a defendant, in this or any other proceeding, to bar enforcement of a search warrant secured on the basis of illegal wiretap and eavesdrop evidence. 394 U.S. at 177-179. See also In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971) where the Court ordered invalidation of a grand jury subpoena issued in violation of the Fourth Amendment, despite Government contention that the action was premature and that the proper remedy was to move for the exclusion of the evidence at trial. The Court rejected the Government's argument because it was founded on the incorrect "premise that the grand jury may for its own purposes compel production of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment." 442 F.2d 280. For similar reasons the District Court in United States v. Bailey, __F.Supp. __ (N.D. Ill. 1971) 40 U.S.L.W. 2014 denied a government motion which would indiscriminately compel defendants to furnish handwriting exemplars on the grounds that it would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. In view of Alderman, Dionisio and Bailey, as well as the evident Congressional intention to provide a "comprehensive" and meaningful remedy for persons subjected to illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping, it is patently unreasonable for the Government to

8/(Con'd.) also, if the defendant learns of the Government's intention to utilize such evidence in an attempt to obtain a superseding indictment or any other indictment, he may enjoin the Government and the grand jury from taking such action. If a subsequent indictment has been rendered, it clearly would be subject to a dismissal motion under §2518(10)(a) notwithstanding Blue.

maintain that the defendant does not have the right in this hearing for his removal to bar the enforcement of a tainted arrest warrant and the introduction against him of other tainted evidence, where in this proceeding it is not merely his property, but his liberty which is in jeopardy.

IV

Contrary to the Government's assertion, the defendant does not seek full disclosure of its case. A very limited, albeit important, hearing is contemplated by the defendant's motion. The Magistrate in this proceeding is fully empowered, as the Attorney General has recognized, 1970 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 4058 to determine the legality of the Government's evidence and to adopt such procedures as he may deem necessary to safeguard the interests of both parties and prevent any abuse of the process. See 18 U.S.C. §2518(8) (d).

Conclusion

Defendant's motion is not only grounded on §§2515, 2518(10) (a) and 3504(a), but is also grounded independently on Rule 40 and the Fourth Amendment. Significantly the Government's memorandum ignores this latter ground for defendant's motion. The singular thrust of the Government's memorandum is directed at §§2515, 2518(10) (a) and 3504(a). For that reason, the substance of our reply has been limited to a discussion of the applicability of those provisions. And it is clear that we are entitled to relief under those provisions. But it is equally clear, and we do not intend that our silence in this reply be taken as abandonment of the point, that we are independently entitled to the relief requested in the instant motion under Rule 40

and the Fourth Amendment.

Therefore, upon all the grounds stated above and previously stated in our principal memorandum, we respectfully submit that the relief requested in the instant motion be granted in each and every respect.

Dated: July 23, 1971

Respectfully submitted,

Leonard B. Boudin

Leonard B. Boudin
Langdell Hall
Cambridge, Massachusetts
and
Charles R. Nesson
Langdell Hall
Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Attorneys for Defendant

Of counsel,
David Rosenberg.

At least, it came as close to it as our system allows, and by very much the same kind of agitation that toppled Diem, and for many of the same reasons. The Congress having been bypassed in 1965 and inadequately consulted since then, the public having been ignored and misled, resentments were built up which created a situation where the President of this country was not able to get easily and safely to airports and auditoriums to campaign -- just as, as early as 1961, I observed that Diem needed large military escorts to get to the airport.

Failure has always been over-determined in Vietnam but, in the case of Diem, it happened at least in part because he disregarded the advice we had given him to do something to improve popular support for his regime.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : C. D. Brennan

DATE: July 31, 1971

FROM : W. R. Wannall *wf*

1 - Mr. Brennan

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Wagoner

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

REC-23 Wannall

On the evening of 7/30/71 Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Washington Field Office, forwarded the attached material which had been received by SA [redacted] on 7/29/71 from [redacted] Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The attachment is a compilation of a long list of names of persons who were reportedly connected with the task force that prepared the "McNamara Study." [redacted] explained that various people had been requested to compile lists based on their recollections and that there has been no confirmation of the fact that all persons listed were actually involved in task force matters.

The principal list is dated 7/27/71 and it is supported by seven attachments.

SA [redacted] said that it is his understanding a copy of the attachment was sent to the White House and may have been the basis for the 17 names listed in the attachment to the President's letter to the Director wherein he requested that information on these 17 individuals be sent to Mr. Egil Krogh. [redacted] was instructed to get all possible information on these 17 individuals since the Bureau is considering having interviews conducted with all those not previously interviewed.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

Enclosure

WRW:ams

(4)

EX 101

REC-23

1 AUG 11 1971

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

57 AUG 11 1971

100-5-10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : C. D. Brennan

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Bishop

DATE: August 2, 1971

- 1 - Mr. Dalbey
- 1 - Mr. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Wagoner

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Memorandum 7/31/71 advised that we would send through under date of Tuesday, 8/3/71, material to be sent to Mr. Egil Krogh of the White House regarding Daniel Ellsberg, principal suspect in the leak of the "McNamara Study" and 16 other individuals. In this connection, the President by letter to the Director received 7/30/71 requested that this information be furnished to Mr. Krogh, whom he had directed to examine in depth circumstances of the many recent disclosures of Top Secret and other sensitive material. Letter to Mr. Krogh with material we have compiled is attached.

Information which we have included regarding Ellsberg relates not only to his background and apparent connections with the disclosure of the "McNamara Study" but also to public admissions of his connections with this disclosure and his change of attitude toward the Vietnam war from one of support to one of active opposition.

With regard to the 16 other individuals on whom we have compiled data for Mr. Krogh, we have noted that five of them have been interviewed during the Ellsberg investigation and the actual reports of interviews have been included as a part of the memoranda compiled. This is in compliance with the specific request of the President. With respect to the sixth individual, Charles M. Cooke, we have noted that we endeavored to interview him 7/21/71 but he declined in the absence of specific clearance from the Deputy Attorney General. We called this to the attention of the Attorney General in the past, advising we would make no further efforts to talk to Cooke at this time.

In view of White House interest in this matter, in our cover communication to Mr. Krogh we are advising that if he concurs we will proceed with interviews of the 10 remaining individuals whom we have not yet interviewed. This, of course, does not include interview with Ellsberg at this time.

Since the President has designated Mr. Krogh to examine this matter in depth, Mr. Krogh may well be in touch with the Attorney General and, accordingly we feel we should send to Attorney General as well as his Deputy and Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, copies of the material we have compiled for Mr. Krogh.

EX-105 REC-47 1111971
WRW:ams (8)

ACTION - CONTINUED OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Brennan
Re: MC LEK

ACTION:

(1) Attached for approval is a communication to Mr. Krogh transmitting the requested material.

(2) Attached is a proposed letter to the Attorney General, with copies for Deputy Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, enclosing copies of the memoranda compiled for Mr. Krogh. If approved, this letter will also go forward.

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PEP 7 - DJD
gam

1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Mohr
 1 - Mr. Bishop
 1 - Mr. Dalbey
 1 - Mr. Brennan
 1 - Mr. Wannall
 1 - Mr. Wagoner

August 2, 1971

BY LIAISON

REC-10

EX-112

79060

722

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of July 29, 1971, which requested certain information for Mr. Egil Krogh relative to our continuing investigation of Daniel Ellsberg, as well as information regarding individuals of interest to Mr. Krogh in his examination of the circumstances of many recent disclosures of Top Secret and other sensitive material to the public.

The information is being compiled and will be furnished expeditiously to Mr. Krogh in accordance with your request.

Sincerely yours,

ERH:emj:ams
 (9)

NOTE:

REC'D BY LIAISON

See cover memorandum W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan, captioned "MC LEK," dated 7/31/71, prepared by WRW:ams.

Tolson _____
 Felt _____
 Sullivan _____
 Mohr _____
 Bishop _____
 Brennan, C.D. _____
 Callahan _____
 Casper _____
 Conrad _____
 Dalbey _____
 Gale _____
 Ponder _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Walters _____
 Soyars _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

DELIVERED BY LIAISON
 ONE

51 AUG 11 1971

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1971

Dear Edgar:

I have directed Egil Krogh to examine in depth the circumstances of the many recent disclosures of top secret and other sensitive material to the public. It is vital to the security of this country that appropriate and immediate steps be taken to correct the procedures and practices which have led to such disclosures.

To assist Mr. Krogh in this project, I ask that you forward to him as soon as possible:

- (1) All information acquired to date, including individual reports of interviews, with respect to those persons named on the attachment to this letter; and
- (2) A comprehensive background paper on Daniel Ellsberg;

and to provide him with such other further information or investigation as he may, in the future, request.

Please keep Mr. Krogh up-to-date on the results of your continuing investigation into this matter.

Sincerely,



Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

REC-10

EX-112

65-77060-912
12 AUG 5 1971

71
61 AUG 15 1971

FBI

Date: 7/27/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
 FROM: SAC, HONOLULU (65-1081) (RUC)
 SUBJECT: MC LEK
 (NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
 OO: Los Angeles

Re Bureau airtel to Albany dated 7/21/71.

The following investigation was conducted by SA-
 [REDACTED] at Honolulu, Hawaii:

Confidential informants who are familiar with some phases of New Left activity in Hawaii were contacted on 7/27/71 and advised they had been furnished no information bearing on ELLSBERG's past or present connections with New Left Peace Groups and similar organizations of a subversive nature:

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 In addition the following agencies were contacted and advised their files contain no information concerning ELLSBERG:
 [REDACTED]

Attorney General's Office EX-105
 Honolulu, Hawaii

REC-47.65-74060-823

65 JUL 31 1971

② - Bureau
 2 - Los Angeles
 1 - Honolulu
 TC/ctm
 (5)

NAT. SEC.

App **67 AUG 11 1971**
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

HN 65-1081

[REDACTED]
710th MID
Honolulu, Hawaii

[REDACTED]
NISO Pearl Harbor
Hawaii

[REDACTED]
OSI Hickam Air Force Base

The indices of the Honolulu Office contain no information concerning ELLSBERG.

The Honolulu Office will remain alert for any information concerning any connection of ELLSBERG with a subversive group and the Bureau and the office of origin will be advised if such information is received.

F B I

Date: 7/26/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)

FROM SAC, OMAHA (65-849) (P)

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

OO: Los Angeles

Re Bureau airtels, 7/21/71.

Check of Postal Inspectors, Des Moines, Iowa, indicates that "New York Review of Books", Post Office Box 79, Des Moines, Iowa, a subscription promotion box number of Cowles Publications Communications, 111 10th Street, Des Moines, Iowa, box discontinued as of 7/15/71.

For information of Bureau and receiving offices, Cowles Publications (Look Magazine), Des Moines, Iowa, has utilized box numbers for magazine subscription promotion both for their own publications and for other publications in Des Moines, Iowa, for sometime, however, recently Cowles has discontinued this subscription promotion practice.

For further information of the Bureau and receiving offices, a review of the records of the Des Moines, Iowa, Public Library indicates publication "New York Review of Books", a bi-weekly publication of a literary nature.

- EX-105 [REC-34] 65-74060-211
- ② - Bureau (RM)
 - 2 - New York (RM)
 - 1 - Los Angeles (105-27942) (info) (RM)
 - 1 - Boston (65-5236) (info) (RM)
 - 2 - Omaha
- DET:dsa
(8)
- 17 JUL 29 1971
- NAT. SEC.

Approved: 51 AUG 11 1971 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

OM 65-849

The publication is published in New York, New York, and the headquarters is located at 250 West 57th Street, New York City, zip code 10019.

A. WHITNEY ELLSWORTH is its publisher and one of its editors is a BARBARA EPSTEIN.

A review of library records indicated that the March 11, 1971, issue of "New York Review of Books" carries an article, "Laos: What is Nixon Up To?" DANIEL ELLSBERG is credited with being the author of this article.

LEADS:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, will obtain back issues of "New York Review of Books" March 11, 1971, issue which contains article entitled "Laos: What is Nixon Up To?"; by DANIEL ELLSBERG, and furnish same to Bureau by airtel.

OMAHA

AT OMAHA, NEBRASKA, will contact sources familiar with New Left activity within the Omaha Division and furnish results to Bureau and Los Angeles.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE PHILADELPHIA	OFFICE OF ORIGIN LOS ANGELES	DATE JUL 28 1971	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 7/20-23/71
TITLE OF CASE D/INT. DISSEM.		REPORT MADE BY [REDACTED]	TYPE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]		CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - R	REC-110

REFERENCE

Position stated in Philadelphia, dated 7/14/71.

-JFC-

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

[REDACTED] was contacted by [REDACTED]


Files of the Philadelphia Office reflect [REDACTED]
 born 11/2/05 at [REDACTED] of American parents.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED				MORE		ACQUITTED		CASE HAS BEEN:	
CONVICTED	ACTED	FINED	SAVED	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	RECOVERED
APPROVED				SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE		DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW			
COPIES MADE:				[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]			
5 - Bureau (65-7166) (RM)				[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]			
2 - Boston (65-5234) (RM)				[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]			
2 - Los Angeles (105-27712) (RM)				[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]			
1 - Philadelphia (65-6346)				[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]			
Dissemination Record of Attached Report				Notations		[REDACTED]			
Agency	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]			
Request Recd	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]			
Date Fwd	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]			
How Fwd	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]			
By	[REDACTED]			[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]			

57 AUG 11 1971

COVER PAGE

PH 63-6346



CONFIDENTIAL

The identity of [REDACTED] is being maintained by
the Bureau and Philadelphia.

-B*-
COVER PAGE

13
PII 65-6346



-BIV-
COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of:

Date:

JUL 28 1971

Office: Philadelphia, Pa.

Field Office File #:

65-6346

Bureau File #:

65-74060

Title:

DANIEL BLOOMING

Character:

ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis:

-100-

DETAILS:

On July 13, 1971, [REDACTED] Hotel Continental, Cambridge, Mass., advised that during the period March 18-25, 1971, fifty-five (55) hotel registrations were executed. Included in the 55 were the following:

PH 65-6346

William Middleton Young

born 11-11-1915 (b. 11-11-15)

[REDACTED]

On July 21, 1961, [REDACTED] advised he did not want to be interviewed by the FBI. [REDACTED] 7/27/61 [REDACTED] 7/27/61

[REDACTED] on July 21, 1961. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] is issued to [REDACTED] current residence [REDACTED] He previously resided [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed on several occasions in the latter part of 1962 in connection with another investigative matter. [REDACTED] This was his third marriage. [REDACTED] and noted for his work in the [REDACTED]

PH 65-6346

Mass. In 1941 they moved to [REDACTED] when [REDACTED]
married for the second time. They moved to the [REDACTED]
area upon her marriage to [REDACTED] in 1946, where they
lived in [REDACTED] Pa., and subsequently at
Philadelphia, Pa.

Voters Registration Records, Chester County
Courthouse, West Chester, Pa. checked in December 1969
reflect [REDACTED] was born [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

F B I

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via Airtel _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)

FROM: SAC, CLEVELAND (65-3521) (P)

RE: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
OO: Los Angeles

ReBuairtel to all offices 7/21/71.

A review of Cleveland indices and contact with logical sources familiar with the established Left, the New Left, and peace groups failed to develop any information indicating ELLSBERG's past or present connection with such group in the Cleveland area.

② - Bureau (RM)
2 - Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM)
2 - Cleveland
TAC:jev
(6)

EX-105

REG-34

65-74060-82

JUL 30 1971

NAT. INT. SEC.

51 AUG 11 1971

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date: 7/27/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
 FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (65-1729) (RUC)
 SUBJECT: MC LEK
 (Nationalities Intelligence)
 ((OO:Los Angeles))

Re Bureau airtel to All Offices, 7/21/71.

Indices of Atlanta Office and contacts with informants familiar with activities and organizations of a subversive nature in Atlanta were negative regarding DANIEL ELLSBERG except information set forth in Atlanta report of SA [REDACTED] dated 7/22/71, concerning distribution of document entitled "Pentagon Viet Nam Study - Top Secret - As Published in the New York Times" at conference of Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 6/25-27/71.

② - Bureau (RM)
 2 - Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM)
 1 - Atlanta
 TFL/els
 (5)

REC-34

65-74060-827

JUL 30 1971

EX-105

NATIONAL SECURITY

51 AUG 11 1971

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE DENVER	OFFICE OF ORIGIN LOS ANGELES	DATE 7/27/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 7/23/71
TITLE OF CASE DANIEL ELLSBERG		REPORT MADE BY [REDACTED]	TYPED BY CS
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESP - X	

REFERENCE: Denver report of SA **[REDACTED]** 7/21/71;
 Denver teletype to Bureau 7/21/71;
 Bureau teletype to Los Angeles 7/22/71.

- P -

LEADS:DENVER DIVISIONAT DENVER, COLORADO:

Per referenced report, will await decision of Departmental officials in Boston, Massachusetts, regarding service of subpoenas on BURT WALLRICH and ANNE GUILFOILE, 701 South Washington Street.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN: PENDING OVER ONE YEAR <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES			
APPROVED <i>[Signature]</i>					SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE			DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
COPIES MADE:								65-74060-811
(8)-Bureau (65-73454) (RM)								REC-3
2-Boston (65-5236) (RM)								EX-105
(1-USA, Boston)								
3-Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM)								
(1-USA, Los Angeles)								
2-Denver (105-4507)								
Dissemination Record of Attached Report					Notations			
Agency	AFM/ISD, DCD (Bryant)							
Request Recd.	By Home							
Date Fwd.	8/2/71							
How Fwd.	RS							

51 AUG 11 1971

- A* -

COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1-USA, Boston, Massachusetts
1-USA, Los Angeles, California

Report of: [REDACTED]
Date: July 27, 1971

Office: Denver

Field Office File #: 105-4507

Bureau File #: 65-73454

Title: DANIEL ELLSBERG

Character: ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis:

[REDACTED] Daniel Ellsberg,
interviewed. [REDACTED] cooperative but could furnish
no pertinent information classified documents being
ELLSBERG's possession.

- P -

DETAILS:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1.

Date of transcription 7/27/71

B. APPROX 1875 Europe

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
DANIEL ELLSBERG, has visited him on occasion in the past, but as best he can recall [REDACTED] ELLSBERG's last visit was over a year ago. He recalled that ELLSBERG's present wife, PATRICIA, was with ELLSBERG on the last two visits, both of which were for the purpose of going skiing. At the time of the first of the two last visits, ELLSBERG was not yet married to PATRICIA.

[REDACTED] could recall no visit in August, 1969, and stated that ELLSBERG visited him less frequently than he did [REDACTED] another relative in Estes Park, Colorado. He could recall no packages in ELLSBERG's possession during any visit which could have contained documents. He stated ELLSBERG never discussed having classified papers of any sort.

He stated that he and his wife [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and he first learned that ELLSBERG was involved with classified documents when he read of it in the Herald-Tribune while overseas.

an office [REDACTED]

handles [REDACTED]

from which he [REDACTED]

Interviewed on 7/23/71 at Denver, Colorado File # DN 105-4507

SAs [REDACTED]

(BDA:cs)

Date dictated 7/27/71

FBI

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

AIRMAIL

(Priority)

COB/

1/1
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
ATTN: DID
FROM: SAC, MILWAUKEE (65-2035) RUC
SUBJECT: MC LEK
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE

your material

Re Milwaukee report of SA [REDACTED]
7/22/71, Milwaukee teletypes to Director, 7/20/71
and 7/28/71.

No pertinent information developed regarding
DANIEL ELLSBERG or his association with established left,
New Left or peace groups within the Milwaukee Division.
Milwaukee indices negative regarding ELLSBERG.

m

EX-105

REC-34

65-74060-829

15 JUL 31 1971

2 - Bureau RM
1 - Milwaukee
KAM/bkc

(3)

NATIONAL SEC.

51 AUG 11 1971

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

FBI

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)

FROM: SAC, JACKSON (65-46) (RUC)

MC LEK

(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

OO: LOS ANGELES

Re Bureau airtel to Albany, 7/21/71.

The Jackson Division had one informant, [REDACTED] attend May-Day activities sponsored by Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) at Washington, D. C., during the month of May, 1971. [REDACTED] currently unavailable for contact.

B. APPROX 1949
[REDACTED] advised only one person from Mississippi known to attend PCPJ activities in Washington, D. C. during May, 1971, this person being [REDACTED] age 22, who attended the demonstration for curiosity reasons. Source, who has been in daily contact with [REDACTED] advised she has never mentioned any information concerning DANIEL ELLSBERG. Source is not personally acquainted with ELLSBERG.

Jackson indices negative.

EX-105

REC-32

65-74060-830

18 JUL 31 1971

2-Bureau (RM)
1-Jackson
CS:pjb
(3)

NAT. INT. SEC.

51 AUG 11 1971
Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via Airtel _____
(Priority)

To: Director, FBI (65-74060)

From: SAC, San Juan (65-496) RUC

MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
(OO:LA)

ReBuairtel to AL dated 7/21/71.

Indices of the San Juan Office reflect no information relating to DANIEL ELLSBERG.

The following investigation to determine if ELLSBERG was in contact with pro-communist or pro-independence elements on the island of Puerto Rico was negative:

[REDACTED]
contacted on 7/27/71, [REDACTED]
contacted on 7/27/71, and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] contacted on 7/27/71.

Local confidential sources were contacted on 7/27 and 7/28/71 and advised they had no information bearing on ELLSBERG'S past or present connections with organizations of a subversive nature.

- (2) - Bureau (RM)
2 - Los Angeles (RM)
1 - San Juan

JJK:clb
(5)

EX-105

REC-32

65-74060-831

JUL 31 1971

Approved: *[Signature]*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent *[Signature]*NAT. INT. SEC.
M Per *[Signature]*

59 AUG 11 1971

F B I

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (65-1729) (RUC)

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
OO: Los Angeles

Re Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 7/21/71.

Indices of Atlanta Office and contacts with informants familiar with activities and organizations of a subversive nature in Atlanta were negative regarding DANIEL ELLSBERG except information set forth in Atlanta report of SA [REDACTED] dated 7/22/71, concerning distribution of document entitled, "PENTAGON VIET NAM STUDY - TOP SECRET - AS PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES" at conference of Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 6/25-27/71.

EX-105

REC-34

65-74060-832

22 JUL 30 1971

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM)
1 - Atlanta
TFL/jwu
(5)

NAT. INT. SEC.
mz 9/1/71

31 AUG 11 1971

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

GPO

FBI

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060) ATTENTION: DID
FROM: SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (65-1447) (P)
SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

Re Buairtel 7/21/71.

For information of the Bureau, Minneapolis has submitted the following communications which tend to link DANIEL ELLSBERG with subversive or extremist individuals:

1. Minneapolis airtel and LHM captioned "KENNETH EARL TILSEN, SM - C", dated 6/28/71 (Bureau file 100-361062).
2. Minneapolis airtel to Bureau dated 6/28/71, captioned "MC LEK" and containing copy of ELLSBERG's testimony on behalf of FRANCIS XAVIER KRONCKE and MICHAEL DUANE THERRIAULT, who were convicted on charges emanating from their attempted raid on Minnesota Selective Service boards.
3. Minneapolis airtel dated 7/19/71 captioned "MC LEK - Nationalities Intelligence" and LHM of same date captioned "DANIEL ELLSBERG, ESPIONAGE - X."

2 - Bureau
2 - Minneapolis
TJM:ras
(4)

EX-105

22 JUL 30 1971

51 AUG 11 1971
Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

☆ U. S. G. ○

PRINTING OFFICE 1971-413-138

MP 65-1447

4. Minneapolis report of SA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] dated 7/22/71 and captioned
"DANIEL ELLSBERG, ESPIONAGE - X."

F B I

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65- 74060)

FROM: SAC, LOUISVILLE (65-933) (P)

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

OO: LOS ANGELES

Re: Bureau Airtel to Albany, 7/21/71,
Louisville Teletype to Bureau, 7/13/71,
Louisville Report of SA [REDACTED]
captioned "DANIEL ELLSBERG, ESPIONAGE-X",
dated 7/15/71.

In accordance with the provisions of referenced Bureau Airtel to Albany, dated 7/21/71, the Bureau's attention is invited to referenced Louisville Teletype and report containing information re identity of subscriber to Kentucky telephone number appearing as collect call charge (4/18/71) on toll record of telephone subscribed to by CORNELIUS SHEEHAN, 4505 Klinge Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., as well as pertinent data contained in Louisville files re said Kentucky telephone subscriber and individual most closely connected therewith.

Louisville has been unable to develop information re association of DANIEL ELLSBERG with above mentioned Kentucky telephone subscriber (Pike County Citizens Association, Elkhorn City, Kentucky) or any subversive organization and/or individuals affiliated therewith within the Louisville Division.

- ② - Bureau (65-74060) (RM)
- 2 - Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM)
- 3 - Louisville
{ 2 - 65-933
1 - 65-934 }

EVA/vlr
(7)

JUL 30 1971

51 AUG 11 1971

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

LS 65-933

Investigation at Louisville continuing per instructions set forth in referenced Bureau Airtel to Albany. Bureau will be advised of all pertinent developments re captioned matter.

F B I

Date: 7/28/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
(Attn: DOMINTEL) *REC-32*

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (65-5236)

SUBJECT: MC LEK
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are two copies of documents received from the USA's office on this date. These documents are as follows:

- 1.) Defendant's Reply Memorandum filed by Attorneys LEONARD B. BOUDIN and CHARLES R. NESSON on behalf of Doctor DANIEL ELLSBERG
- 2.) Reply Memorandum of the U. S. submitted by HERBERT F. TRAVERS, JR., USA, by LAWRENCE P. COHEN, AUSA, Boston, Mass., to the above memorandum *me*
- 3.) Defendant's Response to the Reply Memorandum of the U. S. which was submitted by Attorneys LEONARD B. BOUDIN and CHARLES R. NESSON

with 19C 11/10/71
 ② - Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)
 1 - Los Angeles (105-27952) (RM)
 1 - New York (65-25641) (RM)
 1 - WFO (65-11613) (RM)
 2 - Boston
 REB:mcj
 (7)

EX-105

REC-32

65-74060-835

ENCLOSURE

12 JUL 30 1971

NAI *[Signature]*Approved: *[Signature]*
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE LOS ANGELES	OFFICE OF ORIGIN LOS ANGELES	DATE 7/29/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 7/9/71 - 7/28/71
TITLE OF CASE DANIEL ELLSBERG		REPORT MADE BY <div style="background-color: black; width: 150px; height: 1.2em; margin: 2px;"></div>	TYPED BY mgr
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - X	

REFERENCE: Report of SA [REDACTED] dated 7/19/71.

- P -

ADMINISTRATIVE

By teletype dated 6/29/71, Bureau file 65-74060, the Bureau advised that all communications submitted in connection with the MC LEK (Nationalities Intelligence) investigation that are to be disseminated outside the FBI, should be submitted captioned as above.

Investigation period predates the date of referenced report to include FD-302s that were in dictation and to include investigation conducted by the Chicago Division.

[REDACTED] was present when her husband was

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE	ACQUIT- TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		
							PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
APPROVED		SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE				DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW	
COPIES MADE: 8 - Bureau (65-73454) (RM) 2 - Washington Field (65-11613) (RM) 2 - Boston (65-5236) (RM) 2 - New York City (65-25641) (RM) 2 - Chicago (RM) 2 - Denver [REDACTED] (RM) 3 - Los Angeles [REDACTED]		<div style="text-align: right; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.2em;">REC-89</div> <div style="text-align: right; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.2em;">EX-101</div> <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.2em;">AUG 2 1971</div>					
Dissemination Record of Attached Report							
Agency	[AAS] + SD attention Martin						
Request Recd.	1 DOD (Buzhardt)						
Date Fwd.							
How Fwd.	R/S						
By	E.R.H. [Signature]						

57 AUG 20 1971

COVER PAGE

LA 105-27952

interviewed and stated she could add nothing to the information furnished by her husband.

By teletype dated 7/22/71, the Los Angeles Division set forth the reasons for not interviewing [REDACTED]

LEADS

CHICAGO

AT HILLSDALE, ILLINOIS: Lead has been set out to locate Bekins driver, MESSER.

EL PASO

AT EL PASO, TEXAS: Lead has been set out to ascertain the identity of Mr. WILLIAMS, who was called by ELLSBERG when he was at the Belair Hotel.

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK: Lead has been set to identify the subscriber of telephone number 212-OR5-2659.

SAN FRANCISCO

AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA: (1) Lead has been set out to identify JANE SHOEMAN, telephone number 415-325-6582.

(2) Lead has been set out to identify Mrs. BARNETT, telephone number 415-321-5727. It is believed this is possibly ELLSBERG's sister-in-law.

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA: (1) Bureau authority is being requested to interview WILLIAM MC GLOTHLIN and THELMA MOSS, faculty members at UCLA.

(2) Bekins driver, [REDACTED] operates out of the Los Angeles area and is currently on the road. A stop has been placed with Bekins to have him contact the FBI when he returns.

LA 105-27952

The information concerning [REDACTED] being a guest at Continental Hotel, Cambridge, Massachusetts, was obtained from Bureau teletype to Boston, dated 7/15/71.

[REDACTED]

Records of the Credit Bureau of Greater Los Angeles, regarding [REDACTED] were checked by IC [REDACTED]. Records of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office regarding ROTH were checked by SG [REDACTED]. Los Angeles County Voters Registration Records regarding [REDACTED] were checked by SA [REDACTED]. Records of the Los Angeles Police Department regarding [REDACTED] were reviewed by SG [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: [REDACTED]

Office: Los Angeles, California

Date: 7/29/71

Field Office File #: 105-27952

Bureau File #: 65-73454

Title: DANIEL ELLSBERG

Character: ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis:

[REDACTED] has advised that subject volunteered to take LSD under controlled conditions and was administered a quantity of LSD by a clinical psychologist at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). On another occasion, he volunteered to assist a doctor at UCLA, specializing in matters of the brain, who was seeking volunteers to study the effects of LSD on brain waves [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a former associate of ELLSBERG's at Rand Corporation, characterized ELLSBERG as an exhibitionist, who seeks public and professional adulation. He said the subject was an experimenter with women, food, thoughts, and social actions. He said that ELLSBERG told him he had experimented with LSD. No additional information has been developed to identify additional witnesses to the xeroxing of documents in Los Angeles in 1969.

- P -

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DANIEL ELLSBERG;BACKGROUND, HABITS AND ASSOCIATES	<u>Page</u> 3
. XEROXING OF DOCUMENTS, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA OCTOBER 1969	13
ASSOCIATES	17
TRAVEL	29
MISCELLANEOUS	36

DANIEL ELISBERG
BACKGROUND
HABITS AND ASSOCIATES

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 7/15/71


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On 7/14/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952
by SA's [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/15/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

LA 105-27952



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/19/71

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] telephonically advised as follows:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ELLSBERG, who was then staying at the residence of one DON TAYLOR (phonetic), 1111 San Vicente, Santa Monica, California.

[REDACTED] saw and spoke with DANIEL on this occasion [REDACTED] time.


Interviewed on 7/19/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] *hlm* Date dictated 7/19/71 *b7c*

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/19/71



Interviewed on 7/19/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 7/19/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/21/71

[REDACTED] was interviewed and advised as follows:

[REDACTED] was advised that the FBI is currently conducting an investigation concerning Daniel Ellsberg relating to disclosures of classified information and was asked if he could provide any information concerning these matters. [REDACTED] advised that prior to providing any information in this regard he wished to consult with an attorney and would contact the FBI concerning his decision such consultation.

ESTIGATION
7/21/71
Los Angeles,

Interviewed on 7/20/71 at Beverly Hills, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/20/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/21/71

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] telephonically advised as follows:

As regards, Johnnakey Chounarel (phonetic) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Johnnakey is married to an Austrian and not
an Indian [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] man's first name is Gerhardt (phonetic).


Interviewed on 7/21/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/21/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 7/26/71



Interviewed on 7/23/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 7/23/71

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XEROXING OF DOCUMENTS
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
OCTOBER 1969

1

Date of transcription 7/29/71

[REDACTED] advised as follows:

[REDACTED] Harry Ellsberg, the father of Daniel Ellsberg, has been married three times. He had two children by his first wife, a daughter Margaret and a son Harry. He later married Daniel's mother, whose maiden name was Charsky. He had two children by this second marriage, a son Daniel and a daughter Gloria. Daniel's mother and sister Gloria were killed in an automobile accident when Daniel was approximately fifteen years old. The elder Ellsberg later married a third woman several years after Daniel and Carol were married; however, he had no other children.

[REDACTED] Margaret and Harry Ellsberg are approximately twelve and eleven years older than Daniel, respectively.

[REDACTED] Daniel's half-brother, Harry, attended Wayne State College in Detroit, Michigan, and had also attended Columbia University in New York City, New York, but had withdrawn from Columbia prior to receiving a degree from that school.

[REDACTED] not seen Harry for approximately [REDACTED] years and had little contact with him prior to that time; however, [REDACTED] he had [REDACTED] "left wing leanings" and was anti-establishment and anti-military. [REDACTED] has no information that Harry was ever a communist, a member of the communist party or politically active. [REDACTED] doubts Harry was a communist and bases [REDACTED] as set out above only on conversations [REDACTED] had with Harry in the past.

[REDACTED]

Interviewed on 7/28/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

-SAs [REDACTED]

by [REDACTED]

GJM:fet

Date dictated 7/29/71

²
LA 105-27952

[REDACTED] Harry worked for a railroad company in New York City selling tickets and subsequently took a position approximately fifteen years ago with a life insurance firm also in New York City, where [REDACTED] he continues to be employed.

[REDACTED] Harry married a girl named Sofie, an opera singer, whose professional name [REDACTED] is Sofie Stefan (phonetic). Harry and Sofie have a daughter Ellen, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] not recall the address where Harry now lives but believes that it is in a town called Croton-On-Hudson or a similar such name located north of New York City. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Harry had a listed telephone number [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Daniel's older half-sister Margaret, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believes Margaret is married and lives in New York City, but could furnish nothing more specific. [REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 7/15/71

Neighborhood investigation at 541 $\frac{1}{2}$ North Sycamore, Los Angeles, California, the former residence of Anthony R. Rosenwald, revealed that he moved on May 17, 1971, and left the forwarding address of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised he shared the apartment with [REDACTED]. He stated that Anthony Rosenwald was a free lance photographer who when to Europe approximately May 20, 1971, to do some free lance movie making and to purchase used cameras which he planned to bring back and sell at a profit. [REDACTED] said that Rosenwald did not indicate when he would return. [REDACTED] stated it could be a month or it could be six months from now.

Interviewed on 7/14/71 at Hollywood, California File # Los Angeles 105-279529

by SA [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/14/71

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/20/71

[redacted] "The Advocates" television program, 4376 Sunset Drive, Los Angeles, California, advised as follows:

He was [redacted] of "The Advocates" television program entitled "Should the Goodell Bill, Calling for the Withdrawal of U. S. Troops from Vietnam by December 1, 1970, be Adopted?", which was presented in October 1969, exact date unrecalled by him. He stated that in [redacted]

[redacted] He cannot recall how Ellsberg came to his attention as an expert on Vietnam but believes that Ellsberg may have come to his attention as a co-signer with five others of a letter published in the press urging United States withdrawal from Vietnam. As he recalls the other co-signers of the letter were also Rand employees. [redacted]

[redacted] signers of the letter would appear on the program, but the Rand Corporation had refused to allow this.

[redacted]

He definitely recalls that Daniel Ellsberg was in the audience at the KCET television studio the night the above show was presented and recalls that Ellsberg's daughter, Mary, was with him. He could not recall whether Ellsberg's son, Robert, was also there and does not know who else was in the Ellsberg party. He stated that the program started promptly at 7:00 p.m. and [redacted]

[redacted] saw Daniel Ellsberg in the audience.

He stated that Senator Mathias of Maryland was the guest on the show and was also in the KCET studio that evening. Senator Goodell's portion on the program was [redacted]

Interviewed on 7/19/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [redacted] /bab [redacted] Date dictated 7/20/71


LA 105-27952

aired live from Washington, D. C., and Goodell, therefore, was not in Los Angeles that evening.

ASSOCIATES

ERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 7/15/71



On 7/14/71 at Chicago, Illinois File # CG 65-5369

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] JFM/bak Date dictated 7/15/71

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 7/15/71

[REDACTED] informed that she knew DANIEL ELLSBERG some time ago, but that her interest in him and her relationship with him was purely personal and romantic. She also stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] She claims that she is apolitical and had no interest in either ELLSBERG's or RUSSO's political views or activities. She said that neither ELLSBERG nor RUSSO discussed their duties at Rand Corporation with her, and she had no indication that ELLSBERG planned to duplicate or disclose the contents of government memoranda.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] she feels ELLSBERG is a "lovely guy" and she considers him a hero for what he has done in disclosing the "Pentagon Papers."

[REDACTED] noted that she is acquainted with LINDA SINAY whom she said dated TONY RUSSO. [REDACTED] She said that SINAY became too involved with RUSSO and apparently was contemplating marriage, whereas RUSSO is not the type of man to "make a commitment of that nature." When their romance broke up [REDACTED] stated that SINAY was on the verge of a nervous breakdown, however, she could not remember that exact date or even approximate time of the occurrence.

On 7/15/71 at Chicago, Illinois File # CG 65-5369

SAs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
by [REDACTED] JFM/bak Date dictated 7/15/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 7/21/71

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, California, furnished the following information:

She first met Daniel Ellsberg when he came to Rand Corporation in Santa Monica in approximately 1963. ~~She had lunch with him on several occasions between 1963 and the time that Daniel Ellsberg went to Vietnam.~~

After Daniel Ellsberg returned from Vietnam, she never had any further social contact with him. She saw him at Rand Corporation on several occasions and believes that she edited a couple of papers that he had written. She stated that after he had returned from Vietnam he was extremely sick with hepatitis and his skin color had appeared to be yellow. On the few occasions that she did speak to him at Rand Corporation she recalls that Ellsberg was very critical of the administration's program in Vietnam and the whole Vietnamese situation.

She said that Daniel Ellsberg was a person who did not like group affairs and to her he always gave the impression that he was a "loner". She said that she had no idea that Daniel Ellsberg would ever violate the security classification system at Rand Corporation.

She advised that she has no information pertaining to any copying, photographing or the taking of any classified information from Rand Corporation by Daniel Ellsberg or any other Rand employee.

She stated that she did not know, nor has she ever seen, Anthony Russo nor does she know Lynda Sinay.

She advised that [REDACTED] had been social acquaintances of Daniel Ellsberg. She believes that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and the last she knew they were [REDACTED]

She advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was one of the [REDACTED]

Interviewed on 7/20/71 at Santa Monica, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED] bab

Date dictated 7/20/71

strategists approximately seven or eight years ago and Daniel Ellsberg was a protege of [REDACTED]. She believes that Daniel Ellsberg had much more contact socially and professionally with the [REDACTED] prior to the time that he went to Vietnam, however, she does not know what degree of relationship existed after Ellsberg returned from Vietnam.

She said that in her opinion if Daniel Ellsberg had copied classified documents and given them to the news media, she believes that he would have done this act alone and not with the help of any other person, however, she has no basis for this impression other than she feels strongly that Ellsberg is a "loner".

Date of transcription 7/22/71

[REDACTED]
California, was interviewed and advised as follows:

He is employed as a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, Santa
Monica, California, and had lived at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] from 1965 to March 1971. [REDACTED] stated
that Daniel Ellsberg had been [REDACTED]
Ellsberg resided at 20752 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu.

[REDACTED] said that he was acquainted with Ellsberg,
however, he rarely had contact with him explaining that
they had their own separate circle of friends and except
for one or two occasions when they [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] they did not
socialize with each other.

[REDACTED] was not aware of the identities of
Ellsberg's visitors, however, he recalls that the Ellsberg
children visited their father on many weekends. He also
recalls that Anthony Russo visited Ellsberg on at least
one occasion [REDACTED] with whom
he worked at the Rand Corporation, for a brief visit.

Schultz stated that he met Patricia Marx [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was introduced to her by Ellsberg
at a time prior to their marriage.

[REDACTED] stated that he has no knowledge regarding
the possession of any documents by Ellsberg and never saw
any documents in Ellsberg's home. He added that on occasion
he had seen Ellsberg writing at a table on the beach, but
does not know the nature of this writing other than it was
his impression that Ellsberg was doing some Rand Corporation
work.

Interviewed on 7/21/71 at Santa Monica, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/21/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 7/26/71

[redacted] Los Angeles, California, was interviewed and advised as follows:

He is presently employed as a [redacted]
[redacted] to Rand Corporation
Los Angeles, California.

[redacted] stated that he has known Daniel Ellsberg since approximately 1958 when Ellsberg was a [redacted] and was being considered for employment at the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Ellsberg was highly recommended at Harvard and had written several papers which brought him to [redacted] attention. He stated that Ellsberg was an outstanding young man and brilliant in his presentations.

[redacted] Rand Corporation's hiring of Ellsberg and fully expected that Ellsberg would [redacted] that Ellsberg's particular knowledge was [redacted]

[redacted] and although they had close social contact, their work proceeded along separate lines.

He stated that Ellsberg's work became more concentrated on the Vietnam war and he served on special task forces in this regard. He said Ellsberg's work was involved in this war more from a political approach. He stated that Ellsberg served on several assignments with the United States Government including a tour of duty in Vietnam.

[redacted] Vietnam in approximately 1966 and was aware that Ellsberg had met Neil Sheehan a reporter while in that country.

[redacted] is not aware of the extent of their association.

[redacted] continued that he was aware that in the latter part of 1967 Ellsberg had returned to his employment with the Rand Corporation.

Interviewed on 7/22/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [redacted] WLM/bab

Date dictated 7/23/71

[redacted] stated that he became aware that Ellsberg appeared to be suffering from an intellectual and moral deterioration and cited a lecture that Ellsberg had given during a seminar held at the Adlai Stevenson Institute of the University of Chicago in June 1968, [redacted]

[redacted] Ellsberg's topic was "Lessons and Mislessons on Vietnam" and was delivered to an audience which included several prominent individuals including, among others, Henry Kissinger and Arthur Schlesinger. Two comments recalled by [redacted] were to the effect that if a small country receives aid from the United States then that country should expect that bombs will follow, continuing that bombing is as common to the United States as blueberry pie. [redacted] stated he chided Ellsberg concerning these remarks and following this event he purposely avoided Ellsberg. Concerning his remark regarding a moral deterioration of Ellsberg, [redacted] explained that he was referring to Ellsberg's ethics rather than to his personal conduct.

[redacted] stated that he has no knowledge that Ellsberg had ever appropriated classified documents or xeroxed them; however, he cited two instances which made him question Ellsberg as a security risk. The first concerned an article appearing in the "Washington Post" of May 17, 1970, written by Ben Bagdikian captioned "The Government is a Cruel Liar". It was [redacted] opinion on reading this article that this was more Daniel Ellsberg's article than Bagdikian's as Bagdikian did not normally write this type of work nor have expertise of the nature reflected in the article, but that the words appearing seemed to be more attributable to Ellsberg. [redacted] stated that he has absolutely no proof that his observations have any validity and said that is only an expression of his [redacted] own opinion.

The second point [redacted] cited was to the effect that sometime in the Spring of 1970, while in Chicago, he received a telephone call from [redacted] a close friend and associate at Rand Corporation. [redacted] related

[redacted] that Robert Ellsberg, the son of Daniel and Carol Ellsberg, had informed [redacted] that he and his father had participated with others in copying classified documents in some store in Los Angeles.

[redacted] stated that he had no way to assess the truth of what [redacted] had told him, however, based on [redacted] long-time employment at Rand Corporation and knowledge of the work performed at this Corporation he felt that if in fact Ellsberg had taken documents without authorization and had them reproduced it could lead to serious consequences. therefore, [redacted] promptly telephoned [redacted] Rand Corporation, to inform him of the information relayed by [redacted] told [redacted] that he was aware of this information and it was being investigated.

[redacted] stated that he never believed that Ellsberg would ever have made disclosures as have developed and repeated that he has no knowledge concerning any aspects of Ellsberg ever taking any classified material from Rand Corporation or xeroxing such material.

[redacted] re-iterated that after June 1968, he had very little association with Ellsberg except for isolated meetings at social gatherings. He stated that he was aware that Ellsberg and several other Rand Corporation employees had written a letter which was published in the "Washington Post" criticizing United States involvement in Vietnam and [redacted] had openly expressed disapproval of this action. He recalled that at a social gathering sometime after the writing of this article, Ellsberg [redacted] sought [redacted] approval for what he had done. [redacted] stated that Ellsberg's comments in explaining his action in writing this letter made less sense than the letter itself, which [redacted] stated served no worthwhile purpose and was an unethical use of the Rand Corporation name in identifying the signers of the letter.

[redacted] felt that knowing Ellsberg and the other signers of the above letter it is his opinion that this was strictly Ellsberg's idea and he believes Ellsberg was the moving spirit in its origin. He believes that Ellsberg coerces people and uses them to his advantage and stated that this particular letter was a good example of his feelings on this matter.

[REDACTED] stated that he believes that Ellsberg reached the height of his intellectual brilliance at an early age, but has never really achieved his full potential. He stated that it is his recollection that [REDACTED] Rand Corporation, had expressed disappointment in the quality of Ellsberg's work.

[REDACTED] characterized Ellsberg as an exhibitionist who seeks public and professional adulation. In this regard [REDACTED] stated that Ellsberg openly bragged of his women conquests and was the type of individual who would take pictures of these women in a state of undress and display them. He said Ellsberg was an experimenter not only with women, but with food, thoughts and social actions. He explained that Ellsberg loved to take risks, has parachuted from an airplane and had experimented with the drug LSD even commenting to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] should try LSD as he thought it was great.

[REDACTED] stated that Ellsberg is an actor who can present a sincere, intense affectation by which he can seduce the minds of women as well as the minds of fellow employees and high government officials.

[REDACTED] is of the opinion that Ellsberg has no real or sincere concern regarding the lives of American soldiers or Vietnamese civilians and although he apparently welcomes martyrdom in his present situation, believes Ellsberg has no intention of spending any time in jail.

Regarding Vu Van Thai, [REDACTED] stated that he knew this individual during Thai's employment at the Rand Corporation. He recalled that at one time Thai had been the South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States. He stated that he believed Thai to be the type of individual who would alter his position to suit his purposes.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date 7/26/71

[REDACTED] Rand Corporation, 1700
Main Street, Santa Monica, California, advised as follows: [REDACTED]

He first met DANIEL ELLSBERG when ELLSBERG came to work for the Rand Corporation in the late Fifties. He has never known ELLSBERG socially and has only met him professionally at meetings and seminars. He has had no contact whatsoever with DANIEL ELLSBERG since 1967, other than to glimpse ELLSBERG in the corridors of Rand Corporation.

He has heard rumors from other Rand employees that DANIEL ELLSBERG "was on drugs" but has no direct knowledge of this. He had also heard a rumor that DANIEL ELLSBERG was in some manner connected with the "May-Day people" and RENNIE DAVIS, a leader of the anti-war faction.

He stated that the major source of the rumors he has heard is the person who works [REDACTED] at Rand Corporation, [REDACTED] who knows ELLSBERG well.

He emphasized that he has no direct knowledge of ELLSBERG ever being on drugs or to have participated in any anti-Vietnam war activities other than rumors he has heard.

On 7/23/71 at Santa Monica, California File # 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] 41W [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] REK/mj Date dictated 7/23/71

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date 7/26/71

[redacted] Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, [redacted]
Santa Monica, California, advised as follows:

He has known DANIEL ELLSBERG since ELLSBERG came to work at Rand Corporation in 1958. He and other Rand Corporation employees feel that DANIEL ELLSBERG's apparent unstable behavior could be due to the fact that he may be on drugs; however, he has no direct knowledge that DANIEL ELLSBERG has ever been a drug user.

He did not know that DANIEL ELLSBERG had participated in the task force which compiled the "MC NAMARA Study", nor did he know that ELLSBERG was so involved in the Vietnam project at Rand Corporation. He has no direct knowledge that ELLSBERG was ever associated with any anti-Vietnam War activity; however, on approximately June 16, or 17, 1971, he received a telephone call from [redacted] a CBS Television reporter and who is associated with the [redacted] Show in New York City. FROMSON was calling from Chicago, Illinois. He had introduced [redacted] to DANIEL ELLSBERG several years ago at a dinner. [redacted] called him in an effort to determine ELLSBERG's whereabouts as ELLSBERG's name had just been made public as the person allegedly who made the Pentagon Papers available to the New York Times Newspaper. He told [redacted] that he did not know where ELLSBERG was located. [redacted] told him that he, [redacted] had last seen DANIEL ELLSBERG in April 1971, at Ann Arbor, Michigan, where ELLSBERG was participating in a planning session with others who were organizing the May 1st, 1971, demonstration to be held in Washington, D. C. [redacted] mentioned that included among the people attending this planning session was RENNIE DAVIS. [redacted] further told him that at that time ELLSBERG had appeared "hopped up" and that [redacted] believed ELLSBERG was using drugs.

On 7/23/71 at Santa Monica, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] RFEK/mj Date dictated 7/23/71

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TRAVEL

Date 7/13/71

[redacted]
[redacted] Washington, D. C., telephone number [redacted] advised that [redacted] would be a [redacted] "as identified by the second three digits. He identified the [redacted] as much like a blank counter check in a bank and stated they are available in blank form in air terminals served by the company. [redacted] explained that a customer simply picks up the blank form, which is in triplicate, fills in the destination and presents same to a window or gate. The attendant stamps on the station of departure, flight number, destination, class and date, and since all [redacted] are credit transactions he imprints the credit card on the ticket and has the customer sign it. The top copy is retained by the customer, the second copy is retained by the airline, and the third copy is forwarded to the respective credit card company. Credit cards honored by [redacted] are American Express, Diners Club, Master Charge, BankAmericard, and Carte Blanche.

[redacted] caused a check to be made of his records at [redacted] located [redacted] issued [redacted]

[redacted] Contrary to [redacted] previous statement that the ticket in question would have been stamped and imprinted with a credit card number, it was found to be filled out completely by hand. He attributed this to the probability that the ticket was presented at the departure gate and the attendant did not have appropriate stamps and imprinting equipment.

[redacted] indicates it was issued on [redacted] for travel from [redacted] (designation for [redacted])

On 7/9/71 at National Airport, Arlington Virginia

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 7/12/71

The credit card was indicated as [REDACTED] DANIEL ELLSBERG, expiration date was [REDACTED]. The amount of the ticket was [REDACTED] and it was signed "DANIEL ELLSBERG." The ticket in question bears the initials "C. F. W." in the upper right hand corner, and [REDACTED] determined these to be the initials of [REDACTED] who validated the ticket. While the flight departure time is not indicated on the ticket, [REDACTED] determined from prior airline schedules that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] made available the original airline copy of ticket number [REDACTED] for permanent retention by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/14/71

On July 13, 1971, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
California, advised that she has just located the cash receipts records for the motel for the period of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This record reveals that Daniel Ellsberg checked in on [REDACTED] and departed on [REDACTED]. He occupied [REDACTED] and paid for the [REDACTED] lodging

[REDACTED] He paid with a BankAmericard Number 4024-630-899-363. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that earlier [REDACTED] thought that Ellsberg had only stayed between [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] however, she excused her mistaken belief by the fact [REDACTED]


Interviewed on 7/13/71 at Malibu, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/13/71

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/19/71



Interviewed on 7/16/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952
by SA [redacted] ^{1/m} [redacted] fet [redacted] Date dictated 7/19/71

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/21/71

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] telephonically advised as follows:
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Interviewed on 7/21/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/21/71

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 7/26/71



Interviewed on 7/23/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/23/71

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MISCELLANEOUS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/22/71

[REDACTED] California, advised that a review of his records reflect that an individual giving the name D. Ellsberg, 10 Hillard Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, had stayed at the hotel from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Interviewed on 7/20/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] bab [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/22/71

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 7/26/71

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] California, made available Mr. and
Mrs. D. Ellsberg of 10 Hilliard Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
hotel charges during their stay from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

In addition, he furnished a list of telephone
numbers charged to the Ellsbergs' statement between [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The local numbers called are
as follows:


[REDACTED]

Interviewed on 7/23/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/23/71

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LA 105-27952





[redacted] also furnished the registration card for Mr. and Mrs. D. Ellsberg, 10 Hilliard Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, showing date of arrival as [redacted] and departure as [redacted]. The room number was indicated to be [redacted] and the number of guests two. This registration card was signed Daniel Ellsberg. However, [redacted] stated that Ellsberg and companion occupied Room [redacted]


4
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[REDACTED] he occupied Rooms

[REDACTED] Ellsberg occupied Rooms

[REDACTED] Ellsberg occupied Room [REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/16/71

Interviewed on 7/14/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952-
SAs [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] GJM
by [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/15/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/14/71

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Los Angeles, California, advised that according to their warranty records the 1970 BMW sedan with VIN 2530833 was imported to the United States on October 13, 1969 and was sold by L and N Motors Sales and Service, 8081 Garden Grove Boulevard, Garden Grove, California, to one Patricia Marx of 2752 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, California.

According to [REDACTED] the L and N Motors Sales and Service Company went out of business recently and that any additional information concerning the purchase of the above described vehicle may possibly be obtained from the majority stock holder of the defunct corporation, a Richard Washer (714-644-2369).

Interviewed on 7/13/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/13/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/22/71

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] L & N Motor Sales and Service, 8081 Garden Grove Boulevard, Garden Grove, California, advised that he had located the records involved in the sale of a BMW automobile VIN 2530833. A review of these records reflect the following:

A Patricia Marx called on the telephone to the L & N Motor Sales and Service, talked to salesman [REDACTED] and thereupon purchased the automobile in question over the phone. She sent by mail a \$2,000 check which [REDACTED] believed to have been an out of state check. The car in question was thereafter delivered to her Malibu address 2752 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, California, at which time she paid with an additional check for the remainder of the price. The date of sale of the car to Marx is listed as March 31, 1970.

[REDACTED] advised that Richard Bradford is currently employed at Circle Motors, Long Beach, California (644-2705).

Interviewed on 7/21/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [REDACTED] Date dictated 7/22/71

DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 7/21/71

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] California, was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the inquiry.

[REDACTED] stated that the records of his office reflect that DANIEL ELLSBERG, 10 Hilliard Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, has [REDACTED]. He had had this [REDACTED] which is the only one issued to him, for a period of [REDACTED] and is presently [REDACTED]. His present balance is [REDACTED] and his limit on this card is [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] indicated that any further information will be forthcoming only upon the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum which should be directed to him at the above address.

On 7/20/71 at Pasadena, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952
by SA [REDACTED] *umms* Date dictated 7/20/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 7/23/71

[REDACTED] furnished copies of the following documents pertaining to the moving of items for Daniel Ellsberg, 20752 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, California, to 30 Wadsworth Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Interstate Order for Service, Number 574970, dated September 2, signed by Joe Sekyia (Carrier's Representative).

Uniform Household Goods Bill of Lading and Expense Bill, Number 271925.

Uniform Household Goods Bill of Lading and Expense Bill, Number 533673.

Combination Household Goods Bill of Lading and Freight Bill, Number A380576.

Copy of Bekins communication to Hillsdale and Montebello Office regarding Ellsberg's move dated September 3.

The above documents consist of one page each. One copy each of the above five documents are attached hereto.

[REDACTED] pointed out that in addition to the pick up of household goods at Ellsberg's residence in Malibu, Bill of Lading Number 574970 indicated a second pick up of items at the Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica.

[REDACTED] advised the pick up at Ellsberg's residence as well as the pick up at the Rand Corporation occurred on September 15, 1970.

Interviewed on 7/22/71 at Beverly Hills, California File # Los Angeles 105-2795

SA [REDACTED]
by SA [REDACTED]

Date dictated 7/22/71

[redacted] stated their records further indicate that [redacted] went to Ellsberg's residence and made the estimate for the cost of the goods. In addition, Bekins employee [redacted] delivered some packing material to the Ellsberg residence on September 11, 1970. [redacted] stated that the Ellsbergs handled their own packing. [redacted] further stated that the drivers involved in transferring the items are named Trippett and Messer. Trippett's vehicle was described as Number V4328. [redacted] further explained that according to information on the Bill of Ladings, there was apparently a transfer of some items from Trippett's vehicle to a vehicle driven by Messer. [redacted] did not know the full names of the above drivers, but stated they could be contacted through the Central Office of Bekins Van Lines Company at 333 South Center Street, Hillside, Illinois. [redacted] further stated that a copy of the inventory for both the pick up at Ellsberg's residence and the pick up at Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica can be obtained from the above Central Office at Hillside, Illinois. [redacted] specified that the inventories pertain to Bill of Ladings Number 571925 (residence) and Number 533673 (Rand Corporation).

[redacted] said that from a review of available records he could locate no information reflecting that Bekins Moving Company handled transporting of Ellsberg's automobile to Cambridge, Massachusetts.

HOUSEHOLD GOODS BILL OF LADING AND EXPENSE BILL NOT NEGOTIABLE

IF UNABLE TO LOCATE LOCAL OFFICE, CUSTOMER MAY CONTACT CARRIER AT:
 BEKINS VAN LINES CO.
 213 SOUTH CENTER STREET
 MILLERSVILLE, ILLINOIS 61701
 PHONE AREA CODE 312 544 9100

MENTIONED PROPERTY TENDERED SUBJECT TO RATES, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE TARIFF IN EFFECT ON THE DATE OF THIS BILL OF LADING AND RECEIPTS AS SHOWN ON FACE AND REVERSE SIDE HEREOF

SHIPPER		PHONE		FOR TRANSPORTATION AND DELIVERY TO	
ADDRESS		CITY		CONSIGNEE	
CITY		ZIP		ADDRESS	
ISSUE DATE		ESTIMATE MADE		CITY	
C.O. <input type="checkbox"/> CORP. <input type="checkbox"/> GOVT. <input type="checkbox"/> HHG <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ELEC. <input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		NOTIFY	
CHARGES PAYABLE IN CASH MONEY ORDER OR PAYMENT BY CREDIT CARD DELIVERY CHARGE WILL NOT BE APPLIED TO THIS BILL OF LADING		ADDRESS		PHONE	
NOTICE: Unless the shipper expressly indicates the shipment is for household goods, the carrier's maximum liability for loss and damage shall be determined by the weight of the goods and the value of the goods as shown on the bill of lading. The shipper's liability for loss and damage shall be determined by the weight of the goods and the value of the goods as shown on the bill of lading. The shipper's liability for loss and damage shall be determined by the weight of the goods and the value of the goods as shown on the bill of lading.		ITEMIZED CONTAINER, PACKING AND UNPACKING CHARGES			

DESCRIPTION	CONTAINER			PACKING			UNPACKING		
	QTY.	RATE	TOTAL \$	QTY.	RATE	TOTAL \$	QTY.	RATE	TOTAL \$
23	75	17.25							
23	75	17.25							
2	25	6.00							
2	25	6.00							

(TO BE COMPLETED BY THE PERSON SIGNING BELOW)

NOTICE: THE SHIPPER SIGNING THIS BILL OF LADING MUST INSERT IN THE SPACE ABOVE IN HIS OWN HANDWRITING EITHER HIS DECLARATION OF THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE SHIPMENT OR THE WEIGHT IN POUNDS PER ARTICLE OTHERWISE THE SHIPMENT WILL BE DEEMED RELEASED TO A MAXIMUM VALUE EQUAL TO \$1.25 TIMES THE WEIGHT OF THE SHIPMENT IN POUNDS

X SHIPPER PER FILE DATE 10/10/73
 DESCRIPTION OF SHIPMENT AND LIST OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS DESCRIBED IN ITEM 1 OF THIS BILL OF LADING ATTACHED
 LOADED ON VAN NO. 3034 VEHICLE LOAD NO

SHIPPER GIVEN AND RECEIPT OBTAINED FOR INFORMATION SUMMARY BOP 103

SHIPPER REQUESTS NOTIFICATION ON ACTUAL CHARGES ☐ YES ☐ NO
 NOTIFY ADDRESS 1700 KENN ST, STA 10010, CALIF.
 PHONE 533673

NOTIFIED BY DATE COST 2 225 4.50

THE WEIGHT USED OF LBS. IS THE MANUFACTURERS CERTIFIED CORRECT WEIGHT.

SHIPPER MUST BE ENTERED IN THIS BILL OF LADING YOUR SHIPMENT OF THE VEHICLE

DATE	LOCATION OF SHIPMENT	EQUIPMENT NO.	NAME	HAULING DRIVER OR INTERLINE CARRIER'S ADDRESS	TEL NO.	FROM	TO
10/10/73	3034	100220707001	100220707001	100220707001		KENT.	DET.

WEIGHT, RATE AND CHARGES SUBJECT TO CORRECTION	ACTUAL CHARGES	BASED ON TARIFF NO. <u>120A</u> SEC. <u>6</u> MILES <u>2.01</u>
NET WEIGHT <u>10.71</u> CWT	<u>10.71</u>	RATING OFFICE <u>205</u> DATE <u>10/10/73</u>
CONTAINERS (Itemized above)	<u>10.71</u>	PICKED UP BY <u>3034</u> DATE <u>10/10/73</u>
PACKING SERVICE (Itemized above)	<u>10.71</u>	LOADED BY <u>3034</u> DATE <u>10/10/73</u>
PICK UP <u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	DEL. RES. <input type="checkbox"/> WHSE. <input type="checkbox"/> BY <u>DATE</u>
WAREHOUSE HANDLING <u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	ORDER BOOKED BY <u>000,21</u>
ORIGIN STORAGE <u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	ORIGIN SERVICE BY <u>000,01</u>
APPLIANCE SERVICE CHGS <u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	BILLING AUTHORITY BY <u>DATE</u>
ADDITIONAL TRANSPORTATION CHARGE <u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	IF REWEIGH WT. <u>DATE</u> TARE WT. <u>DATE</u> NET WT. <u>DATE</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	AGREED DLY DATE OR PERIOD OF TIME <u>9-25-75</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	ISSUING CARRIER <u>BEKINS VAN LINES CO.</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	AGENT <u>BEKINS VAN LINES CO.</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	ADDRESS <u>205 1700</u> PHONE <u>533673</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	BY <u>DATE</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	BILLING ADDRESS PER P.O. OR C.O. NO. <u>DATE</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	TO <u>DATE</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	ADDRESS <u>DATE</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	CITY <u>DATE</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	STATE <u>DATE</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	STG. AT DEST. AUTH. <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> Limitation <u>DATE</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	PAYMENT RECEIVED BY <u>DATE</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	11. REGIONAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE COPY <u>DATE</u>
<u>10.71</u> DUE	<u>10.71</u>	No. <u>571925</u>

Any motor carrier, or other person or any officer, agent, employee, or representative thereof, who shall knowingly and willfully neglect or fail to make full, true, and correct entries or who shall knowingly and willfully falsify, destroy, mutilate or alter this form, shall be subject to a penalty of \$5,000 for each such offence.

PROPERTY TRANSFER SUBJECT: RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE TRIP IMPACT ON THE 1 JUL DATE OF THE

1 LADING AND IDENTIFYS AS SHOWN ON FACE AND REVERSE SIDE OF CARD

420.33673

43

174970
INTERSTATE
ORDER FOR
SERVICE

BEKINS VAN LINES CO.
333 SOUTH CENTER STREET
HILLSIDE, ILLINOIS 60162
PHONE: 312-544-9200

B/L REF. NO. 571925

SHIPPER			SHIP HOUSEHOLD GOODS DESCRIBED BELOW FROM			CONSIGNEE			FOR TRANSPORTATION AND DELIVERY TO		
D EISBERG 456-2724			456-2724			SAME			SAME		
20752 PACIFIC COAST HWY (Hwy)			20752 PACIFIC COAST HWY (Hwy)			1ST DEL 10 HILLIARD ST			1ST DEL 10 HILLIARD ST		
MALIBU CALIF			MALIBU CALIF			CAMBRIDGE MASS 02138			CAMBRIDGE MASS 02138		
SERVICE INFORMATION			SHIPPER'S CONTACT ENROUTE			SHIPPER'S CONTACT AT DESTINATION			SHIPPER'S CONTACT AT DESTINATION		
PACKING DATE REQUESTED			AGREED PICK-UP DATE OR PERIOD OF TIME			AGREED DELIVERY DATE OR PERIOD OF TIME			ADDRESS		
8-9-70			9-11-70			9-20-75			31 WADSWORTH ST CAMBRIDGE		
APPROXIMATE WEIGHT 7500 CU. FT.			MILES 1100-3000			DESTINATION DELIVERING AGENT BEKINS M.S.			ADDRESS 560 PROVIDENCE HWY - PHONE 739-1455		
TARIFF NO. 178A			RATE PER CWT. 20.43			INTERLINING CARRIER (if any)			ADDRESS		
LOCATION OF SCALE TO BE USED AT ORIGIN			STORE SHIPMENT: <input type="checkbox"/> IN-TRANSIT <input type="checkbox"/> REGULAR			WAREHOUSE			MATERIALS, PACKING AND UNPACKING SERVICES		
AT			LOCATED			ESTIMATED NO.			ESTIMATED NO.		
SPECIAL SERVICES ORDERED			DESCRIPTION			CU. FT.			Containers		
			BARREL, DISH PACK						2		
			CARTON			LESS THAN			1 1/2		
			CARTON						1 1/2		
			CARTON						3		
			CARTON						4 1/2		
			CARTON						6		
			CARTON						6 1/2		
			WARDROBE CARTON						10		
			CRIB MATTRESS CARTON						1		
			MATTRESS CARTON 54"x75" MAX.						2		
			MATTRESS CARTON OVER 54"x75"						2		
			MATTRESS COVER								
			CRATES & CONTAINERS								
EXTRA FLIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> ORIGIN <input type="checkbox"/> DESTIN. <input type="checkbox"/>			PIANO CARRY <input type="checkbox"/> ORIGIN <input type="checkbox"/> DEST. <input type="checkbox"/> TYPE OF PIANO			ARRANGE APPLIANCE SERVICE <input type="checkbox"/> WASHER <input type="checkbox"/> DRYER <input type="checkbox"/> AIR COND			T.V. SET <input type="checkbox"/> STOVE <input type="checkbox"/> REFER <input type="checkbox"/> FREEZER <input type="checkbox"/> STEREO SET		
EXPEDITED SERVICE - DELIVER ON OR BEFORE			COMPLETE OCCUPANCY OF A CU. FT. VEHICLE			EXCLUSIVE USE OF A CU. FT. VEHICLE			SPACE RESERVATION OF CU. FT.		
TOTAL ESTIMATED CHARGES (When Estimate Made)			4625.50			MAXIMUM AMOUNT REQUIRED TO BE PAID ON DELIVERY OF C.O.D. SHIPMENT UPON REQUEST OF CUSTOMER			4224.05		
CHARGES TO BE PAID IN CASH, MONEY ORDER OR CERTIFIED CHECK BEFORE PROPERTY RELINQUISHED BY CARRIER.			REQUESTS NOTIFICATION OF ACTUAL CHARGES (NO LIES)			IF YES, NOTIFY AT			ADDRESS		
ESTIMATE MADE			UNO			ESTIMATE NO.			CREDIT WILL BE EXTENDED TO APPROVED COMMERCIAL ACCOUNT ONLY INVOICE TO		
SHIPPER GIVEN AND RECEIPT OBTAINED FOR INFORMATION SUMMARY BOP 103.			UNLESS THE SHIPPER EXPRESSLY RELEASES THE SHIPMENT FROM VALUE OF 10 CENTS PER POUND PER ARTICLE, THE CARRIER'S MAXIMUM LIABILITY FOR LOSS AND DAMAGE SHALL BE EITHER THE UNP SUM VALUE DECLARED BY THE SHIPPER OR AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO \$1.25 FOR EACH POUND OF WEIGHT IN THE SHIPMENT, WHICHEVER IS GREATER.			THE SHIPMENT WILL MOVE SUBJECT TO THE RULES AND CONDITIONS OF THE CARRIER'S TARIFF, SHIPPER HERE BY RELEASES THE ENTIRE SHIPMENT TO A VALUE NOT EXCEEDING			1.25		
NOTICE: THE SHIPPER SIGNING THIS CONTRACT MUST INSERT IN THE SPACE ABOVE, IN HIS OWN HANDWRITING, EITHER HIS DECLARATION OF THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE SHIPMENT, OR THE WORDS "ACCOUNTS PER POUND PER ARTICLE". OTHERWISE THE SHIPMENT WILL BE DEEMED RELEASED TO A MAXIMUM VALUE EQUAL TO \$1.25 TIMES THE WEIGHT OF THE SHIPMENT IN POUNDS.			SHIPPER			DATE			9-3		
SHIPPER HEREBY AUTHORIZES AND DIRECTS CARRIER AND CARRIER AGREES TO PERFORM OR ARRANGE FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF PACKING, STOWING AND OTHER SERVICES, AND TO TRANSPORT OR FORWARD OVER THE LINE OF ANY AUTHORIZED CARRIER, AS DIRECTED HEREIN, ONE LOT OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS FOR WHICH RECEIPT WILL BE GIVEN SHIPPER WHEN CARRIER PHYSICALLY RECEIVES SAME, AT THE RATE AND CHARGES AND SUBJECT TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CARRIER'S BUSINESS AS PROVIDED IN THE APPLICABLE TARIFFS AND RATE SCHEDULES IN EFFECT AS OF THE DATE OF SHIPMENT WHICH ARE LAWFULLY PROMULGATED, OR FILED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW, UNLESS SHIPPER INSTRUCTS OTHERWISE. IN WRITING, IT IS AGREED THAT THIS CONTRACT MAY BE PERFORMED AT CARRIER'S OPTION BY EITHER THE MOTOR CARRIER DIVISION OR THE FORWARDER DIVISION OF BEKINS VAN LINES CO.			C.O.D. <input type="checkbox"/> CORP. <input type="checkbox"/> GOVT. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IND. <input type="checkbox"/> ELEC. <input type="checkbox"/> DSE <input type="checkbox"/>			BOOKED BY			CODE 0721		
I HAVE READ THIS CONTRACT, AGREE TO THE PROVISIONS HEREIN AND ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A COPY.			SIGN HERE X			DATE			9-3		
CUSTOMER (SHIPPER OR AGENT)			BY			CARRIER'S REPRESENTATIVE			DATE		
			J. E. Selby						7-2		

BEKINS VAN LINES CO.

FORM 075 (MAY 70)

CUSTOMER (SHIPPER OR AGENT)

CARRIER'S REPRESENTATIVE

DATE

; & FREIGHT BILL

A 380576

STORAGE - SHIPPING

BEUNING
SINCE 1891

PACKING - MOVING

HOME OFFICE

ISSUED AT

MOVING & STORAGE CO.

1335 So. Figueroa St.

Los Angeles, Calif. 90015

EXPLANATION: P-PACKING L-LOADING D-DRIVING UL-UNLOADING UP-UNPACKING X-TIME OUT FOR

Received, pursuant to Order for Services (if any) and subject to the classifications and tariffs, rules and regulations in effect on the date of the issue of this Bill of Lading. The Property described below (contents and conditions of contents of packages unknown) consigned and destined as shown below, which said company (the word company being used throughout this contract as meaning any person or corporation in possession of the property under the contract) agrees to carry to destination indicated below. If within the scope of its lawful operations, otherwise to deliver to another carrier to deliver to said destination. It is mutually agreed, as to each carrier of all or any of said property over all or any portion of route to destination, and as to each party at any time interested in all or any of said property, that every service to be performed hereunder shall be subject to all conditions not prohibited by law, whether printed or written, herein contained, INCLUDING THE CONDITIONS ON BACK HEREOF, which are hereby agreed to by shipper and accepted for himself and his assigns.

MAT'L & PACKING LIST	USED	Unit Charge	CHARGE	
BARRELS, DRUMS, DISC PAK or Other Specially Designed Container CARDBOARD SEPARATORS (SAF-T-PAK)				
CARTONS, NOT OVER 3 CF	25	.75	18	75
CARTONS, OVER 3 NOT OVER 6 CF	25	.75	18	75
CARTONS, OVER 6 NOT OVER 12 CF				
CARTONS, OVER 12 CF				
CARTONS-MATTRESS 3 x 3				
CARTONS-MATTRESS 3 x 3	2	3.25	6	50
COVERS-MATTRESS 3 x 3				
COVERS-MATTRESS 4 x 6				
CARTONS-OFFICE MOVING				
CARTONS-PICTURE & GLASS				
CRATE-SIZE				
LUMBER-1 x 4				
LUMBER-1 x 6				
NAILS-LBS.				
NAPHTHALENE-LBS.				
PAPER-CORRUGATED LBS. <i>N.S.W.</i>	25 lbs			
PAPER-KRAFT-LBS.				
PAPER-TISSUE-QUIRE				
TAPE-GUMMED-ROLL	2			
TWINE-LBS.				
WARDROBES	2	6.00	10	00
TOTAL PACKING MATERIAL				
SALES TAX ON MATERIAL				
Packing Hrs. Unpacking Hrs. @ \$ Hr.				
MAT'L DEL. CHARGE Units @ Ea.			54	00
TOTAL PACKING, UNPACKING & MATERIAL CHARGES			54	00
NAME	DATE	START	FINISH	HOURS
Shipper				
CARRIER: BEKINS MOVING & STORAGE CO. By				
Services shown herein were rendered and the property described above received in good condition except as noted.				
CONSIGNEE: By				

SHIPPER D. Ellisberg

MOVED FROM 20752 Pacific Co Hwy

CONSIGNEE Same

ADDRESS Mod'l Del only

Date 9/11/70 Job No. 11/1931 P.R. No.

COMMODITY. One lot of household goods as described in 17-M.C.C. 467 unless otherwise indicated:

GROUND FLOOR (Not over 7 Steps)	AT ORIGIN	AT DESTINATION
NO. OF FLIGHTS (8 to 20 steps for first flight, Each series not more than 20 steps, thereafter one additional flight.)	1st	

The liability of this company for any piece, package or its contents is limited to 50¢ per pound per article (10¢ per pound per article for shipments by rail or water carrier or by general freight motor carrier) unless a higher valuation is declared in writing and so noted hereon in which case rates based on such higher declared valuation will be assessed.

Higher Valuation: \$

TERMS: All advances of lawful charges must be paid in cash, money order, or certified check before carrier delivers or relinquishes possession of the property, unless otherwise indicated by carrier.

Overtime Charged Before 8 A.M. and After 5 P.M. or For Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays.

Van # 123	No. PCS.	Driver Quinn
Loading Hrs.	RATE FOR FIRST PC. \$	Helper
Double Driving Hrs.	RATE FOR ADD'L PCS. \$	Helper

CARTAGE	Regular Hrs. @ \$	Hr.
CARTAGE	Overtime Hrs. @ \$	Hr.
CARTAGE	Lbs. @ \$	Cwt.
EXTRA MEN	Hrs. @ \$	Hr.
Grand <input type="checkbox"/> Plane Upright <input type="checkbox"/> \$	Flight Extra \$	

ADVANCES w/B 571925

TOTAL Packing, Unpacking & Material Charges 54 00

PROTECTION Valuation \$ Class

TOTAL COLLECT CHARGES 54 00

BEKINS MOVING & STORAGE CO.
Received Payment By 9/14/70

ORIGINAL-NOT NEGOTIABLE
PRINTED IN U.S.A.

5.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 7/26/71

[redacted] Bekins Moving and Storage Company, 215 S. Canon Drive, Beverly Hills, California, telephonically contacted the Los Angeles Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He advised that he recalled visiting the Daniel Ellsberg residence in Malibu, California, in September 1970, [redacted]

[redacted] He said both Ellsberg and his wife were present at the time. He recalled they had a minimum of furniture but a great deal of personal effects, as books, linens, dishes and objects of art. He also said that arrangements were made to transport Ellsberg's automobile aboard the moving van. He noted there were two "pick ups" involved in the move, one at the residence and one at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California. Also, in connection with this move, deliveries were made of Ellsberg's property to the address 10 Hilliard Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts and the address 30 Wadsworth Street, in Cambridge. He stated he assumes one of these addresses is Daniel Ellsberg's office. He said he recalled no special or unusual instructions regarding the handling of any portion of the goods and observed no sensitive data during his brief visit to the Ellsberg residence.

Interviewed on 7/23/71 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 105-27952

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 7/26/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 7/26/71

[REDACTED] The Rand Corporation,
1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, California, furnished the
following information:

She said that [REDACTED]
at the time of his termination from the Rand Corporation
in 1970. She said at the time he ceased active employment
he moved to a temporary office on the Fourth Floor at which
time [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] none of this material
was classified and she feels certain of this as she would have
noticed any classified information. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] when the
movers arrived at Rand in September 1970 to move these
boxes of Ellsberg's and she does not know who assisted
Ellsberg in this move, or if anyone did.

Interviewed on 7/23/71 at Santa Monica, California File # Los Angeles 105-2795

by SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED] CUN/100

Date dictated 7/26/71

LA 105-27952

Records of the Hotel Continental, Cambridge, Massachusetts, as reviewed during July, 1971, revealed that [REDACTED] 18492 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, California, was a registered guest at this hotel, March 20, 1971, for a stay of one day. The registration for [REDACTED] identified him as a representative of "Sims." Payment in the amount of \$12.03 was made by American Express Credit Card, number [REDACTED]

A review of the Western Section Telephone Directory, March, 1971, General Telephone Company of California, on July 16, 1971, revealed a listing for the Students International Meditation Society (SIMS), 1015 Gayley Avenue, West Los Angeles, telephone number 478-1562.

B-APPROX-1

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] telephone number [REDACTED] on July 16, 1971. A woman, who identified herself as the [REDACTED], advised that [REDACTED] has the position of [REDACTED] with SIMS. [REDACTED] travels extensively for SIMS all over the United States and meets with many Senators and with many prominent businessmen. [REDACTED] is presently in [REDACTED] conducting business for SIMS. He is not expected to return to Los Angeles until sometime during August, 1971.

[REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as being a "genius." She stated ROTH is about [REDACTED]. His residence address is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] further advised that the world leader of the SIMS organization is YOGI MAHARISHI MAHESH. She stated the SIMS organization conducts lectures each week in Los Angeles on transcendental meditation. The main purpose of the organization she advised is to "spread happiness" and the organization works to achieve this through instructions and weekly meetings.

Negative checks conducted regarding [REDACTED] are as follows:

LA 105-27952

Los Angeles County Voters' Registration records.
July 16, 1971;

Credit Bureau of Greater Los Angeles records.
July 16, 1971;

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office records.
July 16, 1971.

Records of the Los Angeles Police Department, which
were caused to be reviewed on July 16, 1971, reveal a record
for [REDACTED]

Records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, Drivers'
License Division, Sacramento, California, as were caused to
be reviewed on July 16, 1971, revealed that driver's license
number [REDACTED] is in the name [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This license was issued June 3, 1969.
His marital status is shown as [REDACTED]

INDEX

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
BAGDIKIAN, BEN	24
BELL, JOSEPH	34
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
CHOUNAREL, JOHNNKEY	9
DAVIS, RENNIE	27
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
KISSINGER, HENRY	24
MARX, ADELA	42
MARX, PATRICIA	22, 33, 34, 4
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
ROSENWALD, ANTHONY	14
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
RUSSO, TONY	19, 22, 33, 34
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR	24

INDEX

SHOLMAN, JANE
SINAY, LYNDIA

40
19

THAI, VU VAN

26

FBI

Date: 7/29/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060) ATTN: DID
FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (105-27952)
RE: MC LEK
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE

Re Bureau phone call to Los Angeles 7/28/71 and Los Angeles phone calls to Denver and San Francisco 7/28/71.

Subpoenas for SPENCER MARX, Big Sur, California, and BURTRAM WALLRICH and ANNE MARIE GUILFOILE, both of Denver, Colorado, were obtained from the Complaint Division, U.S. Attorney's Office, at approximately 4:25 p.m., 7/28/71.

Subpoena for MARX was given to [REDACTED] 7/28/71, [REDACTED] departing Los Angeles 7:00 p.m., arriving San Francisco at 8:00 p.m. [REDACTED] San Francisco Office, was advised at 6:47 p.m. by phone.

Subpoenas for WALLRICH and GUILFOILE were given to [REDACTED] Continental Airlines, leaving Los Angeles at approximately 8:20 p.m. and arriving Denver at 11:20 p.m., 7/28/71. [REDACTED] Denver Office, was advised by phone at 8:11 p.m., 7/28/71.

2- Bureau (RM)
2- Denver (RM)
2- San Francisco (RM)
1- Los Angeles
WLM:fet
(7)

EX-105

REC-32

65-74060-837

4 JUL 31 1971

NAT. INT. SEC.

Approved: W99
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

59 AUG 11 1971

F B I

Date: 7/29/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

REGISTERED MAIL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
FROM: SAC, OKLAHOMA CITY (65-1327) -RUC-
RE: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
OO: LOS ANGELES

ReBuairtel to all offices, 7/21/71.

Oklahoma City indices negative re DANIEL ELLSBERG.

Appropriate informants and sources in Oklahoma City Division contacted and ELLSBERG unknown to them.

EX-105

REC-24

65-74060-838

18 AUG 2 1971

1/6 retained 6/10 7/6
2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (Info)(RM)
1 - Oklahoma City
JEG:blh
(4)

NAT. INT. SEC.

51 AUG 11 1971

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

FBI

Date: 7/30/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
FROM: SAC, DALLAS (65-2331) (RUC)
SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

CO - LOS ANGELES

Re Bureau airtel to Albany dated 7/21/71.

Dallas indices are negative re DANIEL ELLSBERG.
Contact with logical sources and informants who have furnished reliable information in the past, within the Dallas Division area fails to develop any information that ELLSBERG has ever been connected with, or active within organizations of a subversive nature in this area:

Informants and sources contacted are as follows:

7/30/71, by SA [REDACTED]

7/30/71, by SA [REDACTED]

7/29/71, by SA [REDACTED]

7/29/71, by SA [REDACTED]

and DL 609-PSI, 7/30/71, by SA [REDACTED]

It is noted further, that former [REDACTED] was contacted regarding instant matter by Alexandria Division on 7/22/71, but no pertinent information was developed, as indicated in Alexandria teletype to Bureau, dated 7/22/71.

Concerning travel of ELLSBERG, as indicated in Dallas teletype dated 7/27/71, and Los Angeles teletype

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Los Angeles (Info) (RM)
1 - Dallas

JWA:mar
(5)

7 AUG 2 1971

NAT. SEC.

Approved: 39 AUG 1 1971
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

DL 65-2331

dated 7/28/71, investigation with Braniff Airlines (BAL), Dallas, Texas, [REDACTED] reflects that [REDACTED] BAL tickets, after 48 hours, are placed on a computer tape, and after 90 days this tape is destroyed. The specific ticket number would be needed, and according to [REDACTED] number reflected on Carte Blanche charge ticket Los Angeles, is definitely not a BAL ticket.

In view of the above, Dallas is conducting no further investigation. No report or LHM is being submitted, UACB.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 30 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	CD
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

NR003 MP CODED

1215PM URGENT 7-30-71 MAW

TO DIRECTOR (65-74060) (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)
FROM MINNEAPOLIS (65-1447) 2P

MC LEX - NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE.

RE BOSTON AIRTEL TO DIRECTOR JULY TWENTYSIX LAST.

MINNEAPOLIS TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IS LISTED TO [REDACTED]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

EX-105

REC-24

AGRICULTURE, HIS WIFE, MARY, AND SON, [REDACTED], AGE [REDACTED]

WERE CONTACTED ON INSTANT DATE. THEY ADVISED THEY WERE

UNABLE TO RECALL RECEIVING ANY LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CALLS

FROM NEW YORK AND STATED THEY HAVE NO RELATIVES OR ACQUAINTANCES

IN THE NEW YORK CITY AREA. THEY STATED THEY DO NOT REMEMBER

END PAGE ONE

59AUG11 1971

PAGE TWO

RECEIVING ANY LONG DISTANCE CALL ON THE EVENING OF JUNE SEVENTEEN, LAST, BUT STATED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE SOMEONE MAY HAVE CALLED THEM DIRECT AND THAT THEY WOULD THUS HAVE BEEN UNAWARE THAT IT WAS A LONG DISTANCE CALL.

THE [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT THE ONLY KNOWLEDGE THEY POSSESS CONCERNING THE "PENTAGON PAPERS" IS WHAT THEY HAVE LEARNED THROUGH THE NEWS MEDIA.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

FORMER SENIOR RESIDENT AGENT [REDACTED] ADVISED INSTANT DATE THAT HE IS A NEIGHBOR OF THE [REDACTED] WHOM HE KNOWS WELL. ANDERSON ADVISED THAT THE [REDACTED] ENJOY AN EXCELLENT REPUTATION AND THAT NONE OF THEIR FAMILY ARE KNOWN TO BE INVOLVED IN ANY RADICAL OR EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES.

AIRMAIL COPIES SENT BOSTON AND LOS ANGELES.

P.

END

JHW FBI WASH DC

F B I

Date: 7/30/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

AIRMAIL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
FROM: SAC, COLUMBIA (65-76) (P)
SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
OO: LOS ANGELES

Re Bureau airtel to Albany, 7/21/71.

Columbia indices negative.

Contacts with all logical sources and informants,
Columbia Division, negative regarding any information bearing
on Ellsberg's past or present connection with established
Left, New Left, peace groups, or similar organizations.

- 19C retained 6/10/76
2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (RM)(105-27952)
2 - Columbia

JWA:nmg
(5)

EX-105

REC-24

65-74060-841

20 AUG 2 1971

NAT. INT. SEC.

Approved: _____

Sent _____

M

Per _____

59 AUG 11 1971

Special Agent in Charge

FBI

Date:

7/29/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO:

DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)
(ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM:

SAC, WFO (65-11613) (P)

MC LEK

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE
(OO:LA)

REC-24

Re WFO summary teletype, 7/28/71, captioned matter.

Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau, one copy for Boston, and two copies for Los Angeles, of an LHM, dated as above and captioned DANIEL ELLSBERG, ESPIONAGE-X.

The enclosed LHM sets forth results of 7/28/71 interview by SAs [redacted] of [redacted]

[redacted] National Security Council, The White House, concerning his knowledge of, and acquaintance with, DANIEL ELLSBERG.

1cc ISO
7 Sept. 8/16/71
[signature]

EX-105

REC-24

65-74060-842

12 AUG 4 1971

- ② Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)
 1-Boston (65-5236) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
 2-Los Angeles (105-27952) (Enc. 2) (RM)
 1-WFO
 JAV:lmc
 (6)

2cc to SPOL by lit
9/17/73 JRA/ide 65-74060
[signature]

Approved: [signature]

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 30 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Bishop _____
Mr. Brennan _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Dalbey _____
Mr. Gale _____
Mr. Ponder _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Walters _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

NR002 AL CODE

3:33 URGENT 7-30-71 MJC

TO DIRECTOR (65-74060) (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE)

BOSTON (65-5236)

LOS ANGELES (105-27952)

NEW YORK (65-25641)

WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11613)

FROM ALBANY (65-2913) 1P

MC LEK NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE.

RE BOSTON TELETYPE TO BUREAU DATED JULY TWENTY EIGHT LAST.

SEARCH OF DMV FILES UNDER NAME [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FAILED TO LOCATE ANY RECORD IDENTIFIABLE WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BORN SEPTEMBER SIXTEEN, NINETEEN THIRTY TWO. VOTING
RECORDS CANNOT BE REVIEWED SINCE [REDACTED] ADDRESS NOT KNOWN.

VOTING RECORDS FILED ALPHABETICALLY ACCORDING TO THE DISTRICT

IN WHICH A PERSON RESIDES AND IT IS NOTED THAT ALBANY, NEW

YORK AREA IS DIVIDED INTO OVER TWO HUNDRED DISTRICTS.

END

TMT FBI WA TU

REC-24

EX-105

12 AUG 4 1971

59 AUG 11 1971

FBI

Date: 7/30/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI. (65-74060)
(Attn: DCINTEL)

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (65-5236)

SUBJECT: MC LEE
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE

Re Boston airtels to Bureau, 7/12 and 7/26/71,
and Boston teletype to Bureau, 7/23/71.

*10% retained 610%
for distribution
etc*

- 1 - Bureau (RM)
- 2 - Albany (info - last page) (RM)
- 2 - Baltimore (RM)
- 2 - Charlotte (RM)
- 2 - Chicago (RM)
- 2 - Cleveland (RM)
- 2 - Columbia (RM)
- 2 - Detroit (RM)
- 2 - Indianapolis (RM)
- 2 - Los Angeles [REDACTED] (RM)
- 2 - Minneapolis (RM)
- 2 - New Haven (RM)
- 2 - New York (65-25642) (RM)
- 2 - Newark (RM)
- 2 - Philadelphia (RM)
- 2 - Pittsburgh (RM)
- 2 - Richmond (RM)
- 2 - Sacramento (RM)
- 2 - St. Louis (RM)
- 2 - San Francisco (RM)
- 2 - WFO (65-11613) (RM)
- 2 - Boston

PEB:mcj
(44)

REC-24

EX-105

65-74060-844

AUG 21 1971

NAT. INT. SEC.

Approved: _____

Sent _____

M

Per _____

59 AUG 11 1971

Special Agent in Charge

For the information of Pittsburgh, on 6/13/71, "The New York Times" newspaper began publication of a series of articles based on "top secret" documents regarded as very sensitive. Documents involved commonly referred to as the Mc Namara Study. The Attorney General has requested the FBI to conduct all necessary investigation, and the Bureau has instructed all investigation be conducted immediately and results be furnished by teletype, Attention: Domintel, utilizing above caption.

The Bureau has further instructed, however, that disseminable communications in this matter should carry the caption, "DANIEL ELLSBERG, ESPIONAGE - X."

Investigation to date has identified DANIEL ELLSBERG, Senior Research Associate, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, Mass., as probably the individual who furnished copies of the Mc Namara Study to "The New York Times."

On 6/25/71, PAUL VINCENT, Deputy Chief, Criminal Section, Internal Security Division, U. S. Department of Justice, authorized the filing of a complaint charging DANIEL ELLSBERG with violation of Title 18, USC, Section 793(e). The complaint was filed before U. S. Magistrate VENETIA S. TASSOPULOS at Los Angeles, Calif., by Special Agent [REDACTED]

An arrest warrant was issued by the Magistrate at 3:45 p.m., Pacific Daylight Time, on 6/25/71; and the warrant was in the possession of the Magistrate returnable whenever ELLSBERG was located and apprehended. A bond of \$100,000 was recommended.

ELLSBERG surrendered himself to Bureau Agents at the Office of the USA, Boston, the morning of 6/28/71; and at hearing, that date, before U. S. Magistrate PETER W. PRINCI, he was released on \$50,000 bond without surety.

Following submission of results by teletype, as previously instructed, include information developed in report form captioned "DANIEL ELLSBERG, ESPIONAGE - X."

The listed offices are requested to identify the subscribers to the below-listed telephone numbers. These telephone numbers were obtained through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum upon the New England Telephone Company, Boston, Mass., by Departmental Attorney PAUL VINCENT, Department of Justice, on the toll records of telephone number 617-422-1421, which is listed to DANIEL ELLSBERG, 10 Hilliard Street, Cambridge, Mass.

<u>Telephone Number</u>	<u>Date Called</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Duration</u>
<u>WASHINGTON FIELD:</u>			
202-224-3121	3/18/71	10:46 a.m.	7 minutes
202-225-6665	6/29/71	11:21 p.m.	1 minute
202-362-6898	3/18/71	10:55 a.m.	11 minutes
202-547-4342	6/7/71	11:09 a.m.	3 minutes
202-628-5425	2/27/71	10:27 p.m.	54 minutes
"	3/3/71	6:15 p.m.	41 minutes
202-638-1820	6/2/71	10:40 a.m.	1 minute
202-638-2260 (collect)	3/1/71	11:30 a.m.	4 minutes
"	3/1/71	11:33 a.m.	1 minute
202-726-4739 or 202-726-4789	2/25/71	7:51 p.m.	8 minutes
202-965-2370	2/4/71	6:15 p.m.	9 minutes
202-333-5226	6/8/71	11:19 p.m.	25 minutes

BS 65-5236

<u>Telephone Number</u>	<u>Date Called</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Duration</u>
<u>NEW YORK OFFICE:</u>			
212-222-2573	3/15/71	4:46 p.m.	9 minutes
212-249-3500	5/26/71	10:23 a.m.	1 minute
212-360-1000	2/12/71	9:51 a.m.	4 minutes
212-369-1165	4/5/71	12:11 p.m.	1 minute
212-421-1234	2/25/71	5:56 p.m.	2 minutes
"	2/26/71	4:30 p.m.	9 minutes
212-552-7301	5/24/71	10:56 a.m.	45 minutes
212-555-1758	4/8/71	1:21 p.m.	1 minute
212-556-1831	3/11/71	2:41 p.m.	1 minute
212-581-0070	6/2/71	10:31 a.m.	1 minute
212-675-5990	2/25/71	4:47 p.m.	9 minutes
212-687-8747	6/2/71	10:30 a.m.	1 minute
212-688-6040	2/2/71	11:06 a.m.	26 minutes
"	2/22/71	5:12 p.m.	23 minutes
212-691-1700	5/25/71	4:29 p.m.	8 minutes
212-724-8964	3/1/71	11:13 p.m.	1 minute
"	3/2/71	9:44 p.m.	22 minutes
"	3/4/71	10:34 a.m.	2 minutes
"	6/7/71	6:26 p.m.	24 minutes
212-749-1156	2/26/71	6:07 p.m.	45 minutes
212-753-4000	5/25/71	4:28 p.m.	1 minute

<u>Telephone Number</u>	<u>Date Called</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Duration</u>
<u>NEW YORK OFFICE (cont.):</u>			
212-753-6377	2/16/71	not shown	1 minute
212-753-9510	5/25/71	4:37 p.m.	2 minutes
212-757-8070	3/9/71	5:12 p.m.	2 minutes
212-832-1100	6/9/71	3:47 p.m.	1 minute
212-861-8336	2/27/71	6:20 p.m.	4 minutes
212-864-0868	3/3/71	8:59 a.m.	1 minute
212-873-6800	3/4/71	10:29 a.m.	2 minutes
212-986-5380	6/8/71	3:38 p.m.	5 minutes
516-427-6335	1/13/71	11:38 a.m.	3 minutes
"	5/25/71	4:12 p.m.	4 minutes
914-232-5024	6/28/71 (date ELLSBERG surrendered at Boston)	5:03 p.m.	38 minutes
914-669-5341	6/2/71	10:32 a.m.	7 minutes
914-723-1513	2/28/71	1:20 p.m.	2 minutes

PHILADELPHIA OFFICE:

215-525-3200	6/28/71 (date ELLSBERG surrendered at Boston)	5:38 p.m.	1 minute
215-525-7376	1/15/71	3:22 p.m.	8 minutes

BS 65-5236

<u>Telephone Number</u>	<u>Date Called</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Duration</u>
<u>CLEVELAND OFFICE:</u>			
216-(probably 7)21-0436	2/24/71	7:24 p.m.	1 minute
<u>PITTSBURGH OFFICE:</u>			
304-345-3242 (Charleston, West Virginia)	2/28/71	12:29 a.m.	1 minute
<u>ST. LOUIS OFFICE:</u>			
314-363-3138	4/16/71	9:57 a.m.	7 minutes
"	4/16/71	10:38 a.m.	4 minutes
314-363-0100	4/16/71	9:55 a.m.	1 minute
<u>SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE:</u>			
405-667-2335 (Big Sur, Calif.)	2/16/71	not shown	2 minutes
408-667-2134 (collect)	4/8/71	----	29 minutes
408-667-2134	5/4/71	11:08 p.m.	19 minutes
408-667-2134 (collect)	5/13/71	----	20 minutes
408-667-2134 (collect)	5/17/71	----	41 minutes
408-667-2134 (collect)	5/30/71	----	30 minutes
408-667-2134 (collect from Big Sur, Calif.)	6/1/71	----	4 minutes
415-325-6582 or 415-325-6582	3/2/71	9:25 p.m.	15 minutes

BS 65-5236

<u>Telephone Number</u>	<u>Date Called</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Duration</u>
<u>BOSTON OFFICE:</u>			
617-645-9177 -	6/3/71	6:33 p.m.	19 minutes
617-772-0084	4/16/71	4:23 p.m.	2 minutes
<u>BUFFALO OFFICE:</u>			
716-852-4372	2/26/71	10:25 a.m.	22 minutes

Unless a reason exists to preclude an interview such as connected with the press or other news media, all offices receiving or who have received requests to identify subscribers will interview all subscribers to determine: (1.) identity of caller, (2.) purpose of call, and (3.) degree of association, bearing in mind that aliases have been used by SUSAN SHEEHAN (SUSAN DOWLING) and NEIL SHEEHAN (SAMUEL JOHNSON). In this regard, specific date recollection of a call by any of the subscribers from or to either of the SHEEHANS or ELLSBERGS would further confirm the identity and place the caller in a specific apartment or room during the pertinent March and April periods.

FBI

Date: 7/29/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

Via _____
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74060)

FROM: SAC, MEMPHIS (65-1018) (RUC)

MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
(OO: LOS ANGELES)

Re Bureau airtel to Albany dated 7/21/71.

A review of the indices of the Memphis Office and contact with sources available who are familiar with some phases of the established Left, the New Left peace groups, and similar organizations, developed no pertinent data regarding captioned matter. In the event information concerning this matter comes to the attention of the Memphis Office, the Bureau will be promptly advised.

A copy of this communication is designated for Los Angeles Office because Los Angeles is office of origin in this case.

EX-105

REC-24

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (Info) (RM)
1 - Memphis

BFJ/acp
(4)

65-74060-815
6 AUG 2 1971

NAT. INT. SEC.

Approved: 59 AUG 11 1971
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 29 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

NR005 MP CODE

156 PM URGENT 7-29-71 TJT

TO DIRECTOR (67-74060) ATTN: DID

BOSTON (65-5236)

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (65-1447) 3P

MC LEK (NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE).

RE BUREAU AIRTEL JULY TWENTYONE LAST, BUREAU TELETYPE JULY TWENTYSIX LAST, AND MINNEAPOLIS AIRTEL JULY TWENTYEIGHT LAST.

FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU, MINNEAPOLIS SOURCES AND INFORMANTS POSSESS NO INFORMATION BEYOND THAT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED TO BUREAU, BOSTON AND LOS ANGELES AND ENUMERATED IN REFERENCED MINNEAPOLIS AIRTEL.

EX-105 REC-24

65-74060-811
12 AUG 4 1971

ADVISED INSTANT

DATE THAT EFFORTS ON JULY TWENTYSEVEN AND TWENTYEIGHT, LAST,

END PAGE ONE

CC 150
AUG 11 1971

MP 65-1447

PAGE TWO

TO LOCATE [REDACTED] PERTAINING TO VEHICLE LEASED ON
[REDACTED] NINETEEN SEVENTY, BY INDIVIDUAL UTILIZING
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAVE THUS FAR BEEN FRUITLESS. [REDACTED] ADVISED IT
WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY AID [REDACTED] IN LOCATING SAID RECORDS IF
THEY KNEW THE INVOICE NUMBER WHICH APPEARS ON ALL COPIES OF
RECEIPTS OR INVOICES FOR SUCH TRANSACTIONS.

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT REVIEW OF RECORDS
OF HER OFFICE REVEALED NO ONE RENTED CAR THERE ON [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] NINETEEN SEVENTY, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] LAST, UNDER NAME OF ELLSBERG.

BOSTON ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN [REDACTED] INVOICE
NUMBER APPEARING ON ELLSBERG'S [REDACTED]
INDICATING HIS [REDACTED] WAS USED TO LEASE VEHICLE
IN MINNEAPOLIS AREA [REDACTED] SEVENTY.

AIRMAIL COPIES SENT EL PASO AND LOS ANGELES.

P.

END

G TMT FBI WA

cc - c O Brennan

11 Seal
b5
X

AX 65-67

PAGE FIVE

IT IS BEING LEFT TO DISCRETION OF BUREAU AND OO WHETHER
EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO INTERVIEW [REDACTED]
AT U. S. NAVY INSTALLATION ON RAF BASE AT EDSALL, SCOTLAND.

RE BUREAU AIRTEL INSTRUCTS CONTACT OF LOGICAL SOURCES AND
INFORMANTS IN THE ESTABLISHED LEFT, THE NEW LEFT, PEACE GROUPS
AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS OF A SUBVERSIVE NATURE FOR INFORMATION
BEARING ON ELLSBERG'S PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTIONS WITH SUCH
GROUPS. ALEXANDRIA CONTACTED SOURCES AND INFORMANTS IN THIS
CONNECTIONS ON JULY FIFTEEN LAST, WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS AND SUBMITTED
IN TELETYPE DATED JULY SIXTEEN LAST. P

END

GXC FBI WASHDC

-846

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 29 1971

TELETYPE

NR 002 EP CODE

*340PM 7-29-71 URGENT DWB

TO DIRECTOR (65-74060) ATTN DID
LOS ANGELES (105-27952)
NEW YORK (65-25641)
FROM EL PASO (65-1019) P

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

MC LEK (NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE) OO LA

RE EP NITEL TO BUREAU, JULY TWENTYEIGHT, LAST.

LOS ANGELES: IMMEDIATELY CONTACT [REDACTED]

END PAGE ONE

"cc to [REDACTED] 150
data deleted"

PAGE TWO

[REDACTED] WHO IS HOLDING PASSENGER NAME LIST SHOWING TRAVEL BY ELLSBERG.
FOR EXAMINATION BY BUAGENT. IMMEDIATELY CONTACT [REDACTED]
PASSENGER REFUNDS AND TICKET USEAGE DATA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO IS HOLDING
MEMORANDUM COPY OF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] FOR BUREAU AGENTS AND OBTAIN
ALL PERTINENT DATA RE TRAVEL.

NEW YORK: CONTACT [REDACTED]
FOR ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION REGARDING [REDACTED] ISSUED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], SEVENTY, SET FORTH ABOVE.

END

cc - C. D. Brennan

*Lead
X*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 29 1971

TELETYPE

NR008 CV CODE

8:27 PM PM URGENT 7/29/71 CLP

TO DIRECTOR (65-74060) (ATTN: DID)

FROM CLEVELAND (65-3521)

~~SECRET~~

REC-24

Mr. T
Mr. F
Mr. S
Mr. M
Mr. B
Mr. Bre
Mr. Cal
Mr. Cas
Mr. Co
Mr. Da
Mr. Gal
Mr. Por
Mr. Ros
Mr. Taw
Mr. Wall
Mr. Soy
Tele. Ro
Miss Hol
Miss Gant

MC LEK (NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE), OO:LA.

RECORDS OF

INDICATED NUMBER

LISTED TO

AND

IS CURRENTLY

AND IS A WELL KNOWN

AND

ADMINISTRATIVE

EX-105

REC-24

65-74060-85

RE BOSTON AIRTEL TO BU, JULY TWENTY SIX, LAST UNDER

MC LEK CAPTION.

12 AUG 4 1971

END PAGE ONE

52 AUG 11 1971
Adm. data deleted

CLASSIFIED BY 6080
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE
5/16/77
LED/Lrb

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES

PAGE TWO

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
REPORT FOLLOWS.

BOSTON AND LOS ANGELES ADVISED BY MAIL.

P

END

EBM FBI WA CLR

cc - C.D. Brennan

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE

5. IDENTIFY, DETERMINE NATURE OF ASSOCIATION AND CONSIDER INTERVIEWS OF SUBSCRIBERS TO AREA CODE TWO ZERO TWO, TELEPHONE NUMBERS OBTAINED FROM RECORDS OF NEW YORK HILTON HOTEL AS HAVING BEEN COLLED FROM SUITES ASSIGNED TO NEW YORK TIMES (NEW YORK AIRTEL SEVEN TWENTY SIX SEVENTYONE.

6. REPORT RESULTS OF WFO INDICES AND CREDIT CHECKS OF SUBSCRIBERS TO TELEPHONE NUMBERS SET FORTH IN BOSTON AIRTEL SEVEN TWELVE SEVENTYONE. IDENTITIES OF SUBSCRIBERS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN WFO TEL SEVEN SIXTEEN LAST.

7. FOLLOW C AND P TELEPHONE COMPANY REGARDING ITS EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN SIGNIFICANCE OF NOTATIONS AND MARKING S ON TELEPHONE TOLL RECORDS OF NEIL SHEEHAN FOR CALLS ONE FOURTEEN LAST TO MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA, AND FOUR EIGHTEEN LAST TO ELKHORN CITY, KENTUCKY, INDICATING THAT CREDITS WERE RECEIVED BY THE SUBSCRIBER BASED UPON SUBSCRIBER'S INQUIRIES. ALSO FOLLOW TELEPHONE COMPANY EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY NUMBERS

END PAGE THREE

-849

PAGE FOUR

FROM WHICH COLLECT CALLS WERE MADE FROM OAKLAND, MARYLAND,
AND CARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA (BUTEL SEVEN TWENTYEIGHT LAST
AND WFO REPORT SEVEN SIX LAST)).

8. FOLLOW WASHINGTON, D.C. [REDACTED] OFFICIALS
REGARDING THEIR EFFORTS TO LOCATE RECORDS OF ELLSBERG'S
REGISTRATION AND TELEPHONE CALLS DURING STAY AT THE HOTEL
[REDACTED] SEVENTY (LOS ANGELES TEL SEVEN TWENTY SIX LAST)).

IT IS NOTED THE HOTEL IS HAVING DIFFICULTIES LOCATING THESE
RECORDS WHICH ARE ON MICROFILM.

9. WILL AT PASSPORT OFFICE, STATE, ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A
PHOTOGRAPH OF [REDACTED] BELIVED THE WIFE OF
[REDACTED] NEW YORK TIMES CORRESPONDENT FOR ASSISTANCE
OF LEGAT HONG KONG [REDACTED].

10. DEVELOP ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND, DETERMINE NATURE OF
RELATIONSHIP AND CONSIDER INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]
THE REGISTRANT OF THE VOLVO AUTO, D.C. LICENSE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], OBSERVED AT ELLSBERG'S RESIDENCE. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

END PAGE FOUR

-849

PAGE FIVE

11. AFFORD COVERAGE OF ELLSBERG'S SCHEDULED APPEARANCE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. AT CLYDE, OF GEORGETOWN, ON EIGHT THREE NEXT (WFO TEL SEVEN TWENTYSEVEN LAST) AND HIS SCHEDULED APPEARANCES IN SEPTEMBER NEXT IN WASHINGTON, D.C., AS ANNOUNCED BY THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES FOR PEACE (WFO TEL SEVEN TWENTYTHREE LAST).

12. INTERVIEW [REDACTED] OF THE COUNSEL FOR A LIVEABLE WORLD FOR PURPOSES OF OBTAINING ANY INFORMATION IN HIS POSSESSION REGARDING ELLSBERG, PARTICULARLY ELLSBERT'S ALLEDED ATTEMPT TO FURNISH PEOPLE ON CAPITOL HILL CLASSIFIED INFORMATION [REDACTED]

13. REVIEW RESULTS OF WFO INVESTIGATION TO DATE TO INSURE THAT ANY INFORMATION EVIDENCING A POSSIBLE CONSPIRACY BY NEW LEFT ELEMENTS WITH ELLSBERG IS INDICATED.

14. WFO SUBMIT UP TO DATE REPORT SEVEN THIRTY NEXT.

END

TRC FBI WDC

cc - C.D. Brennan

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 29 1971
my
TELETYPE

NR 008 BS C O D E

3:40PM URGENT 7-29-71 JAM

TO: DIRECTOR 65-74060 ATTN: DOMINTEL

WJ
LOS ANGELES 105-27952

NEW YORK 65-25641


WASHINGTON FIELD 65-11613

FROM: BOSTON 65-5236 THREE PAGES

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

MC LEK - NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE.

RE BUREAU TEL, JULY TWENTYTHREE, LAST, REQUESTING
RECIPIENT OFFICES TO SET FORTH LEADS AND/OR PROPOSED
ACTION BY COB, THIS DATE. FOLLOWING LEADS ARE SET OUT:

ONE: OBTAIN ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND AND PHOTOGRAPH
OF , "THE NEW YORK TIMES" REPRESENTATIVE

sub
TWO: OBTAIN WRITINGS OF DANIEL ELLSBERG AT HARVARD
AND MIT AND FURNISH TO BUREAU.

THREE: WILL IDENTIFY SUBSCRIBERS TO CALLS EMANATING
FROM HILTON HOTEL TO BOSTON AREA RESIDENTS.

FOUR: WILL ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE DISPOSITION OF ONE
HUNDRED DOLLAR WESTERN UNION DRAFT RECEIVED BY NEIL
SHEEHAN.

END PAGE ONE

57 AUG 11 1971


~~"cc to FBI LSA"~~
~~Adm. detached~~

12 AUG 4 1971

gmb

Memorandum to C. D. Brennan
RE: MC LEK
65-74060

Records of the Rand Corporation at Santa Monica, California, were reviewed yesterday for details of travel conducted by Daniel Ellsberg while employed with that firm as a consultant. These records have revealed extensive travel throughout the United States between dates in December, 1968, through March, 1970. The purposes of these various trips as noted in the records reveal Ellsberg's intent to contact public information officers at the United States Department of State, discussions with Dr. Kissinger at the White House, attendance at high-level symposiums and conferences on the Vietnam situation and other international conferences related to projects on which Ellsberg was conducting research. Appropriate leads are being set out to ascertain details of this travel and to pin down identities of persons contacted looking toward their interviews if believed necessary.



ACTION:

For information.

Investigation continues to receive intensive investigative attention, and you will be advised of pertinent developments.

Pertinent portions of data herein will be included in a weekly memorandum to the White House and will be furnished to the Attorney General, as well as Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division.

✓

WEL *WBS* *WBS* *WBS* *WBS*

BS 65-5236

PAGE TWO

FIVE: WILL CONTINUE TO CONVASS OLD AND NEW LEFT SOURCES.

SIX: CONSIDER INTERVIEW OF MRS. TWADDELL WHO WAS CALLED BY PATRICIA ELLSBERG ON THE EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYONE LAST.

SEVEN: WILL IDENTIFY AND INTERVIEW SUBSCRIBERS TO TELEPHONE NUMBERS CALLED FROM THE APARTMENT OF SPENCER MARX, APARTMENT OF DANIEL ELLSBERG AT TEN HILLIARD ST. IN CAMBRIDGE, AND APARTMENT OF PATRICIA ELLSBERG IN NEW YORK.

EIGHT: WILL FOLLOW GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS.

NINE: WILL CONTINUE ANALYSIS OF ELLSBERG BANK ACCOUNTS.

TEN: WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW PROFESSOR STANLEY HOFFMAN, PRESENTLY IN TRAVEL STATUS.

ELEVEN: WILL AWAIT DEPARTMENT DECISION WITH RESPECT TO ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA TO WESTERN UNION FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING FIVE HUNDRED DOLLAR DRAFT RECEIVED BY NEIL SHEEHAN.

END PAGE TWO

BS 65-5236

PAGE THREE

TWELVE: WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN PHOTOGRAPH OF DEREK //X
SHEARER FOR DISPLAY TO ELLSBERG CHILDREN BY LOS ANGELES. [REDACTED]

THIRTEEN: WILL INTERVIEW [REDACTED], RECIPIENT //X
OF TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE HILTON HOTEL IN NEW YORK BY [REDACTED]
"THE NEW YORK TIMES" STAFF.

FOURTEEN: WILL INTERVIEW [REDACTED] RECIPIENT OF /Lead
TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE HILTON HOTEL IN NEW YORK BY "THE X
NEW YORK TIMES" STAFF.

END

AJP FBI WASH DC

CLR

cc - c O'Brien.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 29 1971

TELETYPE

NR 004 DN CODE

457 PM URGENT 7-29-71 JSG

TO: DIRECTOR (65-74060) ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
AND LOS ANGELES (105-27952) DIVISION
FROM: DENVER (105-4507) 1P

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

MC LEK (NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

SUBPOENAS RECEIVED FROM LOS ANGELES WERE SERVED THIS DATE AT TWELVE FIFTY P.M. (MDT) ON BERTRAM ARNOLD WALLRICH AND ANNE MARIE GUILFOILE AT SEVEN ZERO ONE SOUTH WASHINGTON STREET IN DENVER WITHOUT INCIDENT BY SA [REDACTED] BOTH INDIVIDUALS IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED USM'S OFFICE, DENVER, COLORADO, AND REQUESTED MONETARY ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO MAKE THEIR APPEARANCE IN LOS ANGELES. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY LOS ANGELES FOR USA'S OFFICE THERE TO CONTACT USM, DENVER, AND AUTHORIZE ADVANCE OF MONIES NECESSARY.

SUBPOENAS ARE BEING FURNISHED TO LOS ANGELES OFFICE UNDER SEPARATE COVER FOR RETURN TO USA'S OFFICE THERE.

END TELE

EBM FBI WA CLR

EX-105 REC-24

65-74060-

12 AUG 4 1971

"[REDACTED] data deleted"

Ref - C.O. Brennan
AUG 11 1971

851

Jan 15

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : C. D. Brennan

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: MC LEK
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

1 - Mr. W. J. Sullivan
1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop

DATE: 7/30/71

1 - Mr. D. J. Dalbey
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. R. Wagoner

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

To summarize for information data received during the night from offices involved in our continuing investigation of the leak of classified information to "The New York Times."

The Denver and San Francisco offices yesterday served subpoenas on Bertram Arnold Wallrich and Anne Marie Guilfoile at Denver, and on Spencer B. Marx at Big Sur, California. All three are to report for appearances before the Federal Grand Jury at Los Angeles on the morning of Tuesday, 8/3/71.

When Spencer B. Marx was interviewed earlier, he claimed he had left Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 11/70 and had not returned to his Cambridge, Massachusetts, apartment since that time. Investigation at Boston yesterday revealed that a former student at Tufts University, one Carter DePaul, had befriended Marx at the commune in Big Sur, California, where Marx currently resides. DePaul used a portion of the Marx apartment in Cambridge in late February, 1971, and while entertaining a visitor in that apartment, the visitor met Spencer B. Marx who was occupying the other portion of the apartment at that time.

We had received earlier information that Neil Sheehan, a reporter of "The New York Times" who allegedly copied documents in this matter made available to him by Ellsberg in Cambridge 3/21-23/71, arrived in Cambridge on 3/20/71. He took up residence at the Treadway Motor House and on 3/21/71 made a series of calls to local locksmith companies for purposes as yet unknown. The hotel telephone records of calls are not maintained in such a manner as to reveal whether these calls were actually completed or if, in fact, the calls were unanswered by parties called by Sheehan. Employees of the locksmith companies involved have been interviewed and without exception have advised they had no business hours on Sunday (3/21/71 being a Sunday). Boston continues to contact other locksmith companies for information which would shed light on reason for Sheehan's attempts to contact a locksmith firm.

65-74060

51 AUG 11 1971 (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 30 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

WNR 020 LA CODE

947 PM IMMEDIATE 7-19-71 RWM

TO DIRECTOR (65-74060) ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

BOSTON (65-236)

SAN FRANCISCO

FROM LOS ANGELES (105-27952) 2P.

MC LEX. NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE.

REBUTEL TO LA JULY TWENTY EIGHT LAST AND WFO AIRTEL
TO DIRECTOR JULY TWENTY SIX LAST, NO COPY TO SAN FRANCISCO.

REBUTEL DIRECTED LA TO CAREFULLY REVIEW DETAILS SET
FORTH IN APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT SUBMITTED
BY ELLSBERG DATED AUGUST FOUR NINETEEN SIXTY FOUR, FOR
IDENTITIES OF INDIVIDUALS SUSCEPTIBLE TO INTERVIEW REGARDING
ELLSBERG AS LEADS FOR OBTAINING ADDITIONAL
BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING HIS ACTIVITIES DURING
PERTINENT PERIOD OF INSTANT INVESTIGATION. LEADS OBTAINED
FROM SUCH A REVIEW SHOULD BE SET OUT BY TELETYPE FOR
INSTRUCTIONS FOR IMMEDIATE INTERVIEW. SUBMISSION OF PERTINENT
RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU BY TELETYPE
AND IMMEDIATE SUBMISSION OF INVESTIGATIVE REPORT THEREAFTER.

END PAGE ONE

51 AUG 11 1971

EX-105
REC-24

65-74060-854

AUG 4 1971

PAGE TWO

A REVIEW OF THIS APPLICATION WHICH IS FURNISHED IN WASHINGTON FIELD AIRTEL REVEALS THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE NOT YET BEEN INTERVIEWED AND WOULD APPEAR TO BE RECEPTIVE TO INTERVIEW, THEREFORE, UNLESS ADVISED TO THE CONTRARY, LOS ANGELES WILL INTERVIEW BURTON KLEIN WHO AS OF NINETEEN SIXTY FOUR WAS THE ECONOMICS DIVISION HEAD, RAND CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA. HE WAS LISTED BY ELLSBERG AS HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR AT RAND CORPORATION AT THAT TIME.

lead
X
RA

INDICES OF THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE CONTAIN NO UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION PERTAINING TO KLEIN.

CRANE BRINTON AS OF NINETEEN FIFTY NINE WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE SOCIETY OF FELLOWS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS. HE WAS LISTED BY ELLSBERG AS HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR.

lead
BS
X

CHARLES J. HITCH AS OF NINETEEN SIXTY FOUR WAS ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, D.C. HE IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, WHO ELLSBERG LISTED AS A REFERENCE.

lead
SF
X

THE BOSTON AND SAN FRANCISCO DIVISIONS UNLESS INFORMATION WOULD PRECLUDE SUCH AN INTERVIEW, SHOULD CONDUCT THE NECESSARY INVESTIGATION AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED BUTEL.

END

W

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 30 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

NR 02 CO CODE

422 PM URGENT 7-30-71 TLC

TO DIRECTOR (65-74060)

(ATTENTION: DOMINTEL)

FROM COLUMBIA (65-76) (3P)

MC LEK - NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE

B. APPROX 1916

RE BOSTON AIRTEL TO BUREAU, JULY TWENTY SIX, SEVENTY ONE.

TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SUBSCRIBED TO BY [REDACTED]

MALE, APPROXIMATELY SIXTY FIVE YEARS, FORMERLY EMPLOYED AS

EFFICIENCY EXPERT FOR [REDACTED] A WELL KNOWN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IS RETIRED BUT STILL ACTS

AS [REDACTED] TRAVELLING FREQUENTLY TO EUROPE. [REDACTED]

HAS IN THE PAST ACTIVELY SUPPORTED THE [REDACTED]

END PAGE ONE

REC-24
EX-105

65-14060-855

12 AUG 4 1971

51 AUG 11 1971

PAGE TWO

[REDACTED] IS WELL KNOWN TO AND A NEIGHBOR OF SRA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] STATES [REDACTED] IS EXTREMELY ARROGANT AND OVERBEARING INDIVIDUAL AND HAS IN THE PAST WRITTEN LETTERS TO THE EDITOR OF THE LOCAL NEWSPAPER. HE STATED THESE LETTERS, AS HE RECALLS, RELATED TO THE NATION'S ECONOMIC SITUATION. SA [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT IF INTERVIEWED RE INSTANT CALL, IT IS POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF [REDACTED] PERSONALITY THAT [REDACTED] MAY BECOME INCENSED AND PUBLICIZE INTERVIEW THROUGH SOME NEWS MEDIA. SA [REDACTED] SAID IT IS POSSIBLE, BECAUSE OF HIS ACQUAINTANCE WITH [REDACTED] THAT HE CAN INTERVIEW [REDACTED] WITHOUT [REDACTED] BECOMING INCENSED BUT STATED [REDACTED] REACTION IS UNPREDICTABLE. ✓

SA [REDACTED] ADVISED HE KNOWS OF NO ASSOCIATION BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND ELLSBERG OR THE NEW YORK TIMES. HE STATED [REDACTED] IS A CONSERVATIVE AND HE DOES NOT BELIEVE [REDACTED] WOULD ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH THE LEFT OR NEW LEFT.

COLUMBIA INDICES NEGATIVE RE [REDACTED]

UACB, [REDACTED] WILL BE INTERVIEWED BY SA [REDACTED] ON [REDACTED] AUGUST TWO, SEVENTY ONE.

END PAGE TWO

CO 65-76

PAGE THREE

AIRMAIL COPIES BEING FURNISHED TO BOSTON AND LOS ANGELES
DIVISIONS .

END

TMT FBI WA

JUL 30 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	CDV ✓
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Pender	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

NR009 CE PLAIN

10:00 PM NITEL 7-30-71 ESB

TO: DIRECTOR (65-74060) ATTN: DID

ALEXANDRIA

KNOXVILLE

ATLANTA

LOS ANGELES (105-27952)

BALTIMORE

MEMPHIS

BUTTE

MOBILE

CINCINNATI

NEWARK

COLUMBIA

NEW ORLEANS

DALLAS

NEW YORK (65-25641)

JACKSONVILLE

NORFOLK

KANSAS

PITTSBURG

SAN FRANCISCO

WFO (65-11613)

ALL OFFICES VIA WASHINGTON

FROM: CHARLOTTE (65-1767)

EX-105 REC-24

REV-74060 756

12 AUG 4 1971

MC LEK (NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

RE BOSTON AIRTEL TO BUREAU, JULY TWENTYSIX, SEVENTYONE, AND
BUREAU TELETYPE TO CHARLOTTE AND LOS ANGELES, JULY TWENTYNINE,
SEVENTYONE.

NEW YORK TIMES A SERIES OF ARTICLES BASED ON TOP

SECRET DOCUMENTS. THE DOCUMENTS ARE COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS

END PAGE ONE TELETYPE TO:

ALL OFFICES

cc. C. D. Brennan

PAGE TWO

QUOTE MC NAMARA STUDY END QUOTE. ATTORNEY GENERAL REQUESTED FBI TO CONDUCT ALL NECESSARY INVESTIGATION. THE BUREAU HAS INSTRUCTED ALL INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED IMMEDIATELY AND THE RESULTS FURNISHED BY TELETYPE UNDER ABOVE CAPTION.

THE NEW YORK TIMES PERSONNEL UTILIZED SUITE OF ROOMS AT HILTON HOTEL, NEW YORK CITY, DURING THE PERIOD APRIL TWENTYTWO, SEVENTYONE, THROUGH JULY , SEVENTYONE, IN THE PREPARATION OF THE INFORMATION FOR PUBLICATION. THE NEW YORK HILTON HOTEL MADE AVAILABLE RECORD OF TOLL CALLS MADE FROM THIS SUITE DURING THIS PERIOD. IN ANSWER TO SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM ISSUED BOSTON, MASS., BY DEPUTY CHIEF, CRIMINAL SECTION, INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

REFERENCED BOSTON AIRTEL LIST CALLS MADE FROM SUITE OF ROOMS WHICH INCLUDED TWO THREE MINUTE CALLS FROM ROOM ONE THREE ONE ZERO TO TELEPHONE NUMBER ⁹ ¹ ⁹ ⁸ ³ ³ NINE ONE NINE DASH EIGHT THREE THREE DASH ⁵ ⁷ ⁷ ¹ FIVE SEVEN SEVEN ONE, FIRST CALL MADE TEN TWENTYSIX, P.M., JUNE
END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

TEN, SEVENTYONE, SECOND CALL TWO HOURS LATER MADE TWELVE EIGHTEEN
A.M., JUNE ^EELVEN, SEVENTYONE. TELEPHONE NUMBER ^{9 1 9}NINE ONE NINE
^{8 8 1 3 5 7 7 1}DASH EIGHT THREE THREE DASH FIVE SEVEN SEVEN ONE, LISTED TO THE
DOWNTOWNER MOTOR INN, THREE ZERO NINE HILLSBOROUGH STREET, RALEIGH,
N.C.

THE BUREAU HAS INSTRUCTED THE IDENTITY OF ALL GUESTS REGISTERED
AT THIS DOWNTOWNER MOTOR INN ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE TEN,
SEVENTYONE, BE IDENTIFIED UNLESS INVESTIGATION CAN ~~NOT~~ DEFINITELY *IDENTIFY*
INDIVIDUAL WHO RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALLS FROM SUITE OF ROOMS UTILIZED
BY NEW YORK TIMES PERSONNEL AT HILTON HOTEL DURING LATE EVENING OF
JUNE TEN, SEVENTYONE, AND EARLY MORNING OF JUNE ELEVEN, SEVENTYONE.
CHARLOTTE INSTRUCTED TO SET OUT LEADS BY NITEL FOR OFFICES COVERING:
RESIDENCES OF DOWNTOWNER GUESTS TO FURTHER IDENTIFY SAME.

RECIPIENT OFFICES ARE TO SIMILARLY ADVISE BUREAU AND
LOS ANGELES RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION OF DOWNTOWNER GUESTS.
END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

INVESTIGATION TO BE LIMITED TO IDENTIFY^T OF GUESTS AND NO
INTERVIEWS ARE TO BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT BUREAU AUTHORITY.

BUREAU INSTRUCTS OFFICES TO REMAIN ALERT TO POSSIBILITY
GUESTS INVOLVED COULD BE RELATIVES OF NEW YORK TIMES PERSONNEL ENGAGED
IN CLADE^NSTINE RESEARCH AT NEW YORK OFFICE. IN THIS CONNECTION,
NEIL SHEEHAN, HENDRICK SMITH, E.W. KENWORTHY AND FOX BUTTERFIELD,
ALL EMPLOYEES OF THIS NEWSPAPER HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS WORKING
IN THE NEW YORK HILTON SUITE.

THE RALEIGH, N.C., [REDACTED] GUESTS FOR THE NIGHT
OF JUNE TEN, SEVENTYONE DASH JUNE ELEVEN, SEVENTYONE, ARE AS
FOLLOWS:

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ↓

END PAGE FOUR

PAGE FIVE

ATLANTA DIVISION:

CO.

BALTIMORE DIVISION:

END PAGE FIVE

PAGE SIX

BUTTE DIVISION:

CINCINNATI DIVISION:

COLUMBIA DIVISION:

DALLAS DIVISION:

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION:

END PAGE SIX

PAGE SEVEN

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
KANSAS CITY DIVISION:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
KNOXVILLE DIVISION:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
MEMPHIS DIVISION:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
MOBILE DIVISION:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
END PAGE SEVEN

PAGE EIGHT

NEWARK DIVISION:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NEW ORLEANS DIVISION:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

END PAGE EIGHT

[REDACTED]

PAGE NINE

NEW YORK DIVISION:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NORFOLK DIVISION:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PITTSBURG DIVISION:

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

END PAGE NINE

[REDACTED]

PAGE FOURTEEN



EACH OFFICE HANDLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ABOVE BUREAU
INSTRUCTIONS.

END

~~CORR TIME SHD BE 10:00 PM~~

~~CORR PAGE THREE, SEC. PAR., THIRD LINE AFTER DEFINITELY SHD~~

~~BE IDENTIFY~~

~~OK~~

EBM FBI WA CLR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 30 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

NR 010 MM CODE

723PM URGENT 7-30-71 CLS

TO DIRECTOR 65-74060 ATTN--DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

BOSTON 65-5236

LOS ANGELES 105-27952

ALEXANDRIA

WASHINGTON FIELD 65-11613

NEW YORK 65-25641

FROM MIAMI 65-3264 4P

MCLEK, NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE. 00--LOS ANGELES.

RE MIAMI TELETYPE JULY TWENTY SEVEN LAST; LOS ANGELES
SUMMARY TELETYPE JULY THIRTY INSTANT.

FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALEXANDRIA, REFERENCED LOS ANGELES
TELETYPE SET FORTH A RECORD OF OFFICIAL TRAVEL BY DANIEL
ELLSBERG AS OBTAINED FROM THE RAND CORPORATION. LOS ANGELES
REQUESTED THAT INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN THE RECORD BE
IDENTIFIED AND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO INTERVIEW RELATIVE
TO ELLSBERG. THE TRAVEL INVOLVING MIAMI WAS AS FOLLOWS:

NOVEMBER TEN TO ELEVEN NINETEEN SIXTY-NINE, LOS ANGELES

END PAGE ONE

51 AUG 11 1971
"cc to [redacted] 150
[redacted] completed"

EX-105 REC-24
12 AUG 4 1971

MM 65-74060

PAGE TWO

TO MIAMI TO ATTEND ORSA. PERSON VISITED - [REDACTED]
PURPOSE WAS TO PARTICIPATE AS PANEL MEMBER, "BEGINNING
THEORY AND ARMS CONTROL". PLACE OF RESIDENCE - "BELMORAL
HOTEL, MIAMI".

MIAMI INDICES NEGATIVE REGARDING [REDACTED]
MIAMI DIRECTORIES CONTAIN INFORMATION REGARDING [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS CONTACTED JULY THIRTY INSTANT
AND ADVISED ELLSBERG WAS UNKNOWN TO HIM.
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, ADVISED ON JULY
THIRTY INSTANT THAT [REDACTED] REFLECTED THE [REDACTED]
OF DANIEL ELLSBERG, TWO ZERO SEVEN FIVE TWO PACIFIC COAST
HIGHWAY, MALIBU, CALIFORNIA. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE RECORD INDICATED HE WAS ATTENDING A
CONFERENCE OF ORSA AT THE AMERICANA HOTEL [REDACTED]
ORSA WAS THE ABBREVIATION FOR OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY
OF AMERICA.

PAGE THREE

[REDACTED] HAD NO RECORD OF A REGISTRATION FOR [REDACTED] BUT SUGGESTED HE WAS PROBABLY REGISTERED AT THE AMERICANA HOTEL.

[REDACTED] MIAMI BEACH, ADVISED ON JULY THIRTY INSTANT THAT HE HAD NO RECORD OF [REDACTED] AS A GUEST AT ANY TIME. HE PRODUCED A RECORD REFLECTING THE REGISTRATION OF [REDACTED] ON NOVEMBER NINE NINETEEN SIXTY- NINE. THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS ASSOCIATED WITH ORSA AND FURNISHED HIS HOME ADDRESS AS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE DEPARTED ON NOVEMBER TWELVE NINETEEN SIXTY NINE. MIAMI INDICES NEGATIVE.

WITH REFERENCE TO MIAMI TELTYPE OF JULY TWENTY SEVEN, LAST, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADVISED ON JULY THIRTY INSTANT THAT HE COULD LOCATE NO RECORD WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS EVER USED. HE STATED IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE FROM THIS SERIAL NUMBER, SPECIFICALLY FROM THE FOURTH, FIFTH AND SIXTH DIGITS, NAMESLY ONE SIX EIGHT,
END PAGE THREE

MM 65-74060

PAGE FOUR

THAT THIS WAS AN "EXECUTIVE TICKET" MEANING A TICKET WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL COULD PICK UP AT THE COUNTER AND WRITE ON HIS OWN, SETTING FORTH A CREDIT ACCOUNT NUMBER. IT WOULD NOT BE ISSUED AS A REGULAR TICKET. EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH OF

[REDACTED] FAILED TO LOCATE THIS TICKET INDICATING IT PROBABLY WAS NEVER USED.

[REDACTED] FURTHER ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] WAS USED ON MAY EIGHT NINETEEN SEVENTY ON [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THE IDENTITY OF THE [REDACTED] INASMUCH AS THE [REDACTED] ITSELF HAS BEEN DESTROYED SINCE IT IS MORE THAN ONE YEAR OLD.

ALEXANDRIA IS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY [REDACTED]

AND CONSIDER INTERVIEW OF HIM RELATIVE TO ELLSBERG.

REPORT FOLLOWS.

END

EBM FBI WA ACLR

W. C. D. Brimmer

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

NR010 BA CODED

JUL 30 1971

11:27 PM PM NITEL 7-30-71 TJP

TELETYPE

TO DIRECTOR (65-47060)

ALEXANDRIA (65-67)

BOSTON (65-5236)

NEW YORK (65-25641)

WFO (65-11613)

FROM BALTIMORE (65-3896)

MC LEK; NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE.

RE ALEXANDRIA TEL TO BUREAU, JULY TWENTYNINE LAST.

[REDACTED] INTERVIEWED TODAY AT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND DENIED RECEIVING INSTANT CALL OR

OF HAVING ANY KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING SAME. [REDACTED] ADVISED

THAT THE NAMES NEIL SHEEHAN AND SAMUEL JOHNSON WERE NOT

FAMILIAR TO HIM AND THAT HE KNEW OF DANIEL ELLSBERG ONLY

BECAUSE OF RECENT PUBLICITY. [REDACTED] STATED IT

WAS NOT UNCOMMON TO RECEIVE CALLS INTENDED FOR ANOTHER

SECTION SINCE THAT PARTICULAR NUMBER IS TIED IN WITH

THE PENTAGON SWITCHBOARD. [REDACTED] COULD FURNISH

NO INFORMATION CONCERNING INSTANT CALL.

END

REC-24

EX-105

65-74060-859

AUG 4 1971

67 AUG 11 1971

C.C. C.D. Brennan

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 30 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	CDL
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Pender	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

NR026 BS CODE

11:21 PM URGENT 7-30-71 RGP

TO: DIRECTOR 65-74060 ATTN DID LOS ANGELES 105-27952

NEW YORK 65-25641 WFO 65-11613

FROM: BOSTON 65-5236

MC LEK - NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE.

SUMMARY:

THE FOLLOWING LOCK COMPANIES AND LOCKSMITHS WERE CONTACTED THIS DATE AND COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS INVESTIGATION REGARDING TELEPHONE CALLS TO LOCKSMITH COMPANIES ON MARCH TWENTYONE, LAST, FROM ROOM TWO ONE FIVE, TREADWAY MOTOR HOUSE, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

H. SUMMERS AND SON, THIRTYEIGHT CHARLES ST., BOSTON,

EX-105

REC-24

65-74060-860

DICKSON BROTHERS HARDWARE, TWENTYSIX BRATTLE ST., CAMBRIDGE, [REDACTED] 12 AUG 4 1971

STEEVES HARDWARE STORE, ONE THREE SIX ONE BEACON ST., BROOKLINE, [REDACTED]

END PAGE ONE

67 AUG 11 1971

PASEK CORP., ONE THREE FIVE HARRISON AVE., BOSTON,

[REDACTED]
SWANSONS KEY SHOP , SIX SEVEN FIVE TREMONT ST., BOSTON,

[REDACTED]
STOIA BROTHERS , NINE ZERO SIX BEACON ST., BOSTON,

[REDACTED]
BROOKLINE LOCK CO. AND SECURITY SUPPLY CO., BOTH
THIRTYTHREE HARVARD ST., BROOKLINE, AND AAA LOCK CO.,
FOUR ONE FOUR ZERO WASHINGTON ST., ROSLINDALE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CHARLES STREET SUPPLY CO., FIFTYFOUR CHARLES ST.,
BOSTON, [REDACTED]

CHARLES J. ROWE, INC., ONE ONE ONE NORTH WASHINGTON
ST., BOSTON [REDACTED]

HAZETON CHAIN CO., EIGHTYONE KEMBLE ST., ROXBURY,
[REDACTED]

ABBOTT AND CO., AND M.J. REINHARDT CO., BOTH FORTYNINE
MASSACHUSETTS AVE., BOSTON, [REDACTED]

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

BS 65-5236

ACE BICYCLE SHOP, TWO ZERO FOUR FOUR MASSACHUSETTS
AVE., CAMBRIDGE , AND ACE BICYCLE SHOP, SEVEN ZERO THREE
BROADWAY, SOMERVILLE, [REDACTED]

BACK BAY LOCK AND SAFE CO.; ABC LOCK AND KEY SERVICES;
ABAC AND SONS, LOCKSMITHS; AND MATTAPAN LOCK, ALL SEVEN
SEVEN THREE HUNTINGTON AVE., BOSTON , [REDACTED]

KELLY AND BRUMMITT CO., THIRTYTHREE ROXBURY ST.,
ROXBURY [REDACTED]

CASTLE SQUARE SUPERMARKET, FOUR EIGHT SEVEN TREMONT
ST., BOSTON , [REDACTED]

HUHUB DOOR CHECK CO., THIRTYSIX BROMFIELD ST., BOSTON,
[REDACTED]

COMMONWEALTH LOCKCO., ONE EIGHT FIVE THREE
MASSACHUSETTS AVE., CAMBRIDGE [REDACTED]

ALBERTINES KEY SERVICE , SIX FOUR SIX SOMERVILLE
AVE., SOMERVILLE , [REDACTED]

CITY HALL LOCK AND KEY SHOP, THIRTYTWO PROVINCE ST.,
BOSTON, [REDACTED]

END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

BS 65-5236

BELTRAM AND SON, SEVENTYTWO HOLLAND ST., SOMERVILLE,
[REDACTED]

ARTERY LOCK SERVICE, FOURTEEN MAIN ST., MEDFORD,
[REDACTED]

BEACON LOCK CO., ONE NINE ZERO WALNUT ST., WATERTOWN,
[REDACTED]

BILLS LOCK AND KEY CO., ONE ZERO THREE A ALBION ST.,
WAKEFIELD, [REDACTED]

DOMINEC MORGERA, NINE PORTER ST., EAST BOSTON,
[REDACTED]

MC CORMACKS LOCK SERVICE EIGHTYTWO CIRCUIT RD.,
WEYMOUTH [REDACTED]

JOHN J. MANTIA, FIVE MAIN ST., QUINCY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

QUINCY LOCK CO., SIX SIX SEVEN HANCOCK ST., QUINCY,
[REDACTED]

PARK SLAES SERVICE AND SONS, FIVE ONE ZERO SOMERVILLE
AVE., SOMERVILLE [REDACTED]

END PAGE FOUR

PAGE FIVE

BS 65-5236

JACOBS BROTHERS AND GREEN, FOUR FOUR SIX BLUE HILL
AVE ., ROXBURY, [REDACTED]

BROADWAY LOCK CO. AND BOSTON GRINDING CO., THREE ONE
THREE BROADWAY, SOUTH BOSTON, [REDACTED]

CHARLES H. FISHER AND CO., FORTY FOUR BROOKLINE ST.,
CAMBRIDGE, [REDACTED]

END PAGE P FIVE

PAGE SIX

BS 65-5236

ADMINISTRATIVE:

RE LOS ANGELES TEL , JULY TWENTYNINE , LAST , WHICH ON
PAGE TWO LISTED A CRANE BRINTON AS OF NINETEEN FIFTYNINE
AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SOCIETY OF FELLOWS , HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE , AND IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR OF ELLSBERG . PERSONNEL,
HISTORY DEPARTMENT , HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, INSTANT
DATE, ADVISED CRANE BRINTON , FORMER PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT
AND MODERN HISTORY, IS DECEASED.

[REDACTED] UNAVAILABLE UNTIL NEXT WEEK , AT WHICH TIME
HE WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT THE BOSTON OFFICE FOR
INTERVIEW.

IN RESPONSE TO BUREAU AIRTEL , JULY TWENTYONE , LAST ,
POSITIVE RESULTS OF INDICES SEARCH AND SOURCE CONTACT ,
HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN FURNISHED BUREAU IN FOLLOWING
COMMUNICATIONS IN CAPTIONED MATTER:

BOSTON AIRTEL ANS LHM , JUNE EIGHTEEN . LAST;

BOSTON SUMMARY NITEL SENT FOUR A.M. , JULY SEVENTEEN , LAST;

END PAGE SIX

PAGE SEVEN

BS 65-5236

BOSTON SUMMARY NITEL ASENT ONE THIRTYSEIX A.M., JULY
TWENTYTWO, LAST.

INFORMATION CONTAINED IN LATTER MENTIONED TELS TO BE
INCLUDED IN COMMUNICATION SUITABLE FOR DISSEMINATION.
INFORMANTS CONTINUALLY BEING CONTACTED AND ANY PERTINENT
INFORMATION DEVELOPED WILL BE IMMEDIATELY FURNISHED THE
BUREAU.

END

CORRECTION PAGE THREE LINE ELEVEN FIRST WORD SHOULD BE
HUB AND NOT HUHUB ...

C.C. C.D. Brennan